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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/
imagined in contemporary British society if a spectrum of meaning is imagined that posits a 
warrior existing at one extreme and a weapons platform at the other. Located within a 
philosophical setting and indebted to Charles Taylor’s modern social imaginaries, a number of 
sub-questions function as the mechanism used to explore the thesis question in the six 
research chapters which are: 2, Identity and Narrative; 3, Being and Doing; 4, Clausewitz, 
Trinitarian War and New Wars; 5, Selected Societal Factors (Death, Risk, and Post-heroic 
and Feminised Society); 6, The Future Nature of Conflict; and 7, Future Technology.  
This thesis provides a basis by which to evaluate the cultural, practical, philosophical 
and intellectual pressures affecting how the British soldier is envisaged in the UK social 
imaginary. It also offers a functional framework to understand those roles British society is 
prepared to tolerate and validate when deploying and utilising the generic soldier. The main 
conclusions of the research chapters are contained in the following six propositions: 
1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society 
with whom he/she is in relationship. The identity of the soldier does not necessarily 
require a narrative of war.  
2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language 
of ‘being’ and ‘doing’. For the warrior their ‘being’ is intuited in combat; whereas the 
soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output.  
3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative 
deflation in the soldier’s daily experience in non-Western operational settings. 
4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a non- 
apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers. 
5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting 
will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies. 
6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to 
the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
British combat operations will end in Afghanistan in 20141. Although UK Forces 
have been deployed continuously in the country since 2001, the primary focus for the British 
Army since 2006 has been Helmand Province, in the south west of the country.  ‘At its peak, 
in Helmand alone there were 137 UK bases and around 9,500 UK troops’2. British 
operational deployments in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been both costly, in terms of 
‘blood and treasure’3 and controversial, in terms of legitimacy and popularity4. In contrast to 
other operational deployments5, the ferocity of the fighting involving UK Land Forces, first 
in Iraq and more significantly in Afghanistan, combined with significant casualties over a 
prolonged period of time, has generated intense public discussion on why British soldiers 
have fought and died in a country that to many has little to do with the UK6.  
In contrast and as part of the Government’s response to unprecedented flooding across
large swathes of Southern England7, thousands of soldiers were deployed in support of local/
regional agencies8. Images of British soldiers filling sandbags and building flood defences in 
parts of the UK help illustrate the spectrum of activity that may be required of the British 
soldier. From high intensity war-fighting operations in Afghanistan where from 2008 through 
to 2011, 308 British military personnel died in service for their country9, to thousands of 
soldiers serving their country by helping stem rising flood waters.  
In British Military Doctrine, ‘Fighting Power’ is that ‘ability to fight; to engage
combat. It consists of a conceptual component (the ideas behind how to operate and fight), a 
moral component (the ability to get people to operate and fight) and a physical component 
(the means to operate and fight)’10. Every soldier in the British Army does the same phase 1 
training before undertaking specialist phase 2 training appropriate for role. The concept of the 
generic British soldier, for the purpose of this thesis, resides in the common syllabus of 
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universal phase 1 training. There is however, the expectation that the British soldier can 
move, whenever required, seamlessly from filling sandbags for flood defence to high 
intensity combat operations, with the death and casualties involved in this type of operation. 
It is possible that policy makers might sleepwalk into a context where they ask or expect 
soldiers to move seamlessly from tasks in support of local UK authorities (UK Resilience) to 
combat operations in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either 
unable or unwilling to perform that role; or to put it simply, a situation might arise where 
British soldiers choose not to fight. A British Army equivalent of Srebrenica, where Dutch 
peacekeeping soldiers refused to fight and defend a UN ‘safe area’11 or where 15 British 
naval personnel surrendered without firing a shot at elements of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
who approached them in two speed boats12.  
1.1 Research Question and Methodology
This thesis is an examination of the suggestion, that a spectrum or continuum of 
meaning exists upon which the words ‘warrior’ and ‘weapons platform/battlefield technician’ 
may be located; this will be used throughout the thesis as a philosophical thought experiment. 
Therefore, the research question addressed by this thesis is: 
If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us
about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary 
British  society?
This thesis is indebted to Charles Taylor’s philosophical observations concerning 
modern social imaginaries13. According to Taylor, ‘the social imaginary is not a set of ideas; 
rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society’14; it is ‘the ways 
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
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normative notions and images that underlie those expectations’15. His focus is primarily 
Western history and the social imaginary that underpinned the rise of Western modernity16. 
Taylor contends that although our modern social imaginary has been shaped by
influential theories, particularly those of John Locke and Hugo Grotius17 in combination with 
Reformed Theology18, it is not identical with them. The revolutionary nature of the 
consequences contained within the theory associated with Grotius and Locke, Taylor 
observes, would not have been obvious to those who initially embraced them, though they 
seem obvious to us today19. Indeed, ‘modern modes of individualism seemed a luxury, a 
dangerous indulgence’20. However, contained within the logic of the Grotian-Lockean theory 
of the individual were intellectual drivers that would set in motion changes in the way people 
imagined their relationship to each other within a community21. Instead of a social imaginary 
based upon some form of Divine order or Platonic-Aristotelian concept of Form, which 
resulted in a hierarchical sense of society from ‘time out of mind’22, the social imaginary 
began to be infiltrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by ideas based around the 
needs of each member of society as an individual capable of establishing a mutual basis of 
exchange23. 
Inherent within this is the notion of individual rights24, although this took centuries to 
evolve into its present form. Central to the notion of rights, is the associated concept of free 
agency and in this ‘it also reflects the holder’s sense of their own agency and of the situation 
that agency normatively demands in the world, namely, freedom’25. One expression of this is 
the notion of the public sphere. Taylor defines this as ‘a common space in which the 
members of a society are deemed to meet through a variety of media…to discuss matters of 
common interest; and thus be able to form a common mind about these’26. In this space, ‘a 
metaphorical common space’27, people who never met ‘understood themselves to be engaged 
in discussion and capable of reaching a common mind’28. The ‘public sphere is, then, a locus 
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in which rational views are elaborated but should guide government’29. Political power, 
maintains Taylor, is therefore supervised and checked by something outside of that power, 
but is normative for power30. Political power in this view remains outside of but informed by 
the common mind formed in the public sphere and which holds the political power to 
account. Taylor calls this popular sovereignty and is an example of a mutation in the social 
imaginary that has helped constitute modern society31.   
The generic British soldier resides in the imagination of the British public within the 
public sphere and discourse that occurs there. Although political power will deploy and 
utilise the British Army in a variety of operations, it remains subject to supervision and is 
sensitive to any common mind reached within the public sphere. In light of this there are a 
number of sub-questions that may be derived from the main thesis question when viewed 
through the lens of a modern social imaginary.   
• How is identity constructed in contemporary Western society?
• Does narrative shape concepts of identity?
• Is the difference between warrior and battlefield technician the difference between
‘being’ and ‘doing’?
• If the concept of the soldier as weapons platform/battlefield technician represents an
instrumental notion of ontology (i.e. a unit of utility), does a focus on ‘doing’ 
potentially undermine ‘being’ and therefore the sustainment of fighting power?
• What societal factors shape where the generic British soldier might be imagined on
the spectrum?
• Has war, or is war, changing and what impact does this have on the future nature of
conflict and does this in turn impact on what is expected of the generic British 
soldier?
• How does the development of robotic technology impact upon what is expected of
the generic British soldier?
These sub-questions will function as a mechanism by which to explore the implications of the 
main thesis question: 
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If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell 
us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in 
contemporary  British  society?
For additional clarity and to avoid any misunderstanding of the question this thesis is 
examining it is important to state what the thesis is not seeking to address. It will not seek to 
answer the question of whether the British soldier should be thought of as either a ‘warrior’ 
or ‘weapons platform/battlefield technician’. Neither does it seek to suggest or maintain that 
there has been, or is, some ‘progression’ from the notion of the warrior to the concept of the 
weapons platform. The use of either concept (warrior and weapons platform) is solely to 
establish the left and right of arc of the imagined spectrum. The focus of the thesis is not 
therefore the nature of the warrior, or how this has been understood at various times in 
history or for that matter upon the battlefield technician/weapons platform, or on whether or 
not some form of man/machine nexus is emerging. While these are all interesting notions, 
they are not the question this thesis will examine. Rather the idea of a spectrum with Achilles 
and a drone pilot as extreme reference points, establishes the space in which the generic 
British soldier in the twenty-first century may reside in the imaginary of the UK public. The 
factors examined in this thesis will be presented as forces that may influence how this might 
occur. As a concept it can be represented in this fashion:   
In figure 1, the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, whereas the figure on the 
extreme right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield 
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Fig 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
technician. The black figure with a question mark above his head represents the generic 
soldier and the question of where between the left and right of arcs on the spectrum s/he 
should be located in UK social imaginary. The arrows pointing left and right are a pictorial 
representation of the factors that may influence where the generic British soldier is located on 
the imagined spectrum.   
To help illustrate the basic idea further, figure 2 offers a pictorial illustration of how
an apocalyptic form of public narrative (considered in chapter 2, Identity and Narrative) 
could affect where the generic British soldier might be located on the imagined spectrum. If 
an apocalyptic narrative is generally accepted by public opinion as being the dominant 
narrative at the time when the Government decides to commit British soldiers, then it is likely 
that public opinion will accept those soldiers being involved in high intensity combat.   
Apocalyptic narrative 
Fig 2 
Whereas, in a low mimesis narrative situation (considered in chapter 2, Narrative and 
Identity)  an example of which might be UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus, the UK public may not 
accept British soldiers getting involved in high intensity combat but would prefer the distance 
from combat the idea that the battlefield technician suggests. This is illustrated in figure 3. 
Low mimesis 
Fig 3 
In ancient warfare combat was something conducted at close range – hand-to-hand 
fighting with basic implements, clubs, swords, the length of a spear (Hoplite warfare), the 
range a man could throw a spear, hurl a stone from a sling, project an object from some form 
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of ballista etc. In the twenty-first century, however, most Western styled militaries can 
deliver death from across the globe with incredible accuracy. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) for example, which are frequently invisible to those on the ground, can deliver 
significant amounts of ordinance, while the pilot sits half a world away from the death s/he 
has delivered. The space therefore between the two extreme reference points on our imagined 
spectrum from this perspective is physically immense. The development of robotic stand-off 
technology, as chapter 7 Future Technology will demonstrate, has produced the very real 
possibility that individual soldiers will be able to engage targets/enemy at a safe distance 
many miles away from the machines they operate. In this scenario, combat is no longer 
conducted at close range. For the purpose of the thought experiment, the spectrum will also 
function as representing these metaphors: 
Warrior      = ‘at close hand’ and experiences ‘hand-to-hand combat’
Battlefield Tech   = ‘at a distance’ and ‘dislocated experience of the battlefield’
The use of the spectrum within this thesis will also emphasise the relationship of the two 
extremes and death. It can be represented as: 
Warrior       = personal death is potentially immediate and violent in combat
Battlefield Tech   = death is a dislocated task performed in complete physical safety
To illustrate the practical nature of the spectrum in our thought experiment let us 
consider the following. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the warrior as 
someone ‘whose occupation is warfare; a fighting man, whether soldier, sailor, or (latterly) 
airman; a valiant or experienced man of war’. It also defines the soldier as someone who, 
‘serves in an army for pay; one who takes part in military service or warfare’32. In these 
definitions, a soldier might serve a full career and never once be engaged in combat or 
experience the ‘sight picture’33 so powerfully depicted by Karl Marlantes in his book What It 
Is Like To Go To War34. Stacking shelves in a Quartermaster’s Department is an important 
and necessary job, as is being a chef, or a pay clerk. However, many tens of thousands of 
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soldiers have worn their uniforms and performed their respective tasks with dedication and 
the only time they fired their personal weapon was for their mandatory annual test. In 
contrast, a Special Forces Team that performs a Halo jump behind enemy lines on a search, 
capture or destroy mission resides on a different point (whether that is: physically, 
metaphorically, conceptually, philosophically) on our imagined spectrum.  
This thesis will explore six interconnected areas of study that flow from the main
research question and the sub-questions that emerge from that. Together they work as an 
organic whole when viewed in combination, in that each chapter contributes to the 
construction of a framework within which the concept envisaged in the thesis title can be 
imagined and approached. This approach is similar to that taken by John Lynn in his book 
Battle: A History of Combat and Culture. He states that his ‘conclusions do not run through 
the entire volume, growing in mass and velocity from chapter to chapter in order to maximize 
impact’35. Lynn’s idea, as utilised in this thesis may be presented in this fashion: 
8 
Fig 4 
No one chapter, therefore, functions or is expected to be understood as functioning as a nexus 
or crux of the thesis. Each factor/subject examined contributes to the modern social 
imaginary from which an understanding of the generic soldier emerges and is sustained. 
Another mechanism utilised in chapter 8 (Analysis and Discussion) that seeks to work in 
harmony with this is that of a force field analysis: applied in every change management 
programme in the Army. This may be pictorially presented in this fashion: 
If we assume that the section coloured red in figure 5 represents the space in the social 
imaginary occupied by the generic British soldier, the driving forces/forces for change and 
resisting/restraining forces are those aspects within modern UK society that are active in 
influencing where on our imagined spectrum of meaning the soldier is located in the twenty- 
first century UK. Each chapter will examine various factors that will play a part in this 
interaction between driving and restraining forces.   
This thesis will examine topics from a range of academic disciplines; the thesis
question and sub-questions make this unavoidable. Each chapter will address a distinct subject
(s), although in collaboration they are complementary to the whole thesis. Therefore, to offer 
evidence of competence in that subject matter, the amount of material contained in the 
endnotes may be greater that might usually be expected. The use of the word ‘nature’ in the 
title implies a philosophical approach, in that it deliberately seeks to consider the ontological 
character of the British soldier (i.e. what the soldier is, or expected/required to be 
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Fig 5 
in the UK social imaginary). As a consequence, the emphasis will be philosophical rather 
than historical. It will address historical as well as contemporary issues, in order to set the 
subject matter within a relevant context. The metaphysical dimensions of the nature of war, 
are not only philosophical but also historical, sociological and cultural. Each chapter of this 
thesis will analyse a distinct subject matter or group of associated factors that when combined 
may be viewed as a subject area. The unifying tool throughout will be a philosophical tone of 
examination. Other methodologies, such as interviews, questionnaires, statistical analysis, 
ethnographical studies, or discourse analysis were considered as being insufficient to provide 
the metaphysical reflection and subsequent theoretical analysis the research question 
demanded.  
1.2 Literature Review  
This thesis examines topics from a range of academic disciplines. Consequently each 
chapter is its own literature review of the key ideas and scholarly contribution identified for 
examination in each of the specific domains. Therefore, a comprehensive review of the 
breadth of scholarship contained in this thesis would be little more than a reproduction of 
each of the chapters minus their conclusions. This would be both an inadequate approach to 
adopt and unsophisticated. Consequently, the following literature review will not be a slavish 
overview of the scholarship that infuses, informs and directs this thesis. Rather, it will offer a 
more general introduction.  
Broadly speaking, military historians have tended to focus upon: the history of war as 
a general subject36; the great battles or campaigns of history37; the generals who shaped not 
only the history of their nation but occasionally an entire continent38; or they have focused 
upon the soldier’s experience on the battlefield 39. Scholars like Holmes, Keegan and Howard 
have written authoritatively on the details of major wars, why particular wars were fought, 
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the politics that lay behind the conflict and even what motivated men to fight, sometimes, in 
the most appalling of circumstances. Although military history provides an invaluable 
backdrop against which to construct this thesis, it does not meet the demands of the research 
question posed earlier. For example, Holmes can speak with authority on the British Tommy 
in the First World War, or the experiences of the Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment (PWRR)
40 in modern combat. However, his role as an historian is to place events, people, and 
campaigns into a particular historical context. Whereas, this thesis seeks to address the 
ontological nature of the British soldier in a much broader cultural, sociological, historical, 
metaphysical context in order to produce a philosophical framework within which to imagine 
his/her nature.   
Martin van Creveld is both a military historian41 and an eminent military theorist42. 
His book On Future War was and indeed remains one of the most original and influential 
books written on the subject of war. It not only examined the character of war, it challenged 
the philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz, contending that it was too narrow and state-centric 
and failed to accommodate the modern reality of non-state players. His notion of non- 
trinitarian war and his critique of Clausewitz has generated significant scholarly debate43. 
Two scholars who have made a significant contribution to the developing theory of ‘New 
Wars’ are Mary Kaldor44 and Herfried Münkler45. While recognising the importance of 
Clausewitz, both scholars argue that new wars are no longer simply politics by another 
means. Unlike the military historian, their work resides mainly within the realm of political 
science46. Colin S Gray47 is a leading expert in international politics and strategic studies 
(theory and history) and is perhaps the leading exponent of the Clausewitzian theory of war48. 
His work Another Bloody Century is a detailed application of Clausewitzian philosophy and 
confident refutation of all those who maintain that the nature of war has changed.  
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The political and strategic theorists briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
spend some time considering the practical and philosophical nature of war. However, 
although each makes a contribution to the process of creating the philosophical framework 
mentioned in the thesis title, the focus of their work is not the nature of the British soldier.  
Michael Ignatieff’s The Warrior’s Honor49 is not only required reading for many 
students at the Defence Academy of the UK, it is perhaps one of the few modern books that 
examines the nature and character of the warrior as that concept found manifestation in the 
ethnic wars in Africa, the Balkans and Afghanistan. Ignatieff examines the moral disconnect 
between what he calls ‘these new war makers’ and ‘the liberal interventionists who represent 
our moral stakes’50. As a journalist, academic and politician, his particular view in this book 
is disturbing. It not only represents the harsh reality of the barbarity associated with largely 
untrained militia ‘warriors’ it reflects the huge difficulties liberal human rights organisations 
like the International Committee of the Red Cross face in war zones where moral restraint is 
frequently lacking. The ‘narcissism of minor difference’51, Freud’s superb and apposite 
phrase, articulates the inauthentic nationalism that not only tolerates but encourages bloody 
violence against the other52. What his book does not do, neither does it make any pretentions 
to do so, is examine the nature of the modern British soldier. Like the work of the military 
historian, theorist and political scientist, The Warrior’s Honor adds colour and depth to the 
literary background of this thesis.   
Christopher Coker has done more than any other modern scholar to highlight not only 
the increasingly instrumentalised53 character of a Western approach to war but the 
philosophical and practical implications of this ‘dis-enchantment’ of war54. A theme that 
pervades many of Coker’s works is the centrality of Greek philosophy and practice in 
understanding the Western way of war and the extent to which the West in a post-modern age 
has little requirement for warriors. War, he maintains in Barbarous Philosophers, is an 
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invention by the early philosophers and is ‘their great contribution to the civilizing process’55. 
Not only do the Greeks provide us with our role models and historical archetypes56 they were 
the first to ask the question: what is the true nature of war?57 For the Greeks, war was ‘the 
human thing’58 and it is the camaraderie of soldiers on the battlefield that ‘makes war such an 
intensely human (and even humane) experience59. 
Coker maintains that ‘what the warrior is, is no less important than what he or she
does’60. War, he maintains, is both existential61 and instrumental62. But by instrumentalising 
war, as the West has done, it has made it purely utilitarian and in doing so brought about the 
death of the warrior63. In The Future of War Coker continues to explore the link between, the 
industrialisation of war, in which war became increasingly more instrumental, the 
disenchantment of war64 through the increasing use of technology and the consequences for 
the warrior who ‘found himself estranged from his craft’65. Some of the themes examined in 
this book are considered at greater length in Warrior Geeks66. One of these themes is the 
importance of the concept of sacrifice. ‘Without sacrifice, war has always been considered 
morally questionable’ and ‘without sacrifice or the willingness to risk death oneself, war 
cannot be ‘sacred’, and if it cannot be that it cannot be ethical’67. It is the willingness to 
sacrifice oneself for another that makes war truly human. 
In Warrior Ethos Coker again returns to the theme of the warrior in Western societies, 
which he believes is in trouble. In this book, he focuses upon the link between the warrior 
and killing, something he recognises our post-modern societies do not find attractive68. 
Today, in our overwhelming concern for health we have lost our taste for heroism69; ‘if 
warriors were once venerated they are no longer’70. Commenting on America, he notes that it 
is ‘a culture that knows how to honour the casualties and the dead but not the strength of its 
warriors’71. He contends in his conclusion that the warrior’s ethos has been hallowed out in 
recent years72.  
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Coker’s most recent book Warrior Geeks further explores many of the topics covered 
in his previous books. The central premise that provides the structure framing this endeavour 
is that while acknowledging that technology has had and is having a profound transformative 
effect upon humanity, Coker wants to challenge the ‘geekish’ idea that science can explain 
everything73. He is not hostile to technology or science; he finds common ground with 
Clark74 and Taylor75 and observes that the ‘interactive world of technology and humanity 
may mark the next stage in our cultural evolution’76. However, a key point Coker wants to 
make is that technology is not the only companion in humanity’s evolution. He goes to some 
length to demonstrate and argue his contention ‘that humanity and war have co-evolved as 
Thucydides understood, not through the help of science but through observation’77. ‘What 
Plato’ he maintains ‘could not have grasped is the man-machine fusion’78.  
In developing the theme of Greeks to Geeks, Coker wishes to remind his readers that 
‘the Greeks have never been far from the minds of educated soldiers’79. The developmental 
trends in weapons technology80 not only further instrumentalises war but raises profound 
questions regarding our own ontology81. Some he argues ‘wish to purge war of its existential 
and metaphysical elements and render it wholly instrumental’82. Coker invites his readers to 
imagine the possibility of cyberneticlly, pharmacologically, and genetically enhanced 
soldiers, fighting without fear, with courage that is pre-programmed, and with abilities far in 
excess of normal humans, their minds locked in and linked together in an all-embracing 
neural virtual networked world. While this may be the post-human future that awaits 
humanity83, he contends that we should not be carried away by it.  
Where this thesis differs from the work of Coker is its highly specific theme: ‘how the 
nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?’ 
Although a number of the topics examined in his body of work are also addressed in this 
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thesis, and his work adds additional colour and depth to the literary background of this thesis, 
it is not grounded in his work. 
1.3 Synopsis     
Having scoped the literature in a broad sense, here is a synopsis of the research 
chapters in this thesis.  
Chapter 2 Identity and Narrative. Today, identity is as much a process and something 
that happens ‘between’ rather than ‘in’ or ‘to’ individuals; it is not ‘just there’ and once 
discovered is kept forever. In a post-modern age it is in a continual state of transition, with 
social identity in a process of constant negotiation. The British soldier exists in the social 
imaginary of the UK and therefore in a relationship with that society. Consequently this 
identity is dependent upon the social interaction which validates or invalidates the legitimacy 
of that identity. Narratives help us make sense of our world, individually and collectively as a 
society. Therefore the dominant narrative within a society will dictate the identity of its 
Armed Forces. If that narrative is ‘apocalyptic’ in character, the identity and thereby the role 
expected of the soldier may be inextricably linked with war and combat. However, if the 
dominant narrative in a society is mimetic then the identity and consequent role expected of 
the soldier is unlikely to be linked with war and combat. The nature of the British soldier 
exists in a dynamic, living, evolving and symbiotic relationship with his/her society as part of 
the dialogue that takes place in the public sphere and which emerges as a common mind 
within a UK social imaginary.  
Chapter 3 Being and Doing. Extrinsic (instrumental) and intrinsic (existential) 
motivators are both equally essential in offering an explanation of combat motivation. Human 
beings cannot be reduced to, and given the status of, an object to be used and then discarded. 
Effectively engaging the enemy, using individual direct-fire weapons, depends upon much 
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more than a conditioned response (extrinsic); it requires the will to fight (existential). The 
professional British soldier, located within a social relationship of mutual exchange within 
the UK social imaginary, is required to exhibit both.      
The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of 
‘being’ and ‘doing’. Any definition must have the sophistication required to reflect a modern 
army like the British Army and the granularity necessary in discussing the difference between 
the warrior and the soldier. When viewed through the lens of extreme reference points 
(Achilles and the battlefield technician/weapons platform) the distance between the two is 
literally and metaphorically immense. However, within the spectrum imagined in the thesis 
question, the granularity required becomes increasingly fine when the United Kingdom 
Special Forces (SAS, SBS, SRR, SFSG, 18SR and JSFAW) are placed on the continuum, 
along with the Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marine Commandos and the rest of the 
Combat Arms, who have all distinguished themselves in combat with the enemy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
Chapter 4 Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars. The proposition that Carl von 
Clausewitz identified the universal, eternal truth of war’s objective nature is impossible to 
maintain in anything other than a Cartesian universe. It is a classical Enlightenment 
argument. The notion that there is only one valid, universal truth that is valid in every context 
is an article of faith, whose validity can be challenged by the relativist sceptic. 
Philosophically, the nature of war is not necessarily political. A Clausewitzian model also lies 
at the heart of international relations and International Law. It assumes that Reality, in 
relation to international relations, is political. This is a Western construct, derived from a 
specifically Western (Christian) philosophical, theological and cultural hypothesis.  
The dogma that the military is in Afghanistan to establish the conditions for a political 
solution is a cultured version of the West imposing a Western construct upon a non-Western 
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culture and society. The British soldier serving in this environment comes into daily contact 
with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations and the 
geopolitical goals of his/her government and the alliance they form a part of. It is a reality in 
which religion and culture have a greater sense of validity than a Western construct of 
political imperatives.  
Chapter 5 Selected Societal Factors. This chapter will seek to locate this thesis, in the 
embodiedness of post-modern life, through its consideration of selected societal factors. 
‘How the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British 
society’ must incorporate powerful and influential societal factors that influence the dialogue 
that occurs within the public sphere in a UK social imaginary. For example, despite the 
cultural shift in attitudes towards death in contemporary British society, soldiers who are 
killed in service for their country are located firmly within civil polity. In a post-modern age, 
whenever the older rituals and language of death have all but disappeared from everyday 
public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude towards death has found expression again 
with its re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual for its fallen war dead.  
Post-modern societies are increasingly risk-averse. The fear of potential futures
dominates the present generating what Beck calls ‘real virtuality’84. The implication of this is 
significant. The warrior, historically, accepted the possibility and actuality of intimate violent 
warfare; whereas the battlefield technician/weapons platform is removed from actual personal 
contact with the enemy. Societies that are inherently risk-averse may struggle to create and 
maintain a narrative that sustains the concept of the warrior. The ethical etiquette of avoiding 
known or imagined risks is a strong cultural driver in reducing the areas of public life in 
which a display of heroism might be expected or manifested. The UK is not as yet a 
thoroughly post-heroic society, though there is little reason to envisage that it will not 
become increasingly so.  
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The significant number of British deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
consistent level of public support for service personnel, would suggest that the public in the 
UK is not, at least at this moment, casualty phobic. How an increasingly risk-averse society, 
manifesting post-heroic traits, will be able to generate a narrative that could sustain 
significant casualty numbers in future conflicts is a pertinent question. Previous generations 
who reluctantly accepted high casualty numbers were not marked by the same aversion to 
risk or manifested the same post-heroic traits.  One of the most controversial conclusions of 
this chapter may lie in the logical consequence of feminist thought on Western societies and 
their militaries and how this informs how those societies imagine themselves. Historically, 
the notion of the warrior was essentially male in most cultures. Today, however, concepts 
such as gender, sex, masculinities and femininities are recognised as being more liquid and 
malleable than had previously been understood. The ‘narcissism of minor difference’ may 
finally vanish where boundaries are fluid and ill-defined.  
Chapter 6 The Future Nature of Conflict. The twenty-first century will continue to 
been marked by an increasing proliferation of ‘wicked problems’ that defy simplistic answers 
or approaches. The challenges of globalisation and a globalised media centric communication 
environment will also continue to generate significant issues for traditional constructs of the 
nation state. Stabilisation/Intervention operations, in such congested environments, 
consequently, may well be highly contested by groups or non-state actors opposed to outside 
Western involvement. Such groups are likely to be adaptive, intelligent and may model their 
approach upon the experiences of other disaffected groups of non-state actors who were 
perceived to have stood up to the liberal democracies of the West. It is highly likely that 
future adversaries will have studied the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan for insight on 
how to confront a Western style of warfare. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach to 
warfare will prove to be a doctrinal triumph or another military article of faith in future ‘wars 
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among the people’, is likely to be further tested in this century. SDSR provided little in terms 
of the genuine strategic thought required to prepare the British Armed Forces to face the kind 
of hybrid, asymmetric threat an adaptive, intelligent state or non-state actor presents.  
Chapter 7 Future Technology. In this chapter future battlefield technology is 
considered within a variety of contexts: historically; current and on-going technological 
development; legally; and ethically, philosophically and practically. American success in 
using advanced technology against its enemies has been mixed at best. In Vietnam the 
ideological premise underpinning ‘techno war’ was essentially flawed, leading to a failed 
tactical use of its technological superiority. The two Gulf Wars in contrast offered, at least 
initially, an impressive example of what superior technology could achieve. It is likely, 
however, that future enemies will not make the same mistakes Iraqi forces made. The GI of 
the twenty-first century is frequently portrayed as a systems operator, where the distinction 
between man and the machine is blurred. The concept of a ‘Nobody’ people, living in an 
atomised cyber-world engaged in warfare akin to a video game, is frightening. Driven by a 
vision to conduct virtually ‘risk free’ military operations, the march of semi and autonomous 
robotic weapons appears unstoppable. Future combat teams will comprise soldiers who 
accompany robotic platforms on tactical missions. Such a vision fundamentally undermines 
the historic notion of sacrifice and the willingness to endure loss in the pursuit of one’s values 
and ideals.  
This thesis will seek to make a contribution to scholarly research through addressing a 
question that has not, to this point, been examined in scholarship: 
If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us
about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary 
British  society?
19 
When viewed in combination with the sub questions, identified earlier, explored through a 
consideration of a number of topics from a range of academic disciplines, this thesis will 
provide a philosophical framework that might assist policy makers avoid a context where 
soldiers are asked or expected to move seamlessly from sandbag filling to combat operations 
in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either unable or 
unwilling to perform that role. This thesis will show how the interaction of the various issues 
examined, will tie any decision to deploy the Army into public discourse on any deployment.  
1 See http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22713.aspx (accessed 22 Feb 14).  
2 Ibid. 
3 British military operations began in Iraq in 2003 and ended in April 2009. In this period 179 military personnel 
died on operations, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10637526 (accessed 22 Feb 14) for a comprehensive list. 
In Afghanistan 447 British military personnel have died on operations, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- 
10629358 (accessed 22 Feb 14). The financial cost of UK operations in Iraq is thought to have cost 
approximately £10bn, see http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/editorial-iraq-10-years-on--this-war- 
damaged-the-uk-at-home-and-abroad-8539583.html (accessed 22 Feb 14); whereas some have put the cost of 
operations in Afghanistan at £37bn, see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/30/afghanistan-war-cost- 
britain-37bn-book (accessed 22 Feb 14).       
4 This is discussed later in the thesis. 
5 For example: as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (enduring); United Nations Protection Force, 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia; part of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and than Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR) before becoming part of Kosovo Force (KFOR); deployment to stabilise the Government of Sierra 
Leone.   
6 For a flavour of the discussion see, http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-
blog/2012/sep/20/uk-afghanistan-us (accessed 22 Feb 14); http://www.examiner.co.uk/news/west-yorkshire- 
news/british-soldiers-fighting-dying-afghanistan-4956277 (accessed 22 Feb 14). 
7 See http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/news/2014/uk-storms-and-floods (accessed 22 Feb 14).  
8 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/military-support-urgent-flood-defence-inspections (accessed 22 Feb 
14).  
9 For a detailed list month by month see, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/17/afghanistan-
casualties-dead-wounded-british-data (accessed 22 Feb 14).  
10 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf 
(accessed 3 Mar 14). 
11 The issues involved in this are profound. However, for a brief overview see of how the Dutch Supreme Court 
held the Dutch Government to account for the failure of its soldiers see, https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/
netherlands-supreme-court-hands-down-historic-judgment-over-srebrenica- genocide-2013-09-06 (accessed 3 
Mar 14).  
12 See http://archive.redstate.com/stories/featured_stories/the_new_soldiers_of_surrender (accessed 3 Mar 14). 
13 C Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004).  
14 Ibid., p2. 
15 Ibid., p23. 
16 Ibid., 2.   
17 Ibid., p10. 
20 
18 Ibid., p150. Taylor does not specifically use the phrase Reformed Theology. Rather he refers throughout this 
book to Protestant theology. However, he references to Protestant can be described as Reformed because of the 
theology involved and the church groups identified, i.e. Baptist and Presbyterian.  
19 Ibid., p16.  
20 Ibid., p17. 
21 Ibid., p12. 
22 Ibid., p9.  
23 Ibid., p12-13.  
24 Ibid., p21.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p83.  
27 Ibid., p86. 
28 Ibid., p85. 
29 Ibid., p89. 
30 Ibid., p91. 
31 Ibid., 109. 
32 See chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the warrior.  
33 This phrase refers to the mental image of deliberately lining a person up in your weapon sights before opening 
fire. It is not something easily forgotten, regardless of how many years might have passed.   
34 K Marlantes, What It Is Like To Go To War (London: Corvus, 2011).  
35 JA Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (New York: Basic, 2004) pxvii.  
36 For example, see J Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993); War and Our World: The 
Reith Lectures 1998 (London: Hutchinson, 1998); Warfare: The Triumph of the West, ed., G Parker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
37 For example, see R Holmes, Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Battlefields of the Second World War (London: BBC Books, 2001); M Howard, The First World War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); J Keegan, The Iraq War (London: Hutchinson, 2004).  
38 For example, see R Holmes, Marlborough: England’s Fragile Genius (London: Harper Press, 2008); 
Wellington: The Iron Duke (London: Harper Collins, 2002); The Little Field Marshall: a Life of Sir John French 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1981).   
39 For example, see J Keegan, J Gau & R Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (London: Harper Press, 
2006); R Holmes, Acts of War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); Tommy: The British Soldier on the 
Western Front 1914-1918 (London: Harper Collins, 2004); Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers At War (London: 
Harper Press, 2006).   
40 Prof Holmes was the Colonel of the Regiment of the PWRR. His book Dusty Warriors was written following 
his visit to the regiment when they were serving in Iraq.  
41 For example, see M van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (London & New York: 
Macmillan, 1989); ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’ in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed., by MI Handel, (Abingdon: 
Cass, 1986) p35-50. 
42 M Van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey’s, 1991). This book was also published under the title, The 
Transformation of War.  
43 This is examined at length in chapter 4.  
44 M Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
45 H Münkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: polity, 2005). 
46 The work of both scholars is examined in chapter 4. 
47 CS Gray, Strategy For Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank 
Cass, 2002); Another Bloody Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); and War, Peace and 
International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London & New York: Routledge, 2007). 
48 Gray is a major dialogue partner in chapter 4. 
49 M Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (New York: Vintage, 1999). 
50 Ibid., p6. 
51 Ibid., p48-71. 
52 Ibid., p56. 
53 A key point in Human Warfare (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) is Coker’s contention that Western 
citizens ‘want a more discerning approach to warfare’ (p82). However, ‘as war becomes more technological it is 
distancing public opinion and the warrior from its consequences’ (p149).  
54 C Coker, The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004) p4-6.  
21 
55 C Coker, Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg (London: 
Hurst, 2010) p8. The supreme insight that philosophy has given us is that the nature of war is paradoxical (p40).  
56 C Coker, Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology in Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War 
(London: Hurst, 2013) pxi. 
57 Coker, Barbarous Philosophers, p44.  
58 C Coker, Warrior Geeks, p55.  
59 C Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p83. 
60 C Coker, Waging War without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Culture (London: Rienner, 2002) 
p6. 
61 This is a somewhat odd use of the word existential, in that the word is an adjective and he is not using it as an 
adjectival noun. This will be explored further in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
62 Coker, Waging War without Warriors, p160. 
63 Ibid.  
64 This is a phrase used by Max Weber who spoke about the disenchantment of the world. The concept is 
considered in chapter 3.  
65 Coker, The Future of War, p48. 
66 For example ‘The Biotechnological Warrior’ (p69-79) and ‘Cyborg Warriors’ (p95-109) in The Future of 
War; ‘Designer warriors’ in Warrior Geeks, p221-280.  
67 Coker, The Future of War, p130. See also Warrior Geeks, p120-122.  
68 Coker, Warrior Ethos, p10.  
69 Ibid., p93. 
70 Ibid., p95. 
71 Ibid., p102. 
72 Ibid., p146. 
73 Coker, Warrior Geeks, p278. 
74 A Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  
75 Timothy Taylor, The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution (London: 
Palgrave, 2010). 
76 Coker, Warrior Geeks, p100. 
77 Ibid., p57. 
78 Ibid., p62. 
79 Ibid., pxi. He goes on to note that ‘when soldiers get back from Afghanistan broken not only in body but in 
mind, they are now shown ‘Warrior Theatre’, a new concept that takes two of the surviving plays of Sophocles 
and their depictions of traumatised soldiers as a therapeutic device by which to restore soldiers’ damaged 
minds’.  
80 See chapter 5 ‘The Rise of the Machines’ (p147-219) which opens with a very interesting depiction of a future 
battlefield. Future battlefield weapons will be considered at length in chapter 7 of this thesis.  
81 Ibid., p215.  
82 Ibid., p291. 
83 Ibid., p291. 
84 U Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) p136. 
22 
Chapter 2 
Identity and Narrative  
This chapter will offer an introductory consideration of the complex nature of the 
subject of identity in general, before exploring in more detail in 2.1.1 ‘Identity in Pre to Post- 
modern Thought’. In section 2.1.2 ‘The Construction of Identity in Modern Society’ the focus 
will shift onto how identity is shaped through our social interaction and role in the societies in 
which we live. Finally in this section, the relatively new concept of corporate or 
organisational identity will briefly be considered, involving a concise look at the seminal 
work of Albert and Whetten on organisational identity.  
Section 2.2 ‘Narrative’ will consider the question ‘Why War?’ This will involve a
consideration of the highly influential Seville Statement and its rejection of Darwinian ideas. 
The role that cultural codes play in creating different narrative genres will be examined, 
along with the competition between narratives for validity and acceptance within society, 
otherwise known as genre wars. In ‘Narrative: Society and War’ (2.2.1), the notion of a 
‘Genre War’ will be explored along with the role it plays within the compartmentalised 
nature of a society in which narrative stories emerge, and thereby have their validity 
contested or affirmed. ‘Narrative: The Military and Society’ (2.2.2) begins with a 
consideration of the definition of what it means to be a man and how this has changed or 
altered to suit the actual or perceived needs of a society. This section will examine how a 
very specific cultural narrative emerged that saw the image of the Army not only radically 
transformed by the mid nineteenth century, but then used as a model for the ‘salvation’ of a 
society, which by the end of the century was disturbed by fears of racial degeneracy.      
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2.1 Identity 
Technology has shaped not only the world we inhabit but also the stories that make 
sense of that world. The British theologian T Beattie contends that, ‘to be human is to live an 
interpreted life. It is to inhabit an imagined world which enables us to make sense of our 
experiences and to lend coherence and meaning to our lives. We are a story-telling species 
whose capacity for imagination, memory and language makes us unique among all the many 
evolved life forms which share our space on planet earth’1. If we were to take the mythical 
story of Achilles, the life and actions of this character would be meaningless without a 
community in which his story could be retold, have meaning, his courage honoured, his 
example extolled and his legacy secured. His personal desire for glory and a form of 
immortality would likewise be pointless. If there were no community to remember and 
recount the story of his exploits, he could never hope to have an immortal name. Identity is 
often located for some within the stories that make sense of their lives or are told about them 
within a community that gives that story meaning or validity. 
Asking an individual the question, ‘Who are you?’ may appear on the surface a
simplistic thing to do. It implies the presupposition that ‘they’ (i.e. that other person) exist 
and that ‘they’ can both understand the question and also correctly interpret the context in 
which it is framed. Initially, it appears as though the questioner is seeking information 
regarding the identity of that individual. As such, one might expect that the one being asked 
the question will be able to give an equally simple reply. However, any study into the subject 
of identity rapidly discovers that it is an immensely complex subject. Regardless of age, 
gender, race, religious beliefs, maturity or academic ability, questions regarding our identity - 
how it is constructed, validated and expressed - are incredibly difficult to reduce to the 
simplistic answer initially anticipated.     
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Our English word ‘identity’ comes from the Latin idem, meaning ‘the same’2. This is 
reflected in Shoemaker and Swinburne’s opening sentences regarding the subject of identity, 
‘There are two philosophical questions about personal identity. The first is: what are the 
logical necessary and sufficient conditions for a person P2 at time t2 being the same person as 
a person P1 at an earlier time t1, or, loosely, what does it mean to say that P2 is the same 
person as P1? The second is: what evidence of observation and experience can we have that a 
person P2 at t2 is the same person as a person P1 at t1?3’ Most people, however, - with or 
without training in philosophy - will live their lives on the assumption that there is a unity 
linking the different periods of their lives and that in some essential manner they are the 
same4 person at 40 as 35. The notion that there is some form of causal relationship of some 
description, within an individual’s lifetime, may be traced back to the philosopher David 
Hume5. Today this idea has been described as ‘the unity relation’6 or ‘genidentity’7. Although 
many people will instinctively accept that they have some form of unity in their concept of 
personal identity8, the validity of this approach is nevertheless open to criticism.  
Underlying this manner of exploring the subject of identity are, and what may be 
described as, the basic tenants of the Enlightenment Project9: also known as ‘modernism’. 
Implicit in the ideas of the philosophers associated with this ‘project’, Descartes, Locke, 
Hume and Kant (for example), is the belief that truth existed and that it could be discovered 
through the application of reason and logic. Therefore, identity and its truth could be 
discovered. Although each philosopher had his own distinct position, their concept of identity 
essentially regarded the human being as ‘Subject’10. Viewing man11 as ‘subject’ placed man 
at a disjuncture with the world. As subject, man was distinct from the world and therefore 
capable of viewing it in a detached, systematic manner. Consequently, man became the centre 
and the measure of all things12. During the later stages of the twentieth century, the certainty 
and optimism13 associated with the ‘Enlightenment Project’ came under devastating attack 
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from a new and radical form of thinking, known as ‘Postmodernism’. The basic tenants of 
modernism were fundamentally undermined14. This meant that concepts such as knowledge, 
truth, history and language were all subjected to the critique of post-modern thinking. 
2.1.1 Identity in Pre to Post-modern Thought.  
Historically, identity was something that simply ‘was’. ‘In traditional societies, one’s 
identity was fixed, solid, and stable’15. In the pre-modern world, contends MacIntyre16, a 
person’s role in society gave him/her their essential identity. These roles, and consequently 
the identity associated with these roles, were socially constructed. He argues that an 
individual encountered the world only in relation to the role socially constructed for him. In 
such a pre-modern society, ‘the individual is identified and constituted in and through certain 
of his or her roles…I confront the world as a member of this family, this household, this clan, 
this tribe, this city, this nation, this kingdom. There is no ‘‘I’’ apart from these’17. In this view 
there were no identity crises or the need to radically rethink one’s identity18. Taylor would 
refer to this period as a premodern social imaginary, where society was constructed around 
various modes of ‘hierarchical complementarity’19.  
Modernism, however, saw the decline of the pre-modern society. This had the effect 
of destroying the shared frameworks from which the beliefs and values that ordered life 
arose. How an individual derived his/her identity now fundamentally changed. Instead of 
viewing himself/herself in relation to their function in society to understand their identity, the 
individual took centre stage as ‘subject’20. This is not to say that the sense of community 
completely broke down in the early stages of modernity. It did not21. However, modernity 
created a profound process of change in which the individual had to adapt and readapt. 
Giddens utilises the image of a juggernaut to express something of the nature of modernity 
and speaks of ‘the sheer sense of being caught up in massive waves of global 
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transformation’22. Although ‘identities’ were still relatively fixed in the early stages of 
modernism, the possibility of new identities expanded as modernity changed the structures of 
social life and the environment23. However, with these possibilities came the fear of choosing 
the wrong identity24 but as chapter 3 will explore, the dignity of the knowing subject was 
corrupted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Against this corruption and the horrors of two World Wars a new philosophical model 
emerged in Europe that removed significance based on knowledge, status or function and 
assigned it to human action, will and decision25. In existentialist thought, man was not simply 
‘subject’ but was also ‘agent’. The existentialist view of man saw identity not as simply 
‘is’  (i.e. ‘subject’) but as ‘becoming’ (i.e. ‘agent’) through his experience and interaction 
within the external world26. Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche had laid the 
foundation, which Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger developed in the twentieth 
century27. Although there are profound differences between the rationalist and 
existentialist view of human identity, they both share one fundamental tenet: identity is 
inextricably bound up with our notion of the ‘self’. It is on this point that a post-modern 
critique has been so devastating.  
Postmodernist thinkers maintain that there is no ‘self’. They reject the belief that there 
are any absolutes in the objective realm. Nash observes that postmodernism has at its heart an 
‘eminent “lack of trust” in language as a medium for the representation of truth, its 
unsleeping attention to the fine print of what is said, its rigorous aim to search out 
inconstancy, inconsistency and contradiction, and its express intent on the dismemberment of 
foundational authority’28. This ‘dismemberment of foundational authority’ has profound 
implications for the notion of identity. If there are no absolutes (foundational authority) in the 
objective realm, there can be no absolutes in the subjective realm29. Therefore, if an 
individual cannot know anything for certain in the objective realm, how can they know 
anything for certain in the internal, subjective realm?  
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The ‘self’, or personal identity, becomes a myth and an illusion30. Indeed, Nash is 
quite clear on this point when he states, ‘postmodern thinking’s [original spelling] stress on 
the impossibility of the subject’s self-definition finds its resounding echo in the narcissant’s 
interminable oscillation among a multitude of modes of self-conception and behaviour’31. 
The ‘impossibility of the subject’s self-definition’ enables the postmodernist to maintain that 
‘I’ is meaningless32. If there is no ‘I’, there can be no identity in the modernist’s sense of the 
word. For the postmodernist, what emerges is a multiplicity of being and realities, each of 
which is of equal value and importance, though unrelated. This multiplicity of ‘beings’ can 
have no objective relationship with each other because in postmodern thought there are no 
meta-narratives, either externally or internally. Postmodernism has cast identity adrift into a 
sea of subjectivity without any external reference points, for there can be none in its thought.      
Post-modern ideas are grounded in a linguistic indeterminacy33, which is driven by a 
‘discourse of suspicion’34 that is compelled to ‘deconstruct’ all ‘texts’ or ‘narratives’ to 
expose the power issues that underlie them. ‘As Derrida says, “the displacement” of “the 
centrality of the subject”, so essential to deconstruction’s enterprise, was from the beginning 
part of what was commonly called a “discourse of suspicion”’35. The decentring of the ‘self’ 
was therefore, no mere consequence of postmodernist thinking but an essential part of its 
project. The only way an individual can ‘know’ or attempt to ‘know’ himself or herself, or 
answer the question ‘who are you?’ is through the use of language. However, a persuasive 
dictum in modern academia is that language is a social construct and that all human discourse 
is conditioned by the socio-political nature of reality36. Language therefore, is a cultural 
creation expressing the socio-political nature of a particular community.  
From this perspective, meaning is ultimately a social construction37. Language, 
therefore, does not reveal meaning, it constructs meaning. In postmodern thought, the 
language an individual might use to answer the question ‘who are you?’ reveals more about 
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the community from which that individual comes than it does about the individual answering 
the question. An individual’s use of language reveals how their society constructs its basic 
meanings and values and the weight given to those meanings and values. The postmodernist’s 
‘discourse of suspicion’ drives the requirement to deconstruct the ‘text’ or ‘narrative’ to 
uncover the connections between knowledge and power38. ‘Although artificial linguistic 
constructions are designed to convey the illusion of truth, they are actually a cover for the 
power relationships that constitute the culture’39. What emerges from this reasoning is a 
linguistic indeterminacy: history, truth and identity become ‘islands of discourse’40, a state of 
existence where anything goes41.  
2.1.2 The Construction of Identity in Modern Society. 
In this section, the focus shifts from identity as an abstract philosophical concept to 
how identity/identities is/are thought to be formed in modern (Western) societies. The 
emphasis in modern sociology and psychology, with regard to the subject of identity, is to 
assert that identity is something that happens ‘between’ rather than ‘in’ or ‘to’ individuals42. 
In other words identity is relational rather than simply being or becoming. Jenkins contends 
that identity is not ‘just there’ but needs to be established43 and that this process of 
establishing one’s identity is like the game of ‘playing the vis-à-vis’44. The ‘self’ from this 
perspective now becomes essentially socially relational45.  
Jenkins’ argument may be summarised as follows: ‘if identity is a necessary 
prerequisite for social life, the reverse is also true. Individual identity - embodied in selfhood 
- is not meaningful in isolation from the social world of other people. Individuals are unique 
and variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed: in the processes of primary and 
subsequent socialisation, and in the ongoing process of social interaction within which 
individuals define and redefine themselves and others throughout their lives’46. Initially it 
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appears as though this position is similar to the emphasis found in other thinkers. In some 
respects it appears similar to MacIntyre’s argument regarding identity in pre-modern 
communities and to the thinking of Hegel, Buber and Levinas. There are, however, 
significant differences.  
MacIntyre’s argument is that in pre-modern communities the concept of identity was 
socially constructed, but that it was fixed and given, not negotiated. A blacksmith, for 
example, was male and had a specific well defined role, standing and position within his 
community. He did not need to construct his identity; it was given to him. In Hegel’s Master/
Slave parable both individuals recognised themselves through the encounter with the other. 
His basic premise was that, we think about others in terms of ourselves47. In Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind the central issue is recognition of the self not its creation48. Buber’s 
widely read and studied book, I and Thou, again focused on the centrality of relationship in a 
person’s establishing of identity. He maintained that it was only when we recognise another 
as Thou do we enter into a proper mode of engagement and can properly be described as I. 
Whereas when the relationship is I – It the other is viewed as a means, a thing, and object to 
be used. Levinas went further by developing the argument that without recognising ‘the 
relational dynamic that prioritises the other over the self, there is no self’49. In contrast to 
Cartesian metaphysics, the ‘self’ is no longer simply the ‘ego’, the ‘I’, the ‘subject’. In 
contrast to the existentialist position, the central theme running through the thinking of 
MacIntyre, Hegel, Buber and Levinas, is that identity is relational and dependent upon 
interaction with others.  
What makes the emphasis found in modern sociology and psychology distinct, of 
which Jenkins’ position is an example, is that identity is not simply recognised by the ‘other’: 
it is an on-going process of negotiation creating and recreating identities. In other words, 
there is no ‘self’ without social interaction, which then validates or invalidates that identity. 
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Commenting on what he refers to as the internal-external dialectic Jenkins states that, ‘it is 
not enough to assert an identity. That identity must also be validated (or not) by those with 
whom we have dealings. Social identity is never unilateral’ (emphasis original)50. He 
maintains that individuals seek to ‘be’ and be ‘seen to be’ and are involved in ‘impression 
management strategies’51 when interacting with others. This process of social construction of 
identities, therefore, is also a process of legitimising an internal image through and by an 
external source52. The real issue for Castells then becomes, ‘how, from what, by whom, and 
for what?’53 Whose definition counts in this negotiation and why? These are vital questions. 
If Castells is correct, when he maintains, that identities only become identities whenever 
individuals internalise them and then construct their meaning around this internalised 
identity54, then the adoption of a socially constructed identity is fundamentally an issue of 
power55. The construction of identities then becomes, quite simply, the interplay of power 
relations. Power not simply to have an identity validated or accepted by the ‘other’, but to 
have power in validating the identity of another social actor.  
One important area of identity construction in modern society that must be briefly 
mentioned is that of organisational or corporate identity. Hatch states that organisational or 
corporate identity ‘refers to members’ experiences of and beliefs about the organization as a 
whole’56. The concept of organisational identity should not, she contends, be confused with 
the closely related theme of corporate image. This she maintains ‘refers to impressions that 
an organisation makes on its external audiences’57.  All organisations and institutions are, by 
their very nature, relational in that they have no option but to inter-act internally and with the 
world outside their organisation. As such, every organisation will either consciously or 
unconsciously have a corporate view of its identity and will, depending on the type of 
organisation, seek to carefully cultivate the image it projects to the external world.   
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The seminal work on this aspect of identity is that of Stuart Albert and David Whetten 
in their article ‘Organisational Identity’58. In this article, Albert and Whetten defined 
organisational identity as central, distinctive and temporally continuous. They argued that an 
organisation’s identity must have at its core something that is important and essential which 
distinguishes it from other organisations59. However, while seeking to be distinctive an 
organisation’s classification of its identity will not, they contend, simply have one single 
statement of its identity. Rather, any statement will seek to reflect its ability to change over 
time and may have an identity that could contain strands that would not normally be expected 
to be found together in one organisation60. Although Albert and Whetten do not cite examples 
of such an organisation, one such example might be the British Army61.  
2.2 Narrative 
One of the historically consistent traits of mankind, throughout the ages, has been his 
propensity to continually wage war against his fellow man. Why this is so has perplexed 
scholars and commentators: notably Einstein and Freud62. At the very height of Athenian 
culture and commerce, Greece’s golden age was irreparably damaged by the atrocity of the 
Peloponnesian War63. More recently, the optimism of the Enlightenment, that inspired many 
utopian ideas in the Victorian Age, were horribly crushed in the industrialised carnage of the 
First World War. Military historians like Keegan64 and Holmes65 have written extensively 
and authoritatively on the details of major wars and the politics that lay behind them. In part 
they give answers as to why particular wars were fought and what motivated ordinary men to 
fight in them. Why man should continually fight devastating wars, with all the accompanying 
disasters that usually follow wars, continues to be an open topic of debate.   
The academics who composed The Seville Statement (May 1986) state in its opening 
proposition that, ‘Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other 
animals’66. This makes war a human enterprise. In a powerfully worded document, each of 
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the Statement’s five articles begins with the declaration that, ‘It is scientifically incorrect to 
say…’ This doctrinal affirmation67 gives the statement the appearance that it is the settled 
conclusion of exhaustive scientific research. The Seville Statement has five key propositions, 
they are: 
1. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that we have inherited a tendency 
to make war from our animal ancestors. 
2. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war or any other violent 
behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature. 
3. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that in the course of human 
evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other 
kinds of behaviour. 
4. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that humans have a 'violent brain'. 
5. IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or 
any single motivation. 
The introduction to the Statement gives a strong indication for the main motivation behind 
composing and issuing it. It states that the ‘misuse of scientific theories and data to justify 
violence and war is not new but has been made since the advent of modern science. For 
example, the theory of evolution has been used to justify not only war, but also genocide, 
colonialism, and suppression of the weak’. The second proposition makes it clear that war or 
violence is not something that has been ‘genetically programmed into our human nature’. 
Although it does not explicitly say so, these statements appear to be a partial denial of what 
became known as Social Darwinism. 
Inherent within the philosophy of Social Darwinism is the inevitability of struggle68.
‘Nationalism,’ as Glover contends, ‘was reinforced by the belief in a Darwinian struggle for 
survival, with the race or nation being the unit taking part in the struggle. Nations unwilling 
to fight would go under’69. This philosophy was epitomised by Bismarck70 who stated that 
‘the weak were made to be devoured by the strong’71. Many within Europe understood the 
struggle between nations prior to 1914 as part of the natural order in which only the fittest 
survived, evolving to higher forms of political organisation72. This philosophy left Britain, 
France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary feeling that their position was threatened and 
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fearful of failing to face up to the challenge of war73. As a consequence both Germany and 
France developed complicated and detailed plans for the war in Europe that seemed 
inevitable74. The Seville Statement is a denial that war is a product of the evolutionary process 
or as a result of our genetic inheritance. Rather, war ‘is a product of culture’ made possible 
‘primarily through language which makes…the co-ordination of groups, the transmission of 
technology, and the use of tools’.   
Adopted by UNESCO and the American Anthropological Association the Seville 
Statement and has been influential since its declaration. However, for Keegan ‘there is little 
that is scientific about it. Science has thus far quite failed to substantiate any of its five 
articles, some of which are not scientific propositions at all’75. To support this frank assertion, 
he maintains that ‘war is too complex an activity for step-by-step genetic mutation to 
“program” organisms for it’76. For Keegan, ‘the Seville Statement, in short, is one of hope, 
not objective truth’77. His observations in this regard are valid. Nevertheless, it does make a 
valuable contribution. It shows, at the very least, that there is no obvious scientific reason that 
makes war a biological imperative for humanity. The question, ‘Why War?’ must be 
explained using a different route.  
Although Einstein and Freud could not agree on a definitive answer to the question 
‘Why War?’, a broad consensus does exist today in some circles. Smith observes that, 
‘popular beliefs and academic theories alike point overwhelmingly to the machinations and 
interests of elites and the struggle for power and security within and among nations’78. He 
states that, ‘within the social sciences there is a general tendency to understand any violent 
conflict as the product and process of struggles for dominance’79. Citing Karl Marx, Max 
Weber and Charles Tilly, as contributors to this notion of human struggle for power, he 
contends that, 
The vision of an endless, strategic, self-interested quest to dominate, of a grim world 
where there are weak or dependant cultural constraints upon and motivations for 
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violent and power-seeking activity seems to be deeply entrenched in Western 
culture80.   
Within sociology and political science, according to Smith, the causes of war can be summed 
up in sentences containing ‘various combinations of words like threat, gain, power, strategy, 
or ingenious permutations of the mathematical ciphers that stand in their place’81. An 
example of this may be seen in the connection many in the West make between the second 
Gulf War and American desire to acquire control over Iraq’s huge reserves82.  
Smith argues that ‘we need to start by moving away from the state-centred model of 
realist political science toward an understanding of society as comprised of multiple, 
differentiated, reciprocally influencing arenas of activity’83. Implicit within this 
understanding of how society works or inter-acts with itself is the notion of cultural codes84, 
which are set in binary opposition to one another85. These cultural codes are in essence, ‘a 
kind of cultural DNA’86 and function as shared constructs that create a narrative structure 
which a society uses to convey meaning. These binary codes may be set out as follows87: 
The civil discourse of motives  The civil discourse of social relationships 
Active   Passive  Open         Secret 
Rational  Irrational  Trusting        Suspicious 
Reasonable  Hysterical  Critical        Deferential 
Calm   Excitable  Truthful        Deceitful 
Controlled  Emotive  Straightforward       Calculating 
Realistic  Unrealistic  Autonomous        Dependent 
Sane   Mad 
The civil discourse of social institutions 
Rule regulated   Arbitrary 
Law    Power 
Equality   Hierarchy 
Inclusive   Exclusive  
Impersonal   Personal 
Contractual   Ascriptive 
Groups   Factions 
Office    Personality 
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Although binary codes are part of the process through which we make sense of the 
world, they ‘do not offer an instruction manual for what to do next’88. What is required for a 
civil discourse is narrative; the stories used by individuals, groups or societies to make sense 
of the world and their relation to it. Because the stories told by a group or a society are an 
essential part of how they understand the world around them, and their role in that world, the 
form of narrative used must conform to certain genres with well-defined attributes89. What 
distinguishes Smith’s argument from the work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, is that 
he combines the idea of cultural narratives with binary codes of civil discourse, creating a 
structural90 approach to understanding cultural narrative, which is more than a philosophical 
consideration of a subject but has its roots in the ‘development of narratives in the “real 
world” by “ordinary people” in their responses to an unfolding event sequence’91.  
Developing a model that is derived ‘loosely’ from Northrop Fyre’s work, particularly 
The Anatomy of Criticism92, Smith maintains that narratives may be grouped under four 
headings: Low mimesis, Tragedy/Romance and Apocalypse. This is not to suggest, however, 
that these are the only four genres through which people construct narratives. Rather people 
move through genre types, from low mimesis93, ‘through comedy, romance, tragedy, and on 
to heroic and mythic genres’94. This process of re-interpretation, or what Smith’s describes as 
narrative inflation and deflation, depends not only on how the story is perceived to unfold 
within the community/society/nation, but also how the main characters (Protagonist and 
Antagonist) change, or appear to change, depending on how their actions are interpreted.   
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Smith’s Structural Model of Genre95 
Low Mimesis  Tragedy/Romance  Apocalypse 
mundane            ideals
MOTIVATION 
local             national                    global
OBJECT OF STRUGGLE
limited   elevated     extraordinary
POWERS OF ACTION
This diagram helpfully sets out how binary codes, or a society’s cultural DNA, 
function in the construction of a narrative, along with the possible narrative inflation and 
deflation. A story with a low mimesis is limited, local and mundane, where the protagonist 
and antagonist are essentially similar: ‘the predominate narrative for our understanding of 
everyday politics… in short, all those events that do not seem to have a lot of drama to them 
at least for us, the distant and emotionally detached audience’96. In contrast, tragedy 
deliberately seeks to connect an audience through an emotional engagement in a plot-line, 
which enables them to view their own life through the lives of the characters in the unfolding 
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drama. As a result the narrative moves away from being simply a local, mundane affair, 
requiring a limited response, to something more profound which may necessitate a greater 
response because the stakes have risen97. According to Aristotle tragedy,  
is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in 
language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being 
found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity 
and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.98   
In this quote the word translated ‘purgation’ is the Greek word katharismos (καθαρισμός, ου) 
meaning ‘cleaning, purification: purification rites’. Greek tragedy could have this ‘cathartic’ 
effect through the manner in which the audience was invited to become involved with the 
plot by engaging the feelings and emotions of those watching with the circumstances of the 
characters on the stage99.  
The ultimate narrative genre, in terms of consequences in the life of a nation and the 
potential cost, is without doubt ‘Apocalypse’. In his satirical article on the ever increasing use 
of hyperbole in public life, Hume states, ‘welcome to the apocalypse auction, where experts 
and authorities bid up their pet threats to public safety. In competing to win headlines, they 
all seem to lose a sense of perspective’100. The word ‘Apocalypse’ comes from the Greek 
word apokalypsis (αποκαλυψις) meaning ‘unveiling, or revelation’101 and is used in the 
opening sentences in the Book of the Revelation regarding the unveiling of ‘Jesus 
Christ’  (Rev1:1). Because Revelation portrays the ultimate crisis for humanity, frequently 
utilising violent images of judgement, the word ‘apocalyptic’ is now inextricably linked with 
either a grave crisis for the whole of society or with a doomsday scenario102. However, 
Hume’s article shows that ‘the doomsday scenario’ is appearing with alarming regularity 
in recent news reports, with numerous agencies vying to have their voice heard regarding 
their specific apocalyptic threat to public safety. 
This genre usually deals with events or circumstances of world-historical 
importance, with events that legitimise the use of language that portrays the very struggle for 
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either national or world survival. However, because the issues involved are so critical, they 
are also more readily open to narrative deflation because of the intense scrutiny they come 
under. Despite this, ‘apocalyptic narratives are the most effective,’ according to Smith, ‘at 
generating and legitimating massive society-wide sacrifice and are today the only narrative 
form that can sustain war as culturally acceptable’103. Though Smith’s observation is valid for 
the majority of modern states, Münkler104 and Ignatieff105 have shown that a different form of 
warfare has been emerging in differing parts of the world, where the combatants are not 
necessarily states but warlords, terrorists and bands of irregular militia106. Irregular militia 
and war bands are not under the same constraints as democratic states to create or sustain a 
narrative for war. Münkler argues that these ‘New Wars’ are more about gangsterism than 
political goals. The controversy over why America, the United Kingdom and their Allies 
went to war against Iraq lends weight to Smith’s contention that war is only culturally 
acceptable to democratic states when an apocalyptic narrative is used to justify it. 
Consequently, the stated reasons given to justify the United Kingdom going to war against 
Iraq have been subjected to intense scrutiny. As a result, the story used to explain the use of 
force has been subjected to narrative deflation for a large number of people in the United 
Kingdom, who now feel that the government lied about the apocalyptic nature of the 
narrative used to justify Britain’s involvement in a highly unpopular war.     
2.2.1 Narrative: Society and War 
‘Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other animals’, 
so The Seville Statement affirms. Tragically, warfare and violence among mankind uniquely 
singles us out as a species. No other animal purposely creates instruments specifically 
designed to inflict injury or death. Indeed it can be maintained that war, and thereby this trait, 
is as old as mankind. In tracing the history of warfare Keegan considers the question of 
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whether ‘‘pre-man’ was violent towards his own species or not’107. On the question of 
whether pre-man waged a form of warfare against his fellow man, the eminent military 
historian notes that this debate ‘is a dangerous one to enter’108, because the available evidence 
is open to conflicting interpretation109. Not only is there disagreement in interpreting potential 
evidence from the earliest history of humanity. How a society understands a cultural situation 
today, which may lead to or legitimise war is open to a fiercely competitive array of 
interpretations. This has been described as ‘Genre Wars’110.  
To understand this concept of ‘Genre Wars’ it is necessary to consider briefly the 
compartmentalised nature of a society in which a narrative story may emerge and thereby 
have its validity contested or affirmed. Berger and Luckmann, following William James111, 
contend that modern societies are replete with ‘sub-universes’ of meaning, though largely 
related to their economic surplus112. They state that, 
In advanced industrial societies, with their immense economic surplus allowing large 
numbers of individuals to devote themselves full-time to even the obscurest pursuits, 
pluralistic competition between sub-universes of meaning of every conceivable sort 
becomes the normal state of affairs. With the establishment of sub-universes of 
meaning a variety of perspectives on the total society emerges, each viewing the latter 
from the angle of one sub-universe.113  
One example they use, of this competition between sub-universes, is that of orthodox 
medicine and other rivals to that orthodoxy such as homeopathy and Christian Science. Some 
scholars prefer to use Schutz’s concept of ‘provinces of meaning’114 rather than sub- 
universes. The main difference between the two ideas is that the change of terminology 
emphasises ‘that it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the 
objects, which constitutes reality’115. In other words it is not the sub-universe itself that 
constitutes reality for an individual but the experience of life while viewing the world from 
the perspective of that sub-universe.  
In the section on identity, it was noted that some contend that there is no ‘self’ in the 
Cartesian sense of the ‘self’ but rather that an individual has a multiplicity of being and 
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realities, in which there is an ‘interminable oscillation among a multitude of modes of self- 
conception and behaviour’116. These ‘modes of self-conception’ or ‘modes of being’, as they 
are also known, enable an individual to play out different roles, sometimes roles that might be 
considered as contradictory, without recognising that those modes of being might be 
contradictory. Glover gives a sobering example of this in his treatment of the My Lai 
massacre117, in which American soldiers who would have otherwise been considered decent 
average men, took part in one of the most gruesome atrocities of the Vietnam War118.  
Each sub-universe of meaning, or province of meaning, or mode of being will have its 
own internal norms for making sense of the world from within its own perspective; even with 
its own moral reference points and standards. As a consequence, two scholars viewing the 
same event might, as a result of their differing world views, adopt differing and competing 
interpretations of the same event. Michael Ignatieff gives a classic example of such an 
occurrence, which also illustrates the notion of a genre war. In his book Virtual War119, 
Ignatieff gives a lengthy account of his dialogue with Robert Skidelsky, in which both men 
discuss the merit of military intervention by NATO in Kosovo (1999). Ignatieff takes the 
position that humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide was sufficient cause to over-ride 
the basic concept enshrined in the centuries old Treaty of Westphalia, namely that of non- 
interference in the domestic affairs of states by other sovereign states. Skidelsky in contrast 
could not accept that military intervention in Kosovo by NATO, on humanitarian grounds, 
could be sustained morally.  
Skidelsky’s position was based on three main tenets120. Firstly, that ‘the UN was 
founded on the principle of national sovereignty. States could and should be sanctioned for 
acts of aggression against other states, but within their borders they were free (with one large 
caveat) to do what they liked’121. His second point was based on his belief that there were no 
internationally agreed values or standards or the means to uphold them. Rather, Skidelsky 
40 
maintained that NATO was seeking to impose the West’s value system on Milosevic, in a 
manner similar to ‘old imperialism’. Thirdly, towards the end of the correspondence between 
these two writers, Skidelsky states that ‘I would have expected more scepticism from you 
about NATO’s claims. My main point, though, is that the NATO action has made the world a 
more dangerous place’122.  
Skidelsky’s whole approach is underpinned by a hermeneutic of suspicion, which 
dominates his interpretation of why the West, in the form of NATO with America and the 
UK taking the lead, took on the role of aggressor. His dismissal of NATO’s stated reason for 
going to war is an example of narrative deflation. By linking the notion of ‘old imperialism’ 
with the actions of the Western powers, Skidelsky, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
was juxtaposing binary codes located within ‘the civil discourse of social institutions’. For 
example his use of the phrase ‘old imperialism’ conjures up the contrast between, ‘Rule 
regulated’ and ‘Arbitrary’ and between ‘Law’ and ‘Power’. In contrast, Ignatieff’s narrative 
for understanding why NATO intervened to stop more acts of genocide in the Balkans, 
conformed to a more apocalyptic mode of narration. Ignatieff dismisses Skidelsky’s reference 
to ‘meddlesome post-imperialism moralism’123, arguing that the moral values that 
underpinned the military action were also shared by the Kosovar Albanians. The 
correspondence between these two scholarly writers reveals how intelligent people can come 
to diametrically opposed positions while considering the same evidence.  
Genre wars almost always precede actual wars124. Consequently, competing narratives 
will reveal a significant amount about the sub-universes that create and sustain them, their 
motives and ultimate goals and the lengths they are prepared to go to in order to achieve 
those goals. An example of this can be seen in the narratives that emerged, within the ‘sub- 
universes of meaning’125, prior to the Bosnian War. Hedges dogmatically states that, ‘the 
ethnic conflicts and insurgencies of our time, whether between Serbs and Muslims or Hutus 
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and Tutsis, are not religious wars. They are not clashes between cultures or civilizations, nor 
are they the result of ancient ethnic hatreds. They are manufactured wars, perpetuated by fear, 
greed and paranoia’126. ‘It took Milošević,’ he argues ‘four years of hate propaganda and lies, 
pumped forth daily over the airways from Belgrade, before he got one Serb to cross the 
border into Bosnia and begin the murderous rampage that triggered war’127. Ignatieff also 
maintains that the nationalist rhetoric of Milošević was a language game, in which he created 
the fantasy of a greater Serbia where the Serbian people would never again be beaten by 
ethnic Albanians128. As the political situation within the former Yugoslavia deteriorated, trust 
between former neighbours was steadily replaced by suspicion and the growing realisation 
that safety was only possible within one’s own ethnic community. Minute variations between 
culturally similar groups grew and were portrayed as fundamental differences129: Freud’s 
narcissism of minor difference130. As the fragmentation of Yugoslavia grew, each ethnic 
group became its own social ‘sub-universe of meaning’, which defined itself in opposition to 
those who had created their own narrative of who and what they were, again in opposition to 
the ‘other’.  
The consequence of this was the terrible spectre of ethnic cleansing, acts of 
unspeakable cruelty and mass murder in a country that had previously been at peace for many 
decades. The narrative, however, that Milošević created for his people not only took the 
Serbs back four hundred years to the late feudal world before the European nation-state, the 
narrative the Serbian people embraced took them ‘from interethnic tolerance and 
accommodation – to the Hobbesian world of interethnic war’131. In antiquity Thucydides 
famously remarked, ‘what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the 
fear this caused in Sparta’132. This quote forms the basic structure of what has become known 
as the Hobbesian trap133. Originally translated by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, 
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the basic problem presented by Thucydides has found manifestation in most wars134, if not 
every war135. The Bosnian War is just another example.   
2.2.2 Narrative:  The Military and Society
In section 2.1.1 ‘Identity in Pre to Post-modern Thought’ it was noted that in 
traditional societies identity was something that simply ‘was’ and that one’s identity was 
fixed, solid, and stable136. Identity was culturally shaped by the actual or perceived needs of a 
particular society or community. This process applies to even the most basic of questions: 
‘what does it mean to be a man’ or ‘what does it mean to be a woman’. Braudy maintains that 
‘throughout history the definitions of “man,” “manly,” and “masculine” have shifted in 
response to the prevailing social and cultural demands’137. In ancient antiquity the Homeric 
depiction of Achilles, as the archetypal warrior, inspired generations of Greeks138. However, 
as the centuries passed and Greek warfare evolved, what was required by the ‘state’139 and 
thereby what was expected of a man also evolved. Achilles was a one man killing machine, 
effective, brutal and obsessed with personal glory140. In hoplite warfare, however, what was 
required was conformity and unity of purpose. The tightly knit formations of the Greek 
phalanx subsumed individual identity into that of the whole141. One example of this change in 
emphasis is the tragic example of Aristodemus, one of only two survivors of the legendary 
battle of Thermopylae.  
The main accounts of this Spartan warrior come from the writings of Herodotus. In 
book VII, Polymnia, of his Histories, Herodotus gives the account of the shame Aristodemus 
endured when he returned back to Sparta. 
When Aristodemus returned to Lacedaemon, reproach and disgrace awaited him; 
disgrace, inasmuch as no Spartan would give him a light to kindle his fire, or so much 
as address a word to him; and reproach, since all spoke of him as ‘the craven.’ 
However he wiped away all his shame afterwards at the battle of Plataea.142 
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In book IX, Calliope, Herodotus also supplies the account of Aristodemus’ determined 
attempt to regain his honour in the eyes of his fellow Spartans, 
The bravest man by far on that day was, in my judgment, Aristodemus - the same who 
alone escaped from the slaughter of the three hundred at Thermopylae, and who on 
that account had endured disgrace and reproach: next to him were Posidonius, 
Philocyon, and Amompharetus the Spartan.143 
In the Iliad, Achilles is the individual warrior seeking personal glory regardless of the cost to 
his own life. Yet when Aristodemus seeks to regain his honour, and remove his shame by 
fighting in a very individualistic manner, it was understood differently. Although his personal 
bravery was recognised, and his shame removed, he received no public honours for his 
actions in battle, for how could a state honour ‘a madman’? The story of Aristodemus is an 
illustration of how an older paradigm of manly courage could be interpreted as an act of 
madness by a culture steeped in the Homeric myth.  
Throughout history the concept of what it means to be a man, and thereby any link to 
the military, is a consistently changing one. In the Iliad, Nestor, the oldest of the Achaeans, 
tells his younger companions that ‘I have mixed in the past with better men than you…the 
finest men I have ever seen or shall see’144, a general belief that has found expression 
throughout the millennia. Braudy states that ‘what is “true” masculinity has also historically 
been tinged with, even steeped in, nostalgia for a lost masculinity’145. For many, war has been 
and indeed is often described as the ultimate crucible in which the reality of manhood can be 
tested. The allure of heroism and the chance to achieve the glory of a previous generation 
helps to create the myth of war146. However, the allure and myth of war depends on the 
creation of a narrative that gives these notions meaning and value within a society. Paris 
describes this as ‘discovering the pleasures of war’ and contends that in the nineteenth 
century Britain created a popular culture that ‘legitimized war, romanticized battle and 
portrayed the warrior as a masculine ideal’147. Using the Victorians as an example, we shall 
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consider how the creation of this narrative required a very specific theological and 
philosophical view of the world.  
Social Darwinism was an integral part of how Britain viewed herself as a nation in
the late nineteenth century. Paris notes that, ‘in 1859, Charles Darwin published The Origin 
of Species, and while few actually read the book, most literate Britons thought they had 
grasped its meaning’148. As in the animal world so in the human world, evolutionary progress 
was a result of struggle; it was the survival of the fittest. The development of social 
anthropology underpinned British, and European, elitism. European nations thought that they 
had risen above the lower nations of the world and represented the highest form of human 
civilisation149. ‘A vital European advantage was assumed to be cognitive pre-emptiveness. I 
can write about and analyse you, therefore I am better than you’150. However, implicit in the 
notion of racial or national progress is that of racial or national degeneracy. If nations were 
not on the way up, then they were on the way down151. The counterpoint to this was the 
nightmare of racial corruption, a contamination that could result in national demise. It is in 
this context that the Army emerged as providing the medium of salvation152 from this decay 
and a model upon which large aspects of society could be based153.    
Britain during the nineteenth century was in a state of almost perpetual change, 
subject to immense pressures from within154 and without155. What it meant to be British156 for 
those living in the British Isles was not fixed but emerged and developed as the century 
evolved. As the nineteenth century unfolded, the question of how Britain understood herself, 
became intertwined with the role of the military, and in particular the Army. MacKenzie 
states that, ‘between 1800 and 1900 the reputation of the military in Britain was 
transformed’157. Initially this transformation of the Army took place largely in the mind of 
popular opinion158, whereas changes in the pay and conditions of the military happened 
slowly and largely in response to growing popular support159. Following the successful defeat 
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of Napoleon in 1815, Britain was left without any major adversary in Europe or particularly 
on the high seas160. The Congress of Vienna161 gave something to each of the major powers, 
effectively allowing Britain to disengage ‘from the Continent, enabling internal and colonial 
consolidation’162 and initiating the idea of military non-intervention in Europe. Consequently, 
the size of the Army in 1815 fell from 204,386 to 92,586 by 1820, with the size of the Navy 
falling from 85,384 to 23,000 in the same period163. In conjunction with this reduction in size 
of Britain’s military, expenditure on the armed forces also fell significantly from £72,000,000 
in 1814 to £15,000,000 in 1830164.  
In the period following the Congress of Vienna, though at peace with the major 
powers on the Continent, Britain fought a succession of wars which saw her strengthen and 
increase the size of her empire. These relatively small wars of empire165, while often quite 
brief in duration166, not only expanded the empire but created the impression that Britain’s 
military strength was greater than it actually was167. Imperial conflicts, in faraway places, 
however, provided the material for the rise of the myth of the imperial hero168 and created the 
market for publications and books that cultivated a popular militarism within huge sections of 
British life169. Because this warfare was far away from the lives of ordinary people the 
depiction of war was almost entirely romanticised170 and bore little resemblance to the reality 
and carnage of war. Paintings of famous war scenes were often little more than idealised 
fantasies rather than accurate depictions of actual events171. Holmes notes that the approach 
of popular artists to the First World War was scarcely better172. One of the most noted 
examples of this idealised approach to depicting a famous event is the popular story and 
painting of the sinking of the HMS Birkenhead off the coast of Africa in February 1852. 
On 26 February 1852, while transporting reinforcements to Algoa Bay, HMS 
Birkenhead struck submerged rocks just off the African coast and sank. The Birkenhead, like 
many of the ships of that age, did not have enough serviceable lifeboats for all of its 
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passengers. Consequently only 193 of the 643 people on board survived. The officers and 
soldiers of the 73rd Regiment of Foot173, along with the crew, famously helped all the women 
and children into the lifeboats. The Commanding Officer’s order to ‘stand fast’ was obeyed; 
there was no panic and no ‘rushing of the lifeboats’174. The actions of the men on the 
Birkenhead are still regarded as an exceptional example of courage and selfless 
commitment175. It was no less so for many in Victorian society. At the time, Sir William 
Napier176 in a letter to The Times sought ‘national recognition of the “matchless chivalry” of 
the officers in charge177.  
Accepting that Hemy’s painting of the sinking of the Birkenhead is most likely a 
highly romanticised version of the event, there is little doubt that the actions of the men 
struck a chord within Victorian society. Poems appeared within weeks of the news extolling 
the heroic nature of their actions178. Sir William Napier’s reference to the chivalric nature of 
the officers in charge would have resonated in a society that looked at the chivalric tradition 
with a mixture of nostalgia and regret179. In the space of half a century, the popular view of 
the British soldier had been radically transformed180. These new heroes of a growing and 
expanding empire epitomised the knightly virtues of a more noble age181 as well as becoming 
an example of what true masculinity was, or should be182. Throughout the mid to late 
Victorian period, classical and medieval myths were re-created and adapted for new 
generations, of all ages. Chivalric myths and Arthurian legends were common themes in 
paintings, poetry, music, literature and even architecture183. It is important, however, to 
understand that this transformation of the British soldier went hand in hand with an 
enthusiastic attempt to see the British soldier evangelised184.  
Evangelicalism in the mid Victorian period ‘further encouraged a sense of national 
distinctiveness and mission’185. Although the evangelisation of the Army was largely the 
result of private evangelical initiatives, it did have government support186. The desire to 
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evangelise the Army must also be set beside the widespread belief that it was the burden of 
the ‘white man’187 to civilise those considered less developed188. Though British imperialism 
had a number of aspects to it during the mid to late Victorian period189, one of the main moral 
justifications used to legitimise imperial expansion was the Christianising and civilising 
effect such expansion was thought to have on the peoples ‘liberated’ from barbarism190. As 
an instrument of British imperialism, the British soldier was often portrayed as an ‘idealised 
“Christian warrior”’191, whose military actions paved the way for Christian missionaries to go 
in after the armed conflict and seek to spread the Christian Gospel192. Imperial heroes, 
especially those who died heroically, became the epitome of the ‘muscular Christianity’.  
As this heroic cult193 embedded itself in the social consciousness of Victorian 
Britain, with its images and stories of fantastic ‘daring do’ saturating a major part of the 
literature of that period, it did so against the background of a growing sense of unease and 
fear. The Crimean War was the first European conflict to be reported on daily in the 
newspapers194. As such the serious weaknesses in British military power, in that it was ill- 
equipped, poorly organised and poorly led, were manifestly evident to an increasingly well- 
informed British public. This sense of weakness was emphasised when Sebastopol fell to the 
French rather than the British195. Shortly after the weaknesses in the British military were 
exposed, the nation was gripped by the fear of a French invasion in 1859. This caused 
something of a panic in Britain196 and resulted in the creation of a volunteer force against the 
threat197. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, British foreign policy in 
Europe was largely shaped the recognition of its lack of military strength in Europe198. Herein 
is one of the great contrasts of late Victorian Britain. During the period when its overseas 
empire was rapidly expanding, Britain’s position in Europe was greatly weakened.  
Growing fears of physical degeneracy in the British male were heightened after 
humiliating defeats during the Boer War at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, in what 
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became known as the ‘Black Week’ of 10-15 December 1899. There had been growing 
speculation throughout the 1880s concerning the physical degeneracy of the British urban 
male199. Although Britain ultimately defeated the Boers, the simple fact that the might of the 
British Empire struggled to defeat a small force of irregulars seemed to provide empirical 
evidence of racial decline200. This coupled with the revelation that ‘at Manchester in 1899 
three out of every five volunteers were rejected as physically unfit’201 for military service led 
to the conviction that the British race was indeed degenerating physically202. These fears led 
to a government committee being established to look into these increasingly prevalent 
concerns. The interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, which reported in 
1904, subsequently confirmed many of the fears concerning the physical state of the British 
male203.  
If the British male was in fact physically degenerating, Britain might lose the struggle 
for national survival and become prey to stronger nations204. Lurking underneath this fear was 
the closely related idea that physical deterioration was inextricably linked with decadence, 
which in turn was thought to be closely related to moral decline205. Victorian Britain had 
delved deeply into the classics to find examples that inspired a culture obsessed with manly 
noble virtues. In a similar fashion many Victorians looked to antiquity for parallels with their 
present situation. Yes England was like Athens, but now it was in danger of resembling 
Athens in its days of decay206. Although Britain emerged victorious from the Boer War, the 
war in Africa was readily identified with Athenian defeat at Syracuse207. Similarities were 
also made between the decay of the Roman Empire and the danger of decadence and decay 
within Britain and her empire; ‘the Romans’ Jenkyns noted ‘of the first century had differed 
from the British in being wholly unaware that their empire would ever come to an end’208. 
The glory of ancient Athens, Sparta, Macedon and Rome had faded into history. Now the 
spectre of national degeneracy loomed upon Britain. The Boy Scout movement, maintains 
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Harrison, largely owes its existence to Baden-Powell’s fear that the British Empire ‘would 
succumb like Rome through national decadence’209.  
During the early decades of the nineteenth century less than one per cent of the British
public had any direct experience of military life210. Until the formation of the various 
volunteer units in the late 1850s most Victorians had only experienced a vicarious 
relationship with the military through popular culture, which glamorised and romanticised 
war in faraway places. Even then, argues Paris, those who joined these volunteer units did 
little more than take part in ‘heroic male fantasies acted out as thousands of men volunteered 
to be part-time soldiers in the Rifle Volunteers. The opportunity to wear uniform and share in 
the martial image without any of the hardship or danger faced by the regular soldier proved 
enormously popular, and men flocked to join’211. Fear of racial degeneration, coupled with 
Darwinian theories of the survival of the fittest, created the conditions whereby the army 
became the model upon which the survival of the nation depended212. Bourke has 
demonstrated that it was widely believed that men who had been drilled in the army were 
unlike their civilian counterparts because their bodies had been physically ‘re-formed into 
more manly shapes’213. From the turn of the century the ideal body shape for the British male 
became the military body. ‘It was’ she contends, ‘only a small step from the belief that the 
armed forces improved men’s physique to the proposal that military drill should be applied to 
the civilian population214. As this was considered a national problem, it was also believed that 
the obvious place to begin to address it was in the schools215. Although this approach was not 
universally welcomed, this model or variations of it continued to be used into the 1930s.  
2.3 Conclusions 
The British soldier exists in the social imaginary of the UK and therefore in 
relationship with that society. Consequently this identity is dependent upon the social 
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interaction which validates or invalidates its legitimacy. Unlike pre-modern social 
imaginaries, based upon modes of hierarchical complementarity, in which identity was given 
in relation to function, identity in a modern Western social imaginary identity is based upon 
the principle of free agency and consequently is substantially more complex.  Postmodernist 
theory and sociology has had a profound impact on the construction of identities in the 
twenty-first century. Today, identity is socially relational. It is as much a process and 
something that happens ‘between’ rather than ‘in’ or ‘to’ individuals; is not ‘just there’ and 
once discovered is kept forever. Identity in a post-modern age is in a continual state of 
transition. Social identity is never unilateral.  
The public relationship of the generic British within British society is dependent upon 
the social interaction which validates or invalidates the legitimacy of that identity; the same is 
also true for organisations like the British Army. All organisations and institutions are, by 
their very nature, relational in that they have no option but to inter-act internally and with the 
world outside their organisation. As such, every organisation will have a corporate view of its 
identity and will seek to carefully cultivate the image it projects to the external world. 
However, the ability of an organisation, like the British Army, to project such an image will 
be determined by the genre narratives given validity within the wider society, from which it 
owes its origin and continued existence.    
Narratives help us make sense of our world, individually and collectively as a society.
Societal narratives that emerge and reflect a common mind with a UK social imaginary will 
dictate the identity of its Armed Forces. If the dominant narrative in a society is mimetic then 
the impact upon the military and for the generic British soldier may be profound. In this 
situation the public may not accept British soldiers getting involved in high intensity combat 
but would prefer the distance from combat the idea that the battlefield technician suggests, as 
figure 6 illustrates216. 
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Low mimesis 
Fig 6 
The example of how the size of the British Army and Navy was slashed, along with defence 
expenditure in the years immediately following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, is an 
illustration of how a narrative has a direct effect on how the armed forces are viewed by 
society and what they are expected to deliver.        
If the narrative that emerges in the public discourse is ‘apocalyptic’ the importance of
the military’s role will be heightened and will directly affect how the identity of the generic 
British soldier is understood. In modern Western societies apocalyptic narratives are the most 
effective in legitimising and sustaining the decision to go to war. In such a narrative, public 
opinion will more readily accept its soldiers being involved in high intensity combat.  This is 
illustrated in figure 7. 
Apocalyptic narrative 
Fig 7 
However, apocalyptic narratives are vulnerable to the process of ‘narrative deflation’ and will 
most likely be the subjected to careful scrutiny within the public sphere. This debate, which is 
consciously ‘outside power’, ‘is supposed to be listened to by power’217. The extrapolitical 
status of this discussion is crucial218. In effect, the political power is influenced by the 
discussion that occurs in the public sphere. Therefore, the concept of ‘narrative deflation’ 
within the context of the genre wars discussed in this chapter, will have a direct effect upon 
where on the imagined spectrum, defined in chapter 1, the generic British soldier will reside 
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in the UK public imaginary. In a situation where no direct military threat exists to the UK, 
apocalyptic narratives will be difficult to sustain in the public sphere.    
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Chapter 3 
Being and Doing 
3.1 Introduction 
The research question addressed by this thesis was set out clearly in chapter 11. From 
this a number of sub-questions were derived from the main thesis question when viewed 
through the lens of a modern social imaginary. In this chapter a concept identified in two of 
the sub-questions will be examined in detail, that is, the difference between ‘being’ and 
‘doing’2.  
Military books abound with the word ‘warrior’. In US military publications it is
ubiquitous3. One might therefore expect to find a detailed and possibly varied array of 
answers to the question, what is a warrior? Frequently, however, the words warrior and 
soldier are used interchangeably as though they were synonymous. One example of this is TL 
Challans’ book Awakening Warrior4. Section 3.2 ‘Being and Doing: Cartesian or 
Existentialist’ will examine how a Cartesian approach to viewing and defining man became 
corrupted. Instead of the nobility of the Cartesian subject, large sections of European society 
were reduced to a utility whose relevance was in direct proportion to their function within the 
industrial machine. It will consider the practical impact of this idea as it found expression in 
the carnage of the First World War.  
Section 3.3 ‘Being and Doing: Combat Motivation’ will examine the discussion of
what made some men fight in World War Two, when others with the same training and in the 
same unit did not. It will consider the distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ factors 
and the impact modern training techniques has had in this this debate. Central to this section 
is a reflection on Rune Henriksen’s definition of a warrior and the requirement for a 
sophisticated understanding of a modern army like the British Army and the granularity 
required when discussing the difference between the warrior and the soldier. Section 3.4 
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‘Being and Doing: Existentialist Thought’ will unpack the distinction between ‘being’ and 
‘doing’ by exploring the questions: what does existential mean, what is authenticity, and what 
is alienation and how do these ideas relate to the warrior and or the soldier? This examination 
will provide the basis upon which a definition of what the warrior is will be offered in 3.5 
‘Conclusions’. 
3.2 Being and Doing: Cartesian or Existentialist  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the warrior as someone ‘whose occupation is 
warfare; a fighting man, whether soldier, sailor, or (latterly) airman; a valiant or experienced 
man of war’. It also defines the soldier as someone who, ‘serves in an army for pay; one who 
takes part in military service or warfare’. While dictionaries, by their nature, are succinct in 
their definition of words, this definition of what a warrior is, is vague. For example, a chef 
working on an American, nuclear powered aircraft carrier, may indeed easily meet each of 
the criteria of the dictionary definition. He or she may be an experienced man/woman of war, 
in that they have seen action in one or both of the two Gulf Wars: in the sense that they were 
serving on board the carrier as it took part in offensive operations during either or both wars. 
Chefs on a ship are primarily sailors, albeit with a specific, specialised trade. In our fictional 
example, this particular chef was an integral part of the aircraft carrier’s daily life on active 
operations and served for pay. It is debatable though, whether or not the role of a chef in this 
instance would be considered to be that of a warrior. He or she might be considered brave, by 
members of the general public, to have served in the navy at a time of war. Whether or not, 
however, they would be viewed in quite the same way as a member of the Special Forces that 
operated behind enemy lines during this conflict is again debatable. 
Definitions, at least to some extent, are classically Cartesian in nature. Descartes’
famous, Cogito ergo sum ‘I think therefore I am’ is the foundational bedrock of Western 
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philosophical thought5. Having allowed himself to doubt the existence of everything, 
Descartes made his now famous discovery, that by the use of reason he could prove his own 
existence.  
Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he 
can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious  that I am 
something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and 
carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum) I am, I exist, is  necessarily 
true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.6 
The importance of this moment in the history of Western thought cannot be exaggerated. 
Descartes introduced a new form of dualism into intellectual and philosophical thought. In 
practice what this entailed was the division between the subject, the ego ‘I’, and the objective 
world outside which could be accessed, analysed and categorised by means of reason and 
logic. What was ‘real’ could be examined and discovered by logic. All truth, at least in the 
West, would now be required to be tested at the bar of reason. The attempt therefore, to 
define ‘what’ a warrior ‘is’, in this sense is Cartesian, in that it presupposes that it is a 
substance with fixed identifiable properties, which as a consequence may be known, defined 
and explained logically.   
Cartesian approaches to any subject tend to focus upon mechanistic, rational and
logical factors, which depending upon the subject might be considered the correct and logical 
ones to take. Most patients, for example, would prefer their brain surgeon to be highly 
skilled, logical and precise. Few needing major surgery of this type would disagree. 
However, while acknowledging the critical necessity of a precise and logical approach to 
many aspects of life, existentialist thought has maintained that mechanistic, rational and 
logical factors are not sufficient in and of themselves to exhaust meaning, especially as it 
pertains to what it means to be human. Existentialists ‘claim that thinking about human 
existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern 
thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as 
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atomic subjects interacting with a world of objects’7. In existentialist thought what it means 
to be, or of being, cannot be fully understood in terms of a universal law of behaviour, ‘an 
aspect that is measured not in terms of an objective inventory of what I am but in terms of my 
way of being it’8. Neither can the importance of something be exhausted by a mechanistic 
definition of what something is.   
The logical consequence of the Cartesian dualism9 of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ was 
profound, particularly with regard to how the world and life itself was understood and 
interpreted. As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth rather than the nobility of the 
Cartesian ‘subject’, humanity in the modern industrialised age, underpinned by Cartesian, 
Kantian and Hegelian ideas, had been ‘objectified’. Humanity and life itself, along with the 
external world had been instrumentalised10 and reduced to the status of an object. Writing 
against the background of the First World War, the German sociologist Max Weber 
maintained that the modern world had become ‘disenchanted’11; a legacy of the rationalism 
and on-going process of the intellectualisation of life that had marked the Enlightenment 
Period12. For Weber disenchantment was ‘the knowledge or belief that… there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation’13.  
Logic and reason had replaced myth and magic as the framework to understand and 
interpret life and the external world. In the pre-modern age, that is the world before the 
Enlightenment and the ascendant rise of empiricism, the world of our ancestors was an 
enchanted world. Taylor comments that it was a world of spirits, demons, and moral 
forces’14. Nietzsche had understood the implications of this for religion. Zarathustra, after 
coming down from his mountain solitude, announced that ‘God is dead’15. It was not the case 
that Nietzsche had believed that God existed and then stopped believing. Rather, his use of 
the phrase ‘God is dead’ is an indication of his awareness that the logical empiricism of the 
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Enlightenment had killed the need for God and the morality that a divine order gave. 
Nietzsche understood that this would ultimately lead to nihilism16. The universe had been 
stripped of the logical need for the divine. When Weber spoke of the disenchantment of the 
world, it was all embracive; no aspect of life held mystery or supernatural, everything could 
be objectified, classified and exploited.  
The recognition that life had become disenchanted is powerfully depicted in the 
classic film Metropolis, where men and women are presented as component parts of the great 
industrialised machine of modern technological life. Fritz Lang’s highly stylistic depiction of 
the repetitive and monotonous functionalism of industrialised working life, emphasises the 
extent to which large elements of humanity itself had become an integral part of the on-going 
technological evolution of life. The majority, i.e. the workforce, were exploited by a 
minority, who used them as component parts of the industrialised machine. Although Lang’s 
film was based around a popular theme in early twentieth-century science fiction, it echoed 
real life industrial ideas. Coker maintains that, ‘industrial workers were expected to work 
with machine-like precision’17. Developing this theme, he cites the work and legacy of 
Fredrick Winslow Taylor who, 
developed a form of behavioural engineering that treated the body as a machine. In 
doing so, Taylor objectified the human subject by regarding it not as a person who 
speaks to another subjectively but as a concrete and desubjectified manifestation of 
laws revealed by natural abstraction18.
Nowhere is this Taylorite vision explored more disturbingly than in Huxley’s iconic 
book Brave New World,19 where men and women are selectively bred to service the needs of 
the new world order. The world that Huxley describes is based around the mass production 
methods of the twentieth-century industrialised factory. The book is set in the future, A.F. 
63220, or 632 years After Ford: that is Henry Ford the car manufacturer. In this depiction of 
the future, Ford has replaced God as the deity in this new world21; hymns are even sung to his 
name: 
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Ford, we are twelve; oh, make us one, 
Like drops within the Social River;
Oh, make us now together run
As swiftly as thy shining Flivver.22
It is a Pavlovian conditioned world23 where only the selected few are aware of the true state 
of humanity. Men and women are little more than animals, without parents or family and 
educated only as required to fulfil their designated purpose; humanity has now become the 
perfect utility, with a very specific shelf life of sixty years. 
Long before Huxley or Lang, Nietzsche understood that Man had become a
‘commodity’ or ‘utility’ that could be used by the state for its own end.  This is clearly seen 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Immediately after the section entitled, ‘Of War and Warriors’, he 
launches into ‘Of the New Idol’, a poorly veiled, scathing critique of the modern European 
‘state’. In this section the prophet Zarathustra speaks, 
The state? What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for now I shall speak to you
of the death of peoples. The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; 
and the lie creeps from its mouth: “I, the state, am the people”. It is a lie! It was 
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served 
life24.
Continuing his critique, Zarathustra maintains that, ‘many too many are born: the state was 
invented for the superfluous! Just see how it lures them, the many-too-many! How it devours 
them, and chews them, and re-chews them!’25. Life as a part of the state for Zarathustra, was 
‘universal slow suicide’26. Nietzsche saw through, what he viewed as, the veneer of collective 
responsibility and saw that the state was a cold, calculating attempt by ‘superfluous people’ 
to acquire power ‘and especially the lever of power, plenty of money’27. Nietzsche famously 
remarked that, ‘I see many soldiers: if only I could see many warriors’28. His observation, at 
least to some extent, was a reaction to the massed, conscripted armies of Europe, which had 
inextricably led to the industrialisation and thereby disenchantment of war29. To Nietzsche, 
the massed armies of industrialised European states were fodder to be devoured, chewed and 
then re-chewed by cold lying monsters cynically using them for their own ends.    
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Zarathustra was Nietzsche’s prophet. He not only reveals that ‘God is dead’ but 
announces the new concept of the Übermensch30. It is highly unlikely that Nietzsche was 
seeking to perform some kind of prophetic function towards the populations of Europe in 
general; that somehow his critique of the modern state was designed to awaken the populous 
from their delusions. There is a certain ambiguity as to the regard in which Zarathustra, and 
thereby Nietzsche, held humanity. In the Prologue, the ‘Saint’ asked Zarathustra why he has 
left his solitude31. ‘Zarathustra answered: “I love mankind”32. Yet later in ‘Part One’, 
Zarathustra appears to liken mankind/humanity to ‘flies’, ‘your neighbours will always be 
poisonous flies: that about you which is great, that itself must make them more poisonous and 
ever more fly like’33. Recognising this apparent tension in Nietzsche’s work, Roberts asks a 
pertinent question, ‘does Zarathustra love “man” only for the sake of the Übermensch?’34. 
The answer to this question is most probably a resounding yes, absolutely. Indeed, as 
Hollingdale notes, that ‘over all these discourses hovers Zarathustra’s dictum “Man is 
something that must be overcome”’35. For Nietzsche, humanity in general was nothing more 
than the background for the Übermensch, something to be used for a greater end. Humanity 
was ‘utility’. Where he differed in his understanding of humanity and that he had identified 
by the ‘state’ was the purpose of that ‘utility’; one was noble because it was the medium 
through which the Übermensch could be revealed in triumph, whereas the other was for the 
ignoble pursuit of money. However, in both ‘man’ was a ‘utility’ to be used.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis examined how a specific narrative emerged in Victorian 
Britain that created an idealised image of war that was almost entirely romanticised36 and 
bore little resemblance to the reality and carnage of war. The narrative of war in this period 
was heroic and chivalrous, drawing on a bewildering array of ancient motifs to perpetuate 
this cultic myth. War was still seen as offering the opportunity for individuals to display true 
masculinity. Although there are countless stories of individual heroism in the First World 
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War, this particular war is the horrific example of what an instrumentalised and disenchanted 
war looks like when fought by industrialised giants. Coker has observed that, ‘not only did 
war serve industry, it had itself become a vast industry. Recognizing this fact, Churchill 
described the divisions sucked into the battles of Verdun and the Somme as “the teeth of 
interlocking cog wheels grinding each other”’37.  
Death on the various battlefields in Europe of the First World War had been 
industrialised, a gruesome productivity that generated causality rates unimagined in any 
previous era. Men were as much matériel for the machine of death as the weapons used by 
them and against them. It is unsurprising that a philosophy like Existentialism, that placed the 
emphasis upon the distinctiveness of the experience of the individual at its heart, was highly 
influential in a Europe that had been brutalised by the massed anonymity of industrialised 
carnage: ‘a philosophy once described by Paul Tillich as “a movement of rebellion against 
the dehumanization of man”’38. Cartesian metaphysics had led to large sections of humanity 
being objectified and thereby reduced to a desubjectified utility to be used and defined by 
what it was able to do within the industrialised machine. In stark contrast, existentialist 
thought endeavoured to place the emphasis on what it means to be human as opposed to 
reducing individuals to what they were capable of doing, as units of utility.   
3.3  Being and Doing: Combat Motivation  
A man or a woman cannot be defined solely in terms of their utility and usefulness to 
the process of the machine. In this Fredrick Winslow Taylor was fundamentally wrong. 
When confronted with industrial carnage, those whom he had objectified did not behave as 
conditioned parts of an inhuman machine. Instead of Pavlovian response, the majority of 
soldiers, regardless of nationality, responded with remarkable restraint. For example, Holmes 
has noted that in the German March offensive of 1918 the remarkable thing ‘was not how 
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many British soldiers were killed trying to surrender, but how few. The Germans were 
remarkably scrupulous about accepting surrender in circumstances when, in hot blood, they 
might have killed easily out of hand’39. Ashworth has argued that for significant periods 
during the First World War there were periods were a ‘live and let live system’ of non- 
aggression packs or truces between the combatants, sometimes only a few hundred yards 
apart was unofficially implemented40. Regarding British and American soldiers in World War 
Two, Hastings observes that they ‘fought as bravely and as well as any democracy could ask, 
if the values of civilization were to be retained in their ranks’41.  
Bourke’s study An Intimate History of Killing offers a contrast, in that she has sought 
to not simply put killing back into war, but the intimacy of killing42. The chapter in her book 
entitled ‘War Crimes’ makes for uncomfortable reading. ‘Servicemen of all ranks’, she 
observed ‘were unperturbed by most of these acts of lawless killing’43. However, despite the 
various examples of ‘atrocities’ cited, she also maintains that ‘no matter how thorough the 
training, it still failed to enable most combatants to fight’44. The question regarding the 
fighting spirit of the British Army in World War Two was something that exercised the high 
command. In his War Diaries, General Sir Alan Brooke (later Field Marshall Lord 
Alanbrooke) the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), recounts the numerous 
occasions when Churchill questioned the effectiveness of the Army and its commanders 
(even down to company commander level)45. Later that year Churchill stated to Brooke that 
‘what we wanted he said were combatants and fighting men instead of a mass of non 
combatants’46. He harangued the CIGS insisting that British soldiers were more likely to be 
found in YMCA institutions than fighting the enemy47.  
Combat motivation was and remains critical to military success. ‘What is it’ asks 
Henriksen ‘that makes some men soldiers overcome the challenges of combat, and not 
others?’48. Before examining this subject in some detail in ‘Competition, Diffidence and 
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Glory’, Holmes notes ‘an unfashionable and surprising fact, some men actually enjoy war’49. 
Ernst Jünger’s book Storm of Steel is an example of an individual utterly at ease in the midst 
of war50. In his discussion of what makes men fight, Holmes considers the following: 
heightened sense of awareness51; comradeship and ‘a sense of importance as an individual 
within the group’52; ‘the strangely wonderful sights which counterpoint the horror’53; and 
‘triumphing in a shared endeavour’54. These factors may motivate the few, ‘but they do little 
to explain why the majority fight’ he argues55. Regarding patriotism, he notes that it has 
undoubtedly helped persuade men to join up at the beginning of the war56 but professional 
soldiers are encouraged to think of themselves as servants of the state57.    
In his article ‘The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation’58, Bruce Newsome has 
accessed the combat motivation literature and seeks to establish a clear distinction between 
what he terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ combat motivation. ‘Intrinsic’ motivations, according 
to Newsome, are ‘rational service, volunteerism, “will”, “warrior spirit”, militarism, 
nationalism, ethnicity, religiosity and morality’59; whereas ‘extrinsic’ motivations are those 
derived from the military ‘by socialization, training, and other forms of conditioning’60. 
Newsome basically dismisses and disregards ideas such as the ‘will’ and ‘warrior spirit’ as 
nebulous, making the claim that both notions owe their popularity to their association with 
Carl von Clausewitz, who according to Newsome, never formally separated intrinsic from 
extrinsic resources61. In summarising his critique of ‘intrinsic’ motivations he argues, 
‘intrinsic motivations to serve may be strong, but just a short exposure to the realities of 
combat usually destroys a soldier’s prior motivations’62. In contrast, ‘extrinsic’ motivations63 
which focus on the impact and importance of military training, unit organisation and 
management, are transitive in that they do not dissipate after the initial shock of combat64. 
Good training, organisation and management, in this thesis, are more tangible and ultimately 
useful concepts than ‘the will to fight’ or a ‘warrior ethos’.   
71 
Newsome’s article suffers from its limited historical survey of combat. Any survey of 
combat throughout the ages will reveal that successful warriors, soldiers and armies appeared 
to have had a mixture of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in combat. Achilles was 
motivated by glory. Yet despite this, he understood the importance of good protection and 
was an expert in handling the sword: impossible without dedicated training. Newsome’s 
reference though to the US military’s ‘industrial approach’ joins seamlessly with his own 
mechanistic approach to combat motivation. What he fails to explain, however, is what 
actually makes some people actively fight65 while others, with the same training, and from 
the same unit may not actively fight. An important figure in this discussion is Brigadier SLA 
Marshall. 
A soldier in the First World War, Marshall is best known for his work as an official 
American Army combat historian in the Second World War. During the war he conducted 
group interviews with soldiers who had been in battle a few days previously. This led to 
Marshall publishing a book on infantry combat effectiveness, titled Men Against Fire: the 
Problem of Battle Command; it remains controversial even to this day66. In this book 
Marshall argued that only between fifteen and twenty-five per cent of soldiers fired their 
weapons at the enemy67. Although some scholars have sought to question the accuracy of this 
figure68, Grossman is convinced that ‘every available parallel scholarly study replicates his 
[Marshall’s] findings’69.  
Artillery and machinegun fire was a different matter. Grossman argues that the 
disparity between the individual infantry soldier and soldiers working in teams ‘is largely due 
to the group processes at work in cannon, machine-gun, or other crew-served-weapons 
firing’70. However, by the Vietnam War the firing rate had risen from between fifteen and 
twenty-five per cent to ninety-five per cent71. Grossman accounts for the huge jump in firing 
rates due to ‘a form of classical and operant conditioning (à la Pavlov’s dog and BF Skinner’s 
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rats)’72. Despite the enormous increase in the firing rate, the hit rate was sometimes 50,000 
‘bullets fired for every enemy hit’73. 
Firing rates are not necessarily the most essential component in battle. Henriksen
makes the point that ‘it is relevant to underline the distinction between those who kill in a 
combat zone, and those who “merely are there”’74. He cites Franklin Miller who expresses 
the distinction in this manner: 
Men who actually see enemy troops, put the front sight blade on them, and blow them 
away. These guys are usually the squad leader and the platoon sergeant. Genuine 
killers are not to be confused with guys who simply spray an area and happen to kill 
someone75.  
For Henriksen, what distinguishes ‘average soldiers from their peers with more pronounced 
warrior qualities’76 is combat mastery, which is itself ‘revealed in combat’ [emphasis 
original]77. Will and warrior spirit he regards as something belonging to ‘a human type, 
whose martial gestation is individual rather than collective’78. Like Grossman, Henriksen 
cites Gwynne Dyer who describes such an individual as a ‘natural soldier’79. However, one 
drawback in citing Miller and Dyer is that both are referring primarily to conscript armies and 
not modern all volunteer professional armies, such as the British Army.   
Modern training techniques have increased not only the firing rate of soldiers80 but 
clearly emphasise the purpose of the combat arms (armoured, armoured reconnaissance, 
infantry and attack aviation units). In British Army doctrine Combat Operations it states that:  
Combat elements are those that engage adversaries directly. They manoeuvre and 
fight, typically employing direct-fire weapons, to gain ground, to find and defeat the 
adversary, or to acquire information.81. 
In the same document it states that ‘at the tactical level, an objective should be clear and 
attainable, for example seizing a terrain feature or destroying a force’82. The role of the 
combat arms is clear: gain ground, defeat or destroy a force. Recent combat experience in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that the British infantry soldier is not only 
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trained to actively engage his opponent ‘employing direct-fire weapons’, but will if necessary 
destroy a hostile force83.   
For Henriksen, the soldier’s ‘commitment to combat is much less pronounced than is
the case with the warrior’84. He defines the warrior as ‘a soldier with a personal and 
existential commitment to master and experience warfare, who is willing and able to kill and 
risk sacrificing his life in combat’ [emphasis original]85. He continues ‘a warrior is 
necessarily a soldier first, but not all soldiers, in fact very few, are warriors. Also, to say that 
a soldier is a warrior is to distinguish him from mercenaries’, because the soldier is ultimately 
serving a political cause86. Henriksen maintains that the ‘warrior’s combat motivation comes 
from their existential commitment to combat’ which is generally appreciated that they will 
make individual difference to combat by both direct action ‘or as primary group leaders’87. 
Drawing on the selection process used by Special Forces, he infers ‘that warriors are revealed 
and that they cannot be made’88  and are ‘relatively rare’89.  
Henriksen’s examination of ‘what makes people actively fight in combat’ is a more 
nuanced and thorough analysis than Newsome’s study into the myth, as he defined it, of 
combat motivation. He offers a reasonable explanation, unlike Newsome, of why some 
people fight while others with the same training and from the same unit have not done so in 
the past. By recognising the importance of both extrinsic and intrinsic factors, Henriksen 
offers a compelling argument that both are essential in understanding why warriors and 
soldiers fight. Perhaps more importantly, he locates the study in a modern context, as 
opposed to considering the concept of the warrior in a pre-modern form of Feudal based 
society90. His argument that the warrior is necessarily a soldier, in order to distinguish 
him/her from unlawful combatants, private actors and mercenaries is helpful, if albeit a 
specifically Western construct. Ignatieff maintains that the ‘new warriors’91 who form part of 
some militia or guerrilla group92 in a failed or failing state are examples of warriors who ‘no 
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In figure 8 the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, and the figure on the extreme 
right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield technician. In 
  
        
longer play by the rules’93. In this context, any notion of the warrior’s honour is largely 
absent94. Nevertheless, the distinction between the warrior/soldier and unlawful combatants, 
private actors and mercenaries is critical to properly understand the concept of the warrior/
soldier in a Western setting. 
Though there is much to commend in Henriksen’s examination, his distinction
between the warr o and the soldier is not as s phisticat d a  it needs to be to refl t a moder
army like the British Army. He fails to pay sufficient attention to the granularity that exists 
between someone serving in the Special Forces and someone in the Parachute Regiment 
(Paras) or the Royal Marine Commandos (Commandos) for example. Although the Paras are 
one of the main recruiting grounds for the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Commandos for 
the Special Boat Service (SBS), the commitment to combat by members of the Paras and the 
Commandos in Afghanistan has been exceptional. In this regard, Guards regiments, Calvary 
units (Light Dragoons for example in HERRICK 10), and Regiments of the Line (the Rifles, 
Mercian, Yorkshire etc) have been involved and distinguished themselves in intense and 
protracted fighting, killing large numbers of enemy combatants95. Even within the United 
Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) there are a number of elements: SAS, SBS, Special 
Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR)96, Special Forces Support Group (SFSG formally 1 Para but 
made up of elements of the RAF Regiment)97, 18 Signal Regiment98 and the Joint Special 
Forces Aviation Wing99. The granularity between the SAS and the SRR is fine, as is the 
granularity between SFSG and the 2nd or 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. This idea 
is emphasised to an even greater extent as all infantry soldiers do exactly the same phase 1&2 
training: trainees for the Paras, Guards or regiments of the line all train at the Infantry 
Training Centre, Catterick; and those wishing to promote to corporal or sergeant in the 
infantry (including the Paras) do exactly the same promotion course at Brecon.        
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Any Land Force will have a variety of combat, combat support, combat service 
support and combat command support elements100. Combat elements will include armoured, 
armoured reconnaissance, infantry and attack aviation units. Whereas combat service support 
includes Royal Logistic Corps, Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Medical 
Services and Adjutant General’s Corp (AGC). Although a modern operation such as 
Afghanistan can reduce the notion of a frontline to one of semantics101, the commitment to 
combat required by someone in the AGC is markedly different to someone in an infantry 
regiment. While a soldier from the AGC may find themselves in combat (an insurgent 
ambush for example) s/he will not be expected to go on ‘fighting patrols’ on a daily basis, 
where contact with the enemy is a daily experience. Without recognition of this granularity, 
Henriksen’s point regarding commitment to combat is not as sophisticated as it needs to be.   
3.4 Being and Doing: Existentialist Thought  
‘The essence’ states Henriksen ‘of the difference between a soldier and a warrior is 
this existential commitment’102. ‘Being a warrior’ he maintains ‘cannot be reduced to 
instrumental considerations’103 and argues that ‘to say that a commitment is existential is to 
define it as irreducible to clear cut drives or calculations of benefit to the individual’104. He 
locates the use of the word existential in the context of the warrior’s ‘commitment to master 
and experience warfare, who is willing and able to kill and risk sacrificing his life in 
combat’105. It is clear that Henriksen makes a clear distinction between ‘being a warrior’ and 
‘instrumental considerations’ associated with what he does. The warrior’s mastery and 
experience of warfare is based upon ‘their intrinsic existential commitment’106. Using the 
imagery of the spectrum discussed in chapter 1 the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ 
may be represented as follows:  
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this argument, the Achilles figure is associated with ‘being’ and ‘existential’, whereas, the 
battlefield technician with ‘doing’ and ‘instrumental’. For Coker ‘the warrior…like an 
ordinary soldier, is a product of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, or what I would prefer to 
call the existential and instrumental realms’107.  
‘War’ Coker maintains ‘is transformative’108 [emphasis original] in that war ‘allows a 
warrior to tap into the vein of his own heroism. It allows him to lead an authentic life’109 
[emphasis original]. Warriors, according to Coker, are ‘three-dimension figures, not two-, 
because they also subscribe to a historic myth, which is where Achilles becomes 
important’110. ‘The true warrior has a vocation’ and ‘when he goes into battle for the first 
time he finds himself. He becomes, to use the language of existentialism, an authentic 
being’111. In The Future of War Coker discusses what he describes as ‘The Warrior Meme’112 
the third of which is authenticity113. By the twentieth century, war, he observed, had become 
more disenchanting for the warrior114 which meant that ‘to authenticate his existence on the 
battlefield’ the warrior had to dig deeper into his own subconscious115. ‘To overcome 
alienation re-engagement with life is required’116, however, as the world entered the nuclear 
era ‘the authenticity meme came under intense challenge’117. ‘The attempt’ he maintains ‘to 
“authenticate” the warrior was as self-defeating in the 1970s as it had been in World War II. 
An earlier generation of existentialists’ he continues ‘like Heidegger, Sartre and Camus had 
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Existential Instrumental 
insisted we accept that alienation is an objective condition of life. Part of what it is to be 
‘authentic’ is to grasp, accept and, perhaps, even affirm this fact’118.  
Following Henriksen and Coker it may prove profitable to unpack the distinction 
between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ by exploring further the following ideas: what does existential 
mean, what is authenticity, and what is alienation and how do these ideas relate to the warrior 
and or the soldier? 
The origin of the word ‘existential’ dates to the late seventeenth century and comes
from the Latin existentialis, from existentia meaning: ‘1, existence; 2, that by which essence 
becomes actual’119. In English it is an adjective and means: ‘1, of or relating to existence; 2, 
Logic (of a proposition etc.) affirming or implying the existence of a thing; 3, Philos. 
Concerned with existence, esp. with human existence as viewed by existentialism’120. The 
word ‘existentially’ is an adverb and carries the same meaning as ‘existence’: ‘n. 1 the fact or 
condition of being or existing. 2 the manner of one’s existence or living, esp. under adverse 
conditions (a wretched existence). 3 an existing thing. 4 all that exists’121. When used in 
association with a human, the word ‘existential’ implies the ‘being’ or ‘existence’ of that 
person. The reason why it is frequently connected with existentialism is because this 
philosophical movement explored the concept of what ‘existence’ means for a human. 
Unfortunately, ‘existential is often thrown around meaninglessly or used in odd ways’122. One 
example would be to say that ‘something is existential’, without a further qualifying noun.   
The word ‘existentialism’ derives ‘from the Danish existents-forhold ”condition of 
existence” (frequently used by Kierkegaard), from existential’123. Existentialism is ‘a 
philosophical theory or approach which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as 
a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will’124. 
The word ‘existentialist’ is both a noun and an adjective: (n) ‘a philosopher who emphasizes 
freedom of choice and personal responsibility’; (adj) (relating to or involving 
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existentialism) ”existentialist movement”; “existentialist philosophy”; “the existentialist 
character of his ideas”125’. In this thesis the word existentialist will be used to refer to 
‘thought’ or a philosopher within or pertaining to, the existentialist movement or philosophy.  
‘Being’ for humans126, or to use Heidegger’s word ‘Dasein’127, is an essential 
component in seeking to understand what it is ‘to be’ a person, or what it is to ‘exist’ as a 
man/woman. Existentialists normally classify ‘Being’ in a number of ways: being-in-itself, 
being-in-situation, being-in-the-world, being-for-others and being-for-itself128. A common 
idea in existentialist thinking is that a person ‘suddenly becomes “aware” of their own 
existence’129. ‘Awakening’ in existentialist thought occurs when a person becomes aware of 
their own being and of the resultant change this ‘awakening’ brings in their understanding, 
perception of and relationship with other people. Essentially, it is the moment when one 
discovers that one is a distinct and unique individual. Nietzsche described it as ‘a time came 
when one rubbed one’s eyes: one is still rubbing them today. One had been dreaming: and the 
first and foremost dreamers was – Old Kant’130. Kierkegaard observes that, ‘anxiety is a 
qualification of dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. Awake, the 
difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is 
an intimated nothing’131. What animated existentialist thinkers was their contention that the 
majority did not live their own lives but rather lived lives expected of them by others, the 
many, the crowd.  
In existentialist thought, authenticity is possible only for those who are awake to their 
existence, their being. Nietzsche asks, ‘what does your conscious say? – “You shall become 
the person you are”132. For Heidegger authenticity was the truth of Dasein because it was 
‘most primordial’133. He elaborates his position by stating that, ‘resoluteness, as authentic 
Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it 
becomes a free-floating “I”, and how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, 
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is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? [all emphases original]134’. In other 
words, to live an authentic life means to engage in my own projects, as my own as I live in 
the world. To be authentic in existentialist terms, the projects I engage in must be mine, 
because of my own understanding of myself and what it means to be me, free from external 
constraints and expectations. ‘Authenticity’, according to Crowell, ‘defines a condition on self-
making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I 
find myself in’135.   
The opposite of living an authentic life is that of living an inauthentic one. As one 
might expect, inauthentic life is the opposite of what it means to live authentically. In Being 
and Nothingness136, Sartre uses illustrations of how some construct themselves around the 
expectation of others. One of his famous examples is that of a waiter. In this illustration the 
waiter is inauthentic in that he was only playing the role of being a waiter137. A person may 
be described as being inauthentic whenever they are merely occupying a role. An example of 
living an inauthentic life might be a man who chooses a career path because that particular 
career path is one that is expected of him by either his family or community. This career is 
not his own choice but one made for others and their expectation of him; being-for-others 
rather than being-for-itself.   
Existentialists use the word alienation to describe that state whenever the ‘self’ gets a 
glimpse of what it could be but instantly intuits that it is not that. Sartre’s paradoxical 
sounding assertion is an excellent illustration, ‘yet the for-itself is. It is, we may say, even if it 
is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not’138. In other words, and without 
wishing to sound just as paradoxical, ‘myself’ sees its ‘potential self’ understands that it is 
not that ‘self’ and lives in the consequent alienation from that ‘potential self’. The result of 
this is that those who are awake, live with the reality of their alienation and resultant ‘angst’ 
of that alienation or as Kierkegaard would also describe it, existing in ‘despair’.  
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The subject of angst or despair is central in much of Kierkegaard’s thought. In 
Sickness Unto Death, he argues that there are three kinds of despair: i. despair at not being 
conscious of having a self ‘(Despair Improperly So Called)’; ii. in despair at not willing to be 
oneself; iii. in despair at willing to be oneself139. Not to live in despair he argues later in this 
book ‘must mean the annihilation of the possibility of being this; if it is to be true that a man 
is not in despair, one must annihilate the possibility every instant’. In effect what Kierkegaard 
is saying is that the only way to be free from despair is to annihilate the possibility of 
becoming ‘one’s-self’, remaining unaware of one’s own potential. To be awake to one’s 
potential is to invite despair, according to Kierkegaard. Indeed he maintains, ‘so then it is an 
infinite advantage to be able to despair; and yet it is not only the greatest misfortune and 
misery to be in despair; no, it is perdition’140. To be conscious of one’s alienation is to be 
aware of Dasein’s potential and yet it is to accept, as an advantage, the perdition of despair. It 
is little wonder that Kierkegaard lived a somewhat lonely life.   
Going to war for the warrior does not guarantee authenticity in an existentialist sense; 
someone can be inauthentic in any setting. War creates a very specific and possibly unique 
set of opportunities (in combat with an enemy, using direct-fire weapons) for an individual to 
be authentic in a distinctive environment or as Coker described it ‘when he goes into battle 
for the first time he finds himself. He becomes, to use the language of existentialism, an 
authentic being’141. In existentialist thought looking at the content of someone’s life does not 
reveal authenticity; that would reduce the idea of authenticity to a functional act of utility. 
Function and utility are concepts that fit easily with the notion of the battlefield technician.  
An act, in existentialist thought, is inauthentic if that act is done for the sake of duty or some 
other external motive, like the praise of others, or simply because it is what ‘one’ does. But I 
can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this 
way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I 
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commit myself because I intuit that such action enables me to realise my own personal 
project.  
For example, as a thought experiment, imagine a foot patrol in Afghanistan which 
comes under heavy enemy fire. Seeing the gravity of the situation Cpl A decides to take 
action B, which as a consequence puts his life at great risk. If Cpl A decided upon B because 
B was expected of him by the others in the patrol, in existentialist thought, he has acted 
inauthentically, because he was playing a part given to him. However, if Cpl A does B 
because B is how he perceives himself and is owned by Cpl A as his choice in his project of 
becoming, then Cpl A has acted authentically. In this case A’s actions are not as a result of 
role playing but centred in his understanding of who he perceives himself to be. In both cases, 
Cpl A acts bravely, possibly saving the lives of his men. However, it is only in the latter case 
that he has succeeded in being authentic because he acted as himself and not in relation to a 
role expected of him. To those in the patrol, A’s actions will be highly regarded. However, 
only Cpl A will know if he has performed as an actor playing a part or acted as himself, 
revealing someone involved in the process of becoming. Herein lies the fundamental 
difference. With the role of the actor, his ability to continue in that role is bounded by the part 
created for him by the expectations of ‘others’: he cannot go beyond that part for it is not his 
own, it is the creation of ‘others’. Whereas, if A’s actions were part of his self-awareness of 
his own choice, then action B was an integral element of his ontological development (similar 
to Maslow’s self-actualisation). 
3.5 Conclusions  
A Cartesian approach to a ‘subject’ tends to be mechanistic, viewing the 
‘subject/object’ as a substance with definable properties and that conform to universal laws of 
behaviour. This approach tends to focus upon mechanical, rational and logical factors. In 
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existentialist thought, what it means to be, or of being, cannot be fully understood in terms of 
a universal law of behaviour, ‘an aspect that is measured not in terms of an objective 
inventory of what I am but in terms of my way of being it’. Tragically, the nobility of the 
Cartesian ‘subject’ had been reduced by the nineteenth and early twentieth century to a 
desubjectified utility to be used and defined by what it was able to do within the 
industrialised machine. However, when confronted with industrial carnage, those who had 
been objectified did not behave as conditioned parts of an inhuman machine. Instead of 
Pavlovian response, the majority of soldiers, regardless of nationality, and to their great 
honour responded with remarkable restraint.  
Any definition of what the warrior is, in a Western construct, must firstly reflect a
societal model based upon mutual service, in terms of profitable exchange, where the warrior 
is brought into a specific relationship with society in general. In a Western social setting, this 
exchange relationship is based upon serving a political cause for pay. It is this that 
distinguishes the warrior from the mercenary. Secondly, it must be able to accommodate 
Cartesian and Existentialist thought in terms of both ‘being’ which is existential and ‘doing’ 
which is instrumental. Thirdly, it must offer a basis upon which to distinguish the warrior 
from the soldier but offers the granularity required to reflect the complexity of soldiering in a 
modern army like the British Army.  
The following definition of what the warrior is, is drawn from each of the three
sections in this chapter. A warrior is:  
A professional soldier whose individual ‘being’ is intuited in combat (using direct-fire 
weapons) and who embracing the cost of their authenticity (killing and risk to life and 
limb) is prepared to accept the angst of alienation when not in combat.   
The use of the words ‘a professional soldier’ locates this definition of a warrior within a 
specifically Western social imaginary, and reflects the social and political process of mutual 
exchange inherent within a social contract. It also follows Henriksen’s helpful observation 
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that distinguishes the warrior from the mercenary. The words ‘whose individual “being” is 
intuited in combat’ identifies the warrior as a person who, to use the language of existentialist 
thought, is awakened to his/her ‘being’ and their distinct individuality. Their experience of 
combat provides the context of the “self’s situatedness of-itself” and in that moment, 
discovers him/herself in a unique and potentially life-changing manner.  
The words ‘in combat (using direct-fire weapons)’ makes a clear distinction between 
the warrior who engages an enemy combatant ‘at close hand’ and the drone pilot who is ‘at a 
distance’ and has a ‘dislocated experience of the battlefield’. It also locates the warrior’s 
understanding of him/herself offering a vivid expression of what it means to be, and the 
opportunity to be, authentic. This, however, has a cost to the warrior; s/he must embrace the 
reality and actuality of killing and the risk of being killed in order to experience their own 
authenticity. A deeper and more profound price the warrior must pay, also reflects the wider 
professional role expected of him/her and that is ‘the angst of alienation when not in combat’. 
The profession of arms is such that the warrior does not spend the majority of their military 
service on the battlefield. For much of their military service the warrior will be expected to 
train and prepare for future operational deployments. In the British Army they are no 
different in this regard to every other professional soldier. The difference of course for the 
warrior is that s/he must endure the angst of alienation from the context in which their 
authenticity has been experienced in a powerful and potentially life-changing manner.   
A word of caution is required here. The warrior’s preparedness to accept the angst of 
alienation when not combat, might be pushed to an intolerable level if the tasks required of 
him/her are not directly related to training and preparation: for battle, combat situations or 
developing their martial skills. Most infantry soldiers despise the mundanity of barrack life. 
Various inspections and internal validations of inventory are essential; they are, nevertheless, 
mind-numbingly tedious. Excessive administration and tasks that have no immediate link 
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with their sense of authenticity might function as a false type of alienation, in that it 
introduces a secondary removal from the battlefield and his/her martial sense of ‘being’. If 
allowed to continue and measures are not taken to rectify the problem, this might begin to 
affect the moral component of the warrior’s fighting power.   
The thought experiment outlined in chapter 1 imagined a spectrum between the 
Warrior and the Weapons Platform, with Achilles as an example at one extreme and the 
battlefield technician/weapons platform at the other. Developing this concept further by 
applying it to the concept of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ this idea may be expressed in the following 
diagram: 
In figure 9 the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, and the figure on the extreme 
right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield technician. 
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Fig 9 
What this diagram illustrates in the granularity required when considering the distinction 
between the warrior and the soldier. When viewed through the lens of extreme reference 
points (Achilles and the battlefield technician/ weapons platform) the distance between the 
two is literally and metaphorically immense. However, the distance between the two 
extremes is populated with a spectrum in which the distinction can be less easy to identify. 
This can be seen within the UKSF (SAS, SBS, SRR, SFSG etc). The granularity is also fine 
but distinguishable between UKSF and the rest of the Combat Arms. This chapter has 
demonstrated that a sophisticated understanding of a modern army, like the British Army, is 
required when creating a distinction between the warrior and the soldier and as figures 8 and 
9 have shown this may be framed in the language of ‘being’ and ‘doing’.  
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Chapter 4 
Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars 
4.1 Introduction  
There is considerable debate and disagreement among some scholars and writers1, as 
to whether war has been undergoing a profound change or evolution in the late twentieth 
century and early years of the twenty-first century. Proponents of these new wars2, as they are 
frequently referred to, maintain that the classical definition of war is inapplicable to the forms 
of organised violence witnessed in many modern conflicts; the essence of the argument being 
that the nature of these ‘small wars’ could be cultural, religious or economic. Others argue 
that although the character of war may change, its essential nature remains the same3 and 
fundamentally reject any suggestion that war has evolved. Gray is adamant that ‘war is 
organised violence threatened or waged for political purposes. That is its nature. If the 
behaviour under scrutiny is other than that just defined, it is not war’4.  
This chapter will consider the nature of war both in its classic definition and as it has
been described by those whose maintain that the ‘new wars’ are, in essence, essentially 
different. Structurally the chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first will primarily 
consist in an examination of the classic definition of war, as described by the Prussian Army 
officer and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. This will involve a detailed consideration of his 
work on war’s essential nature. Central to this will be an analysis of the question: is war 
Trinitarian? The proposition, espoused by some scholars that the universal, eternal truth of 
war’s nature was articulated by Clausewitz will be carefully examined primarily against a 
post-modern model. The second part of this chapter will consider the phenomenon described 
by some as ‘new wars’, including a review of several narratives of war utilized by some to 
both explain war and identify trends in modern war. It will also examine the role of the state 
and politics in these ‘new wars’ before considering how International Law, war and terrorism 
are also understood to interact in relation to them. 
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4.2 Classic Definition of War 
Man’s relationship with war has been an enduring reality, so too has his interest in the 
study of war and warfare. In the West5, the classic work of Thucydides, History of the 
Peloponnesian War, continues to remain influential6. The compendium of Flavius Renatus 
Vegetius, Concerning Military Matters, produced sometime around AD390, was translated 
widely and even used by George Washington7. Niccoló Machiavelli, perhaps more famous 
for his work The Prince (1513), also wrote a seven volume work called Art of War (1519- 
20)8. In the East, the classic treatise is without doubt Sun Tzu’s The Art of War9. However, 
particularly in regard to the modern Western way of war, the undisputed classic is Carl von 
Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege or in English On War10. The purpose of this section is the 
consideration of the extent to which Clausewitz’s theory of war is applicable in the twenty- 
first century; it is not a detailed study of On War11.  
Some vigorously maintain that the use of the concept or term ‘new wars’ is 
inappropriate. His modern defenders maintain that On War is more than a culturally situated 
study, influential as it has undoubtedly been. Instead, what commentators like Gray contend 
is that Clausewitz produced the definitive explanation of ‘the eternal features of war’s 
nature’12. Even van Creveld in his treatment of why Clausewitz’s work has been ‘able to 
withstand every kind of political, social, economic and technological change’, entitled his 
paper ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’13. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, On War 
continues to be a key text the field of military studies; that is for any seeking to understand 
the essential features of war14. Although published some 182 years ago (1832) Clausewitz’s 
magnum opus continues to be considered the equivalent of ‘a Copernican shift’ in military 
thinking15. Consequently, this section will also explore the unique contribution that 
Clausewitz’s work made that still resonates so long after its publication.    
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4.2.1 Clausewitz and the Nature of War 
Clausewitz never completed his work On War, at least to his own satisfaction16; only 
chapter one was ever thoroughly finished in this manner17. This has given rise to some 
commentators using phrases like, ‘The Two Clausewitzes’18 and ‘the younger’ or ‘mature 
Clausewitz’19 in an attempt to help reconcile what are thought by some to be 
inconsistencies20. Gat prefers to argue that ‘the obscurity of Clausewitz’s text has continually 
left room for conflicting and unhistorical interpretations’21. Inherent within this perceived 
contrast between the younger and the more mature military philosopher’s thought, is the 
notion that his theory of war might have developed through continual reflection and practical 
observation. This basic idea that his theory of war may have developed or been refined seems 
at odds with those who talk about Clausewitz’s discovery or statement of ‘the eternal realities 
of war’22. If Clausewitz’s thoughts on war developed during his own, short, lifetime it seems 
reasonable to argue that reflection on the nature, or essence, of war might also have benefited 
from a further process of refinement or revision, post-Clausewitz. For example, Newton’s 
three laws of physics were not displaced by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, indeed 
they were incorporated within it. The significant difference between the two ideas in physics 
is that Newton’s universe was fixed whereas Einstein’s expanded and was in a state of 
constant movement. Those historians, who contend that Clausewitz’s theory of war is in 
essence eternal and universal, and thereby fixed and unchanging, belong more to the 
Enlightenment world of Newton’s fixed properties rather than the universe that expands and 
evolves.  
Howard observes that ‘apart from the authors of memoirs and narrative histories, 
writers on war had hitherto fallen into three categories’23: those who dealt with practical 
questions such as ‘armament, supply, drill and deployment’24; those who maintained that 
there were no principles of war and where everything was a matter of individual genesis25; 
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finally, those who described war as a science, having laws and principles for its conduct. In 
chapter 3 of On War, Clausewitz specifically addresses the question of whether it was 
appropriate to use the terms ‘art’ and ‘science’ to war. He accepted that ‘all thought is art’26 
and ‘that the term “the art of war” was more suitable than “the science of war”’27. Clausewitz 
maintained that war is an act of human interaction:  
We therefore conclude that war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; 
rather it is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between major interests, 
which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way it differs from other conflicts. 
Rather than comparing it to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, 
which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to 
politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. 
Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops...28
It is interesting to note that when Engels wrote to Marx he said, ‘among other things I 
am now reading Clausewitz’s On War. A strange way of philosophising, but very good on his 
subject… Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade’29. This allusion to commerce as a 
form of war is also frequently found in Jihadist writings30. However, Clausewitz was not 
writing about economics, science or art, these were little more than illustrations to 
communicate his essential interest. His focus was rather the philosophical consideration of 
the nature of war: ‘but in war more than any other subject we must begin by looking at the 
nature of the whole’31. In the following definition we can perhaps detect something of his 
mature philosophical reflection on this subject in his confident assertion: 
I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but go straight 
to the heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. 
Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by 
imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tried through physical force to compel the other to 
do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him 
incapable of further resistance. 
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.32
Clausewitz’s philosophical world was very much Kantian, in that he believed or 
accepted that an archetypal form of war existed33. In other words, he would have sought to 
identify what it was about war that conformed to the basic Kantian notion of the ‘thing-in-
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itself’ (Ding-an-sich)34. Lenoard contends that ‘he looked upon this absolute concept of war 
as an ideal, a rule, by which to measure all military activities’35. Nietzsche’s critique of the 
inherent philosophical weakness of this rationalist belief did not yet exist. This makes 
Gallie’s comment concerning Clausewitz’s intention that ‘in this he was almost certainly 
deluded, obsessed by the would-be philosopher’s mare’s-nest’36, excessive. He argues that 
‘there is nothing particularly deep or difficult – or revealing – about our received conception 
of war. War is, logically as well as physically, a rough-and-ready as well as brutal and bloody 
affair. And philosophers and military men have been, for once, at one and right in refusing to 
waste their time in worrying about its essential nature’37. Although he makes some bold 
assertions, Gallie offers little by way of explanation. Why is war a logically rough-and-ready 
as well as bloody affair?38 Is there something inherent within war that gives it this 
philosophical, logical necessity? To make this assertion one must surely have already 
discerned its essential nature in order to make such a claim. Unfortunately, Gallie does little 
more than dismiss the very idea, without stating what it is he is dismissing. Although the 
basic preposition that Clausewitz has identified ‘eternal, universal truths’ may be questioned 
as an absolute truth, the fact that his insight into an important aspect of war has spanned three 
centuries is little less than astounding.  
It is clear that in On War Clausewitz held to the proposition that not only did war 
have an objective nature (stated above) but that it also had a subjective nature39. This was an 
accepted part of German philosophical thought at this time. Gray is correct when he asserts 
that from this perspective the objective nature of war would remain unchanging40. Whether 
Clausewitz’s identification is correct and universal is a matter for debate. The subjective 
nature of war would be seen in the character in which it manifested itself. In this regard it 
could, and indeed was subject to change and development, for example, in regard to 
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technology, application or the size of the armies involved41. Clausewitz was clear that 
modern war would have this dual, objective and subjective nature.  
Another important dualism in Clausewitzian thought is his notion of limited and
absolute war; what he describes as ‘absolute war and real war’42. Howard maintains that 
Clausewitz had this distinction in his mind for many years before he sought to give greater 
clarity to the idea in his later rewriting of On War43. In his note of 10 July 1827 concerning 
his plans for revising On War, Clausewitz writes, ‘this distinction between the two kinds of 
war is a matter of actual fact’44. In his revised first chapter he outlines the distinction between 
a theoretical concept and the physical reality of actual war. ‘Once the antagonists have ceased 
to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is no 
longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality 
supplied the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead’45. This is 
classically a form of Platonic thought, in which the physical expression of an idealised form 
is only an imperfect copy of the perfect ideal46.  
Immediately following his articulation of this move from the theoretical to the real, or 
absolute (in his philosophical use of the term) to the limited (realised physical expression), he 
refers to the subject he mentioned in the second section of his revised first book; that is, the 
political47. For Clausewitz, politics gave war its purpose, shaped its goals and set its desired 
outcomes. He explained that: 
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also 
want to make clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change 
it into something entirely different…. The main lines along which military events 
progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout 
the war into subsequent peace…. War cannot be divorced from political life; and 
whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two 
elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of 
sense.48       
Clausewitz uses the political component of war to give the expression of real/limited war its 
sense of purpose and meaning49: ‘war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no 
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sense autonomous’50. However, he also argued forcefully that ‘war is an act of force, and 
there is no logical limit to the application of that force’51. He dismissed the idea that ‘kind- 
hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat 
an enemy without too much bloodshed…. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be 
exposed’52. This was a reaction to those who had argued that the careful marshalling and 
disposition of troops was enough on occasions to settle a war. He accepted that ‘there may be 
a skilful ordering of priority of engagements in strategy; indeed that is what strategy is all 
about, and we do not wish to deny it. We do claim, however, that direct annihilation of the 
enemy’s forces must always be the dominant consideration’53. War for Clausewitz was a 
bloody affair, which had embedded within its nature a propensity to violence in its most 
extreme forms.  
Herein lays a fundamental juxtaposition within Clausewitzian philosophy. On the one 
hand he maintains that ‘the maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the 
simultaneous use of the intellect’54. War, he argues, is a continuation of political policy by 
other means; as such it provided the necessary mechanism to give sense, purpose, meaning to 
the applied use of force. The planned use of force by commanders should also manifest 
intellect, at both its strategic and tactical application. Whereas on the other hand he also 
stated that ‘to introduce in the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an 
absurdity…. War is an act of violence pursued to its utmost ends’55. Howard observes that 
‘this model of dialectically opposed but linked concepts clearly fascinated Clausewitz, as it 
did so many of his contemporaries among German thinkers’56. Heuser is less charitable in her 
contention that ‘the consequence is…. that Clausewitz never managed fully to think through 
some of the implications of his own discovery of the relationship between political aims and 
the conduct of war’57.  
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Liddell Hart, one of Clausewitz’s most severe critics, blamed this dichotomy for the 
destructive manner in which the First World War was conducted on the Western Front58. In 
response Howard notes that ‘Clausewitz’s defenders could reply that, given the issues that 
were seen to be at stake, the war could only be settled by such a ‘trail of moral and physical 
forces by means of the latter’59. He continues that ‘the First World War was conducted as it 
was not because the major military figures happened to have read Clausewitz, but because it 
was so determined by the social and political structure of their epoch’60. At one level this 
observation is valid as it places the blame for the carnage of that human apocalypse squarely 
upon the shoulders of those who made the decisions that led to the major nations in Europe 
stumbling into war61. However, if governments and their military staffs were convinced that 
the theory proposed by Clausewitz was the universal truth of war, this dilutes Howard’s 
defence. It produces a zero-sum approach to a known universal principle that ultimately may 
have created the conditions in which this war escalated to heretofore unimagined levels of 
death and destruction. This type of defence is not unlike the one that goes: Oppenheimer was 
a physicist; the decision to use the atomic bomb had nothing to do with him. The reader must 
determine for themselves the weight of responsibility upon the noted physicist.           
Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’ is an indispensable, integral part of his philosophy 
of war62.  
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given 
case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical 
trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be 
regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which 
the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument 
of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the 
commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be 
kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of 
courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the 
particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the 
business of the government alone. 
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Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three 
tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.63
It is tempting to contemplate that this section indicates Clausewitz’s mature reflection upon 
the theory of war, in which he groups together those component parts that in his mind are a 
philosophically necessary part. The simple and yet striking analogy of war being ‘like an 
object suspended between three magnets’ goes some way to encapsulate the essence of his 
philosophy64.  
4.2.2  Is War Trinitarian? 
At the beginning of this sub-section it is essential to offer some parameters as to its 
purpose. It will not be an evaluation of how influential Clausewitz’s theory of war has been65. 
Neither will it offer an exhaustive survey of opinions as to the merit or otherwise of his 
philosophy66. It will however, seek to examine the extent to which Clausewitz established the 
identification of war’s essential nature. This process will help establish the conditions to 
better explore the concept of ‘new wars’ in the second section of this chapter.  
Clausewitz set himself the task of identifying ‘eternal truths about war’67. There are a 
number of scholars today (for example, Gray, Smith, Echevarria etc.) who maintain that he 
achieved just that. In an article that specifically challenges the whole premise of ‘new wars’ 
Smith argues that the very concept is based upon a false premise. He states that ‘it is the 
tactics within war that vary, not the inherent nature of war’68. We can see his philosophical 
premise clearly in his conclusion, ‘what we call low-intensity conflict can only be fully 
understood within Clausewitzian parameters, which embrace the entire spectrum of war’69. 
This only makes sense philosophically, if we accept that Clausewitz ‘established the eternal 
universal realities of war’70. The difficulty with this proposition is that the philosophical 
sceptic might well ask, ‘whose reality’, ‘whose universe’ and ‘whose truth’71. 
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This is not some mere philosophical game, constructed for an abstract proposition that 
has little practical worth in the ‘real world’72. The current ‘war on terror’ or the insurgencies 
in Afghanistan or Iraq specifically revolve around competing world views that are 
diametrically opposed to one another. The idea that Clausewitz identified 182 years ago the 
universal realities of war that are universally applicable in any cultural setting or period of 
history is impossible to intellectually maintain in a postmodern world where there are no 
absolutes. Even Kant’s categorical imperative is no longer considered universally true in 
every setting73.  
The premise that the nature of war is political is not logically self-evident. Why can 
the nature of war not be primarily economic or religious? What is it about the ‘thingness’ of 
war which makes it political with no possibility of it being anything other? Keegan makes a 
similar criticism of Clausewitzian doctrine by emphasising the cultural situatedness of this 
particular philosophy.  
His [Clausewitz] decision to ignore Ottoman military institutions flawed the integrity 
of his theory at its roots. To look beyond military slavery into the even stranger 
military cultures of the Polynesians, the Zulus and the samurai, whose forms of 
warfare defied altogether the rationality of politics as it is understood by Westerners, 
is to perceive how incomplete, parochial and ultimately misleading is the idea that 
war is the continuation of politics.74     
Keegan states that the belief in the primacy of politics rather than culture was not specifically 
personal to Clausewitz but was rather the position of Western philosophers75 and a product of 
Western culture at that time.  
Keegan’s main point is simple. It is that the identification of politics as the essence of 
war is itself a cultural phenomenon, sited within the specific philosophical milieu of 
Enlightenment thinking. Gray, however, completely misses the philosophical point of 
Keegan’s argument. He accepts the important role culture plays in different expressions of 
warfare. However, Gray then proceeds to maintain that ‘the important fact that war is cultural 
does not diminish the logical and historical authority of the argument that war primarily is 
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political’76. What Gray apparently fails to appreciate is the epistemological space that 
Keegan’s argument creates within which culture has just as valid a claim to be the essence of 
war as politics does. If Clausewitz identified the universal eternal component that defines 
war, then it would be impossible for any epistemological space to be created. The 
fundamental issue that all universal truths must confront is the logical difficulty of relativism 
(whose truth, whose reality etc). Why, from a purely philosophical position, should politics 
have a more legitimate claim than religion or culture to be the essential essence of war? This 
question is totally ignored by those who defend Clausewitzian theory of war.  
Another scholar associated with being anti-Clausewitzian is Martin van Creveld. The
section in his book entitled ‘Nontrinitarian War’ has given rise to some interesting 
responses77. Van Creveld is not anti-Clausewitz; his article ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’78 is 
evidence of his balanced appreciation of the great Prussian’s work and its abiding value to 
those who study war. He argues that it is precisely because Clausewitz sought to delve deeply 
into the subject itself, rather than concentrate solely on its physical expression, that 
establishes his enduring worth. ‘In the end, it is precisely this very lack of practicality as 
usually understood that makes him supremely practical, and able to survive change as well’79. 
However, what van Creveld does, much like Keegan and others, is maintain that Clausewitz’s 
claim of universality must be located within the age when this approach to philosophy was 
accepted as valid. The opening sentence of the sub-section ‘Nontrinitarian War’ gives the 
clue to the thrust of what is to follow, ‘The Clausewitzian Universe rests on the assumption 
that war is….’80. The argument that van Creveld offers, followed by many others, is that the 
‘Clausewitzian Universe’ is a historically, culturally as well politically, distinct period within 
a significant, albeit limited, portion of humanity’s existence.  
The relevance of this cannot be overstated. Any consideration of the current 
manifestations of war or for that matter of future conflicts must do so with this basic 
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proposition in mind. There was a time in which the Newtonian universe had been recognised, 
its properties established and its laws confirmed. Newton’s model was the universal model. 
However, when Einstein discovered the general theory of relativity, humanity’s 
understanding of the universe it now found itself within, had fundamentally changed. The 
universe was now recognised as being fluid and in a continual state of motion. It still had 
laws that conformed to certain principles in certain conditions, but the older norms of 
thinking about the universe had to be seen for what there were, limited. Those who defend 
Clausewitz do so as if they had not been exposed to the relativism that has swept the certainty 
of Enlightenment thought away, rendering it as an expression of a culturally biased, and 
specific view of the world. It is as though On War has been given or afforded an exception 
bubble within which its claim to universality may remain, philosophically unchallenged.  
Van Creveld correctly identified that Clausewitz’s concept of the ‘state’ was a
particularly ‘modern’ understanding81. In this instance ‘modern’ stands in opposition to 
whatever came before; although it also has a very specific philosophical concept82. The thrust 
of this strand of his argument is quite simple: the state is a recent European development83 
and that before its creation, Clausewitz’s threefold division could not have existed. Van 
Creveld conducts a limited historical survey to provide evidence for his main contention. 
When ‘we retreat from the early modern age into the Middle Ages the distinction between 
government, army, and people becomes more tenuous still. As the term “feudal” implies’84. It 
is, he contends, hardly possible in this period to speak of governments let alone states. ‘Under 
such circumstances, to speak of war in modern Clausewitzian terms as something made by 
the state for political ends is to misrepresent reality’85. However, when he considers the 
classical world he accepts that, ‘the Clausewitzian Universe appears to be more relevant than 
it was during the Middle Ages’86.  
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His survey ends with a reflection on the numerous tribal societies all around the 
world. Those societies, he contends, ‘which did not have the state, also do not recognise the 
distinction between army and people. Such societies do not have armies; it would be more 
accurate to say that they themselves are armies’87. Within the rudimentary nature of tribal 
organisations, van Creveld sees a link to the future with regard to what he calls terrorist 
bands. ‘Instead they point to the future, perhaps more so than the world of states from which 
we seem to be emerging’88. His conclusion is succinct: trinitarian war is only one of the many 
forms of war and even then not the most important89. 
Some of the responses to those who have questioned the universal validity of the 
Clausewitzian philosophy of war have been forceful; the use of language at times has been 
regrettable. Gray is unambiguous in his language; ‘some confused theorists would have us 
believe that war can change its nature. Let us stamp on such nonsense immediately’90. He is 
of the opinion that those who adopt an alternative position are guilty of wilfully misreading, 
if not misquoting On War91. It seems a striking thing to imagine either Keegan or van 
Creveld as confused theorists. In an article defending Clausewitz and his relevance to 
strategic thought he makes reference to ‘the better scholarship on Clausewitz’92. This begs the 
question: what makes this scholarship ‘better’? Could it be any scholarship that agrees with 
his position? Smith suggests that a careful and fair-minded evaluation93 dealing with reading 
Clausewitz, will result in the reader agreeing with his position; Bassford encourages his 
readers to take a closer look at the issues and that that will enable them to realise the point of 
Clausewitz’s work94; and Echevarria effectively accuses van Creveld of a poor use of history 
and lack of intellectual rigour95. It would appear that any who do not adopt a specific position 
are therefore guilty of careless reading, being confused or guilty of a lack of intellectual 
rigour, resulting in nonsense and myth.  
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One approach used by some who defend the Clausewitzian philosophy of war is to 
suggest that those who disagree with it have failed to properly understand the significance 
between the subjective and objective nature of war, as articulated by Clausewitz in On War. 
Gray adopts this particular approach arguing that ‘the continuing authority of Clausewitz’s 
argument that the “objective” nature of war does not change with technology, or indeed with 
anything else’96, ‘Clausewitz’s theory is completely unfazed by the permanence or 
impermanence of the character of war’97. Gray uses this distinction between the objective and 
subjective nature in Clausewitz’s theory of war as his basis of understanding ‘for certain’ a 
great deal about future war98 [emphasis original].  
The philosophical validity of the proposition that Clausewitz established the universal 
truth concerning the objective nature of war has already been discussed in this chapter. It 
should be remembered that Clausewitz did not set out to write a purely philosophical treatise. 
In that regard it is not a work of pure philosophy. Clausewitz sought to ground his 
philosophical exploration in a ‘real world’ setting so that not only might it be remembered 
after a few years, but be of use to military commanders engaged in actual war fighting. This 
however, cannot negate the supposition that On War was intended to be a philosophical 
exploration of the nature of war. That the validity of this part of his work is not dealt with by 
writers like Gray is striking99.  
A second and perhaps more nuanced argument is the notion that On War presents a 
primary and secondary trinity100. In this theory, the primary trinity is:    
composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a 
blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative 
spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, 
which makes it subject to reason alone.
Bassford maintains that if one ‘look[s] more closely…you will realize that it is really made 
up of three categories of forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., “primordial violence, 
hatred and enmity”); non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or 
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intent, such as “the play of chance and probability”); and reason or rational calculation (war’s 
subordination to reason “as an instrument of policy”)’101. The secondary trinity would then be 
the three sets of human actors: the people, the army and the government.  
Gray’s interpretation of the relevance of this argument is: ‘If Clausewitz’s trinity is 
read not as a description of a recent era wherein recognisably modern states had armies, but 
rather as a description of the most fundamental ingredients of warfare, the idea of “trinitarian 
war” dies an instant death’102. He then proceeds to claim that ‘if Clausewitz is deemed 
persuasive, it would be ridiculous, certainly redundant, to refer to trinitarian war. In this 
theory, all war in all periods is trinitarian. Indeed, war cannot be other than trinitarian; it is 
war’s very nature, and an enduring nature at that’103. Echevarria develops this theme when he 
maintains that ‘strictly speaking, then, there is no such thing as trinitarian war because, as any 
review of history shows, the forces Clausewitz described are present in every war, not just the 
wars of nation-states. If they are present in every war, then the term must fall out as a 
discriminator. In other words, if the basis for making a distinction, any distinction, 
disappears, then the distinction itself also vanishes. It follows, then, that since there is no such 
thing as “trinitarian” war, per se, there can be no such thing as “nontrinitarian” war’104.  
In the final summary of his article Gray states, ‘Clausewitz is not holy writ, only 
cannon lore’105. This is a fascinating observation because the argument of a primary and 
secondary trinity looks remarkably like three non-theologians describing their hermeneutic 
and subsequent exegesis of a text, without, perhaps, the precision of the professional 
exegete106. The idea of a primary and secondary trinity is an interesting interpretation. Firstly, 
there is an internal logic to it. Secondly, it clearly identifies the distinction in the text of On 
War on this subject, that some perhaps fail to appreciate. Thirdly, it forces those who wish to 
maintain a different position, to articulate the intellectual basis of any alternative with 
reference to this carefully constructed argument.   
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Any examination of this argument should have at least two distinct parts: firstly, it 
should contain an analysis of the interpretation itself; secondly, a consideration of how that 
interpretation is used.  
Clausewitz does not specifically use the term ‘trinitarian war’ in the portion of On
War under consideration. He describes war as ‘a paradoxical trinity’. This ‘trinity’ is then 
described in two stages: firstly as ‘blind natural force’ (a description Clausewitz uses to 
effectively sum up primordial violence, hated, and enmity), the play of chance and 
probability, and then its element of sub-ordination, as an instrument of policy. The second 
stage is Clausewitz’s elaboration of what he has just described, in which he interprets his own 
‘paradoxical trinity’.  
There appears to be no textual indication that might lend weight to the argument that
Clausewitz was constructing his argument with a primary and secondary trinity in mind. In 
any analysis of a specific interpretation there would frequently be a consideration of the 
context in which that interpretation emerged. For example, when did this notion of a primary 
and secondary trinity emerge? If it has been a consistent understanding of this important 
aspect of Clausewitzian thought, then this may be considered as adding significant weight to 
its credibility. However, if it only emerged in direct response to a specific critique of 
Clausewitzian theory then to borrow a theological expression this might be a case of 
‘theological ex eventu’ or ‘theology after the event’. In other words a reading into the text to 
draw out from the text, a defence, rather than taking what would appear to be a natural 
reading of the text. Clausewitz’s interpretation of the third element of ‘war’s paradoxical trinity’ 
would appear to leave little room for divergence, ‘but the political aims are the business of the 
government alone’. The author of On War unmistakably identifies ‘an instrument of policy’ 
with ‘the political aims of the government’. This is not evidence of primary and secondary 
concepts but that they are identical and therefore one and the same.  
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Echevarria’s notion, however, that there is no such thing as a ‘trinitarian war’ because 
all war is trinitarian and therefore it ceases to function as a discriminator is pure sophistry. 
The logic of his argument would have Clausewitz establishing a non-concept, which he has 
just spent considerable time defending from his critics. It is also founded on the premise that 
there is no other possible interpretation of what Clausewitz’s ‘paradoxical trinity’ means. One 
may not agree with another’s position and seek to articulate those grounds, this is wholly 
appropriate. However, to assume that there is no other legitimate intellectual position is 
questionable at best.  
4.3  New Wars  
The term ‘New Wars’ is frequently linked to Mary Kaldor107. However, van Creveld’s 
earlier, landmark book The Transformation of War and his concept of ‘nontrinitarian war’ 
may be identified as the beginning of an intellectual shift away from, or dissatisfaction with, 
a purely Clausewitzian theory of war. WS Lind’s theory of ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’108, 
written about the same period as van Creveld’s book is another example. There have been 
various other concepts such as, Revolution in Military Affairs, Network Centric Warfare, 
Effects Based Warfare109, which have gained ascendency in some military circles. Gray 
describes these various theories or concepts as part of an on-going quest for a grand narrative 
of war110, of which he catalogues twelve ‘alternative master narratives’111. Of these various 
‘grand narratives’ he endorses the twelfth option: ‘Warfare of many kinds are possible, 
indeed probable. In its political, social, cultural, and strategic essentials, the past history of 
warfare is the best guide to its future. The historical study of warfare provides invaluable 
education on what is likely to come’112.  
Unlike Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Warfare (EBW)113, 
Lind’s theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) and the Revolution in Military Affairs 
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(RMA) are presented very much in terms of a meta-narrative, that they seek to provide an 
overarching narrative able to explain a universal concept, which incorporates all the 
component parts of that particular concept.  
In his influential article, ‘The Changing face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’,
Lind did not give a definite period of time for what he calls the ‘first generation 
warfare’  (1GW); it was not until his 2004 description of 1GW that he contends it runs roughly 
from 1648 to 1860114. This period, he argues, represents tactics of the era of the smoothbore 
musket.  The ‘second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, 
barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire’115. The ‘third generation’ (3GW), which Lind 
refers to as ‘a response to the increase in battlefield power’, was based around the German 
development of manoeuvre rather than attrition tactics116. Lind acknowledges that many of 
the elements from 3GW will be present in fourth generation warfare (4GW), except that 
4GW will merely accentuate them.     
4GW is frequently depicted as being apocalyptic in some of its conclusions about the 
future, which can be imbued with a sense of doom for conventional forces, if not Western 
civilisation itself117. This critique is distinctly balanced when one reads TX Hammes, The 
Sling and the Stone or ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation’118. 
However, as Gray observes, proponents of 4GW ‘tend to write persuasively for the excellent 
reason that 4GW in good part is an empirical reality: it is substantially true’. He then adds, 
‘but for a killer caveat, it is not true enough’119. Osinga maintains that from one perspective, 
4GW is nothing new; it is only another concept for dealing with insurgencies120.  
This criticism, though, seems inadequate. It may appear to some as little more than an 
attempt to defend a Clausewitzian/political approach to the nature of war. One of the central 
strengths of 4GW is that it seeks to identify an evolution in insurgences, by suggesting that 
they may have an interconnecting thread of characteristics, such as being sited in a global 
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context, being media centric and having an ability to effect its target enemy’s ability to raise 
finance in a global market121. The ideological nature of Jihadist insurgences is not political in 
nature, as in a Clausewitzian construct, but essentially religious122. Habeck observes that 
immediately after the attacks on 9/11, Americans agonised over what motivated those 
involved to plan and then execute such a plan. The list offered by analysts, scholars and 
politicians like President Bush, she remarked, was long and varied. One voice was silent, that 
of the attackers123. This is not because they had been silent. Far from it, as Habeck’s book 
shows. The point is that the content of their explanation is not something that a Western 
secular society comprehends or affords the same level of seriousness or weight. ‘The 
consistent need’, she contends, ‘to find explanations other than religious ones for the attacks 
says, in fact, more about the West than it does about the jihadis’124. 
In other words when one of the extremist Islamist groups argue that they are seeking 
to fulfil Allah’s will, this is interpreted as meaning that the underlying motivator indicates 
significant poverty, social deprivation, or it is the voice of the excluded. If this economic 
alienation could therefore be addressed, politically, the religious extremism will dissipate125. 
The social and financial background from and in which some elements of Jihadist extremism 
has flourished is, in comparison with the affluent parts of the West, poor. Habeck’s detailed 
examination of the theological foundation of some of the Jihadist groups proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that those who construct these religious theories passionately believe them, 
even if others do not. The issue that Habeck addresses is that that voice is not granted true 
explanatory power but is consistently reinterpreted so that the answer is political, social, or 
economic but not religious126. The Clausewitzian model, with its insistence upon the political 
nature of war is invariably employed by Western militaries127. The suggestion that Western 
governments are therefore dealing with something new raises an interesting philosophical 
question.    
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‘When do too many exceptions become a new rule or norm?’128 Or to put the same 
question another way, when restoring a classic car at what point does the car being restored 
become a new or different car and what measure do we employ to judge that129. Those who 
contend that new wars are not new but manifestations of a universal truth with an unending 
number of subjective characteristics, never appear to address this issue. If for the sake of this 
thought experiment we think of the role of the media in war, is it intellectually satisfying to 
contend that this role is essentially the same from the Crimean War, through the two world 
wars up to the modern insurgences? Are the black and white images from the Crimean War 
of the same essence as what scholars refer to as the ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ (POTD)130?         
One of the key findings of a report examining POTD is that ‘does not equate to a 
single act of terror – it is not an event, it is part of a process of narrative construction, 
reinforcement and confirmation through deeds’131. ‘POTD has shifted from territorial to 
“visual” theatres of operation’. Is this nothing more than propaganda? ‘Propaganda’, as 
Ignatieff states, ‘has been central to war since the dawn of democracy’132. However, he then 
contends, ‘it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to understand the awesome 
potential for influencing the opinion-base of an enemy, by manipulating modern real-time 
news to his advantage’133. POTD does not so much re-enforce a narrative, as though engaged 
in the kind of narrative war discussed in chapter 2. It is a process of creating a living evolving 
narrative, one which the media corps of Western militaries has huge difficulty responding to 
quickly. Can this really be the same, in essence or nature, as the propaganda of the early 
eighteenth century or the black and white photos from the Crimea? ‘When do too many 
exceptions become a new rule or norm?’       
Clausewitzian theory is essentially Cartesian134 in that it understands the nature of war 
to be a thing, an object (politics), albeit with a multivariate, adaptable subjective character. 
This thesis has sought to establish that in this, it is similar to that other Enlightenment theory 
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of Newtonian135 physics. Why should this particular Enlightenment theoretical model not be 
subjected to the same critique that other Cartesian metaphysical constructs have been? The 
notion that there is only one universal eternal truth, valid in every context, must be 
challenged.  
4.3.1 The Role of the State and Politics in War
The basis of van Creveld’s theory concerning ‘nontrinitarian’ war is his contention 
that ‘war is made predominantly by states or to be exact, by governments’136 and that this 
presumption has not been universally valid both in history and in other non-western cultures 
such as tribal societies137. The issue for Gray is that ‘war is organised violence threatened or 
waged for political purposes. That is its nature. If the behaviour under scrutiny is other than 
that just defined, it is not war’138. However, in the ‘new wars’ described by Kaldor and 
Münkler139 some of the incredibly brutal, organised violence does not appear to have any 
easily identifiable government structures responsible either for the violence or opposed to it. 
In Gray’s maxim, it is questionable whether these ‘new wars’ meet the Clausewitzian criteria. 
Both Kaldor and Münkler cite the statistic that in the early part of the twentieth century, 
roughly 90 per cent of those killed or wounded have been described as combatants under 
International Law. Whereas in these ‘new wars’ there has been a radical turn around in the 
statistics. Some 80 per cent of the killed and wounded in these ‘new wars’ are now civilians 
and only 20 per cent of those were, or could be considered, ‘combatants’140.  
This new type of warfare, according to Kaldor, has to be understood in terms of 
‘global dislocation’141. Globalisation is central to her argument, by which she means global 
interconnectedness (political, economic, military and cultural)142. These new globalised wars 
are set against the backdrop of failed or failing states, hence the dislocation. Kaldor states that 
‘the main implication of globalisation is that territorial sovereignty is no longer available’143. 
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This context is perfect for what she calls ‘identity politics’144. By this she means that identity 
tends to be associated with the politics of ideas, such as religion, or a label that someone is 
born with and cannot change, such as an ethnic identifier145. In these ‘new wars’, she argues, 
‘battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring 
factions is common’146. The failure of the ‘state’ in these cases is usually accompanied by a 
growing privatisation of violence147. Local warlords take the place of recognised state 
structures, although their goal is largely financial and for the establishment of prestige148. 
‘The point’, she observes in relation to these wars is that, ‘the modern distinctions between 
the political and the economic, the public and the private, the military and the civil are 
breaking down’149. Her prognosis is gloomy, ‘the new type of warfare is a predatory social 
condition’150. 
The recent Strategic Defence and Security Review will eventually result in an overall 
reduction in the size of UK’s armed forces. This will be partly based upon the huge cost 
financially to the nation, and as a result of the perceived change in the types of threat to the 
national interest151. Münkler has demonstrated, in contrast, that the ‘new wars’ are not only 
relatively inexpensive to maintain, due to the abundant supply of lightweight automatic 
weapons readily available in a global market, but these wars are themselves downright cheap 
to prepare and wage152. Like Kaldor he contends that these ‘wars are not waged against a 
similarly armed enemy but mainly employ long-term violence against large parts of the 
civilian population’153. For Münkler the most important reason why these new wars are so 
cheap, and therefore easy to start, ‘is that they are funded through asymmetrical relations of 
exchange imposed upon society’154. What he means by this is that force becomes the 
dominate element in exchange, manifested in the threat of violence or in extortion. This 
attracts young men to a local warlord or militia leader ‘in return for a kind of livelihood and 
the prospect of an otherwise unattainable reputation’155.  
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Ironically, the desire of the international community to alleviate the suffering of the 
civilian populations not militarily involved in a conflict inadvertently provided additional 
sources of supplies not only for the needy but also the combatants156. The constant supply of 
aid enables the warring parties to be supplied, thereby prolonging the conflict. When the 
international community, along with the UN, implemented an embargo policy designed to 
allow these new wars to burn themselves out, it failed in almost every case. Münkler states 
that a ‘shadow globalisation’ (interested parties and/or the diaspora) provided the necessary 
resources for the war to continue. The international community is therefore faced with an 
unenviable choice: does it stand by and do nothing while civilians starve? Or does it 
intervene to provide aid, both medical and basic food stuffs, which in turn provides additional 
support to those engaged in the ‘war’, as they skim what they need from the aid shipments 
before the people get what remains157?   
The description and analysis of these ‘new wars’ does not appear to sit easily within 
the classic Clausewitzian definition of war; its ‘truth’ does not appear to be true in the 
context, or world, that Kaldor, Münkler and Gilbert describe. Clausewitz would have 
recognised the nature of the relationship between the state and the citizen, as described by 
Adam Ferguson158. He likely would have agreed with his main contention. However, the 
world that Ferguson described has been replaced in some parts of the world159. Bobbitt 
maintains that there have been various manifestations of the ‘state’. His analysis begins in 
1494 when Charles VIII invades Italy and continues up to the present day160. Bobbitt’s 
argument is essentially that the concept and nature of the state evolved over time adapting to 
meet the challenges and demands it encountered161. The state as a concept has developed 
since Clausewitz described the relationship within his ‘wonderful trinity’ and is in an 
evolutionary process. ‘The gradual transition from the Nation State to the Market State model 
implies a redefinition of the state’s fundamental promises: [from maximisation of the 
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Nation’s welfare] toward maximisation of opportunities for…civil society and citizens’162. 
Does this suggested transition matter to a Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war?  
Yes absolutely. The process of globalisation is fundamentally changing the context in
which the notion of a Western state should be considered. The recent economic bailout of 
several European governments illustrates the economic power of non-state players with the 
influence to undermine or strengthen a country’s liquidity. If there has been a clash of wills in 
this process, (i.e. the state against international money markets) its nature was not political 
but economic. Secondly, if for the sake of this thought experiment we assume that the 
evolution of the nature of the state is analogous to the development of an individual’s identity 
throughout their life, we are presented with an interesting question. Most people live their 
lives on the assumption that there is a unity linking the different periods of their lives and that 
in some essential manner they are the same person at 40 as 39. However, if the question 
becomes ‘are you the same person now at 58 as you were at 8?’, many will answer that they 
have changed significantly despite an intuitive awareness that in some sense they remain the 
same person. The notion that the state is somehow the same in essence as it was in the early 
nineteenth century requires a more detailed defence than has been offered so far by those who 
maintain the pre-eminency of a Clausewitzian universe. The classic definition of war as a 
clash of political will is not universally applicable to an analysis of ‘new wars’. The 
genocide, appalling loss of life and limb, the extreme poverty and deprivation associated with 
these ‘new wars’ means that they cannot be dismissed as something other than war. This is 
war, only not war within a Clausewitzian universe.     
4.3.2 International Law, War and Terrorism
Clausewitz briefly, and rather dismissively, mentions what he refers to as: ‘certain self-
imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as International Law 
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and custom, but they scarcely weaken it’163. The irony is that the international system, as 
Brown observes, is underpinned by the essential philosophical creation articulated by 
Clausewitz164. ‘War is a normal feature of international relations, a normal part of the 
functioning of the international system’165. Gray describes this as the realist paradigm166, 
which shows no convincing evidence that it is undergoing some transformation167. Brown, 
however, is not convinced. For him, there is a growing suspicion about what he calls ‘state- 
centricity’ because the political conception of war is an example ‘of international relations 
not behaving quite in the way it is supposed to. In reality’ he continues, ‘the malaise here 
goes much deeper. A Clausewitzian view of war is an essential requirement for the balance of 
power to operate; the two institutions stand together, and if, as suggested here, they fall 
together the whole state-centric edifice is in ruins’168. Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the 
continuation of politics contains within it the logical consequence that war is a ‘phenomenon’ 
that occurs only between states. This logically expresses two related and important 
derivatives: firstly, that in order for this to occur, the state must have a monopoly or sole 
ownership of violence; and secondly, that the establishment of a condition of peace can be 
formally guaranteed on the basis of that monopoly of violence.  
Stumpf argues that the emergence of the territorial state in Europe, in conjunction 
with a secularisation within the legal tradition, saw a growing debate on public International 
Law regarding how relations between states could be subjected to more formal structures169. 
Previously, maintains Stumpf, there had been an understanding of law as ‘a metaphysical 
system, supplemented by a Christological concept of legislation’170. In a similar fashion, Best 
writes that International Law ‘comes to us soaked in several sorts of reason: the reason of the 
classical-cum-Christian natural law which originally gave life to the jus gentium, the reason 
of the Enlightenment which made International Law a necessary element of civilised 
international relations’171. There are several vital observations that may be deduced from this 
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historical construct: 1. a state-centric understanding of international relations is essentially a 
Western (Cartesian) paradigm; 2. that peace is the antithetical state to war; 3. the international 
legal system is both Western in origin and grew out of the theological and philosophical 
foundations of Judaic-Christian traditions.  
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence is an example of
the statutes of International Law distilled into practical directives and guidance on how it 
should be applied. Like Law on the battlefield the historical, theological and or moral 
foundations that underpin International Law are simply ignored172. Rogers makes no apology 
for his English legal background or the impact of Western ideology173. The theological and 
moral principles that motivated Grotius are simply ignored. A non-moral/ethical approach to 
law is known as a form of ‘legal positivism’174, which maintains that the conditions of legal 
validity are purely a matter of social facts. However, theologians and ethicists would contend 
that Augustine’s lex iniusta non est lex, ‘unjust law is not law’ raises the question of whether 
or not law should ever seek to divorce itself from a moral consideration.    
This creates an interesting dynamic especially in regard to how International Law is 
considered. International Law as a concept, generally only exists only between states. The 
individual has no role in its classical expression; Stumpf describes this as its blindness to 
individuals175. Yet despite this it has been used with a distinct moral element. Referring to the 
trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo as ‘victor’s justice’, Falk notes that ‘dramatizing the criminal 
accountability of individuals who were acting on behalf of the state did permanently escalate 
the claims of law in relation to armed conflict’176. If war is only the extension of politics, a 
clash of political interest and will, charging individuals with the ‘crimes’ of a state’s policy 
required a selective understanding of what the law is. This sense of arbitrariness concerning 
how states use or abuse, apply or ignore International Law has been a consistent feature of 
modern life.  
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Lebor describes in great detail how the major world powers did little to stop genocide 
in Rwanda, but broke no laws in failing to act177. The perception of indifference or selective 
application or adherence to International Law is graphically illustrated in regard to the 
terrorism. Western states, according to Booth and Dunne, have consistently ‘sought to deny 
that states can commit terrorism. The bias of terror has always been “against people and in 
favour of governments”’178. States wage war: terrorists are criminals who break the law. 
Kaldor and Münkler have argued cogently that ‘new wars’ have changed the parameters of 
war. Acts of terror perpetrated against civilians eventually prompt calls for military 
intervention179. This raises the question: how will those states act? Gross is blunt: 
The baffling question is why the United States and some of its allies blatantly employ 
unlawful means of warfare as they wage asymmetric war against national 
insurgencies,  international terror, rogue countries and state-sponsored guerrilla 
organisations. Sixty years after World War II and the great humanitarian tide of 
concern for basic human rights, many nations find themselves resorting to low-tech, 
primitive, and generally prohibited forms of warfare. Why have liberal democracies 
now abandoned some of the core principles of humanitarian law as they fight 
asymmetric wars?180     
Gross contends that the answer lies in what he terms ‘Exceptionalism’181; ‘emergencies do 
not overturn or repudiate the laws of war, they simply allow for exceptions’182. Falk describes 
it in this manner, ‘it is in this context that….leads to government lawyers to grant politicians 
and military commanders “freedom” from the constraints of the Geneva Conventions, derided 
as “quaint” embodying restraints that pertain to a different age’183. Gross argues that there is 
evidence that the exceptions are evolving into rules. For Byers, the unilateralism of the 
United States leads to the making of International Law by exception184. 
Military necessity has consistently been used by states to defend their prosecution of a 
war185; except of course where they have been defeated. Raymond observes that typical 
expressions used in defence of military necessity have the form ‘circumstances required that I 
do X. The rhetorical strategy behind this form of argument is to frame situations of 
circumscribed options as situations where no alternatives exist’186. A major difficultly with 
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this argument is that it is also generally used by those engaged in an insurgency or ‘new war’. 
Exceptionalism and necessity are themes frequently used by Jihadists. Although some of their 
rhetoric finds a sympathetic hearing in parts of the Muslim world187, it is only some of the 1.2 
billion Muslims that live around the world. The emptiness of some stereotypes becomes very 
evident188. Nevertheless, the various groups that are engaged in a Jihad against the West have 
a very specific view of International Law, and its state-centric basis: 
International Law and governance are likewise rejected by jihadis who view the UN 
as both a wholly owned subsidiary of the United States and Europe, and as proponent 
of a legal system at odds with Islam. The idea of International Law is detested for 
exactly the same reason as democracy: it ignores shari‘a and is based upon the non- 
Islamic notion that nations can “make up” any laws they please189.  
If one extracts the conspiracy element from these views of the West, there is a great 
deal about their understanding of the origins of the state-centric system, the legal system and 
the origins of democracy in the West that is fundamentally correct. That the majority of those 
who live in the West are unaware of the foundational role Christian theology and philosophy 
played in constructing the framework that evolved into what is today a largely secularised 
system is irrelevant. Grotius’ desire to see International Law develop was based upon his 
Christian theological convictions190. Jihadists understand the religious foundations of the 
Western state-centric view and its imposition of politics as the key to conflict resolution as 
modern expression of imperialism. ‘The truth of the matter is that the latter-day imperialism 
is but a mask for the crusading spirit, since it is not possible for it to appear in its true form, 
as it was in the Middle Ages’191. The suggestion, therefore, that an essentially Cartesian 
model of the world is universally valid, in every construct of reality is self-evidently false. 
Those who currently stand opposed to a Western construct of the world, appear to be 
determined to wage war against a system it considers alien to its view of reality.  
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4.4 Conclusions 
The proposition that Carl von Clausewitz identified the universal, eternal truth of 
war’s objective nature is impossible to maintain in anything other than a Cartesian universe. 
It is a classical Enlightenment argument. The notion that there is only one valid, universal 
truth that is valid in every context is an article of faith, whose validity can be challenged by 
the relativist sceptic. The existence of ‘new wars’ and asymmetric warfare is evidence of 
models of war that do not fit easily within a state-centric (Clausewitzian) understanding of 
war. Philosophically, the nature of war is not necessarily political. The relevance of this is far 
reaching.  
This chapter has shown that a Clausewitzian model lies at the heart of international
relations and International Law. This is again a Cartesian or Enlightenment model. It assumes 
that Reality, in relation to international relations, is political. This is a Western construct, 
derived from a specifically Western (Christian) philosophical, theological and cultural 
construct. In chapter 2 of this thesis the concept of the ‘white man’s burden’ as understood in 
the late nineteenth century, was briefly considered. It was underpinned by a form of imperial 
colonialism, in which nations, primarily from a Western philosophical worldview sought to 
remake the ‘primitive’ world in its own image. The imperative underpinning the work of 
ISAF in Afghanistan can, from one perspective, be presented in similar terms. The dogma 
that the military is there to establish the conditions for a political solution is a cultured 
version of the West imposing a Western construct upon a non-Western culture and society. 
Why should the solution not be in certain contexts, religious or purely economic?  
ISAF, as a mechanism of Western/International policy, might be seeking to apply a
model that lacks validity for many in Afghanistan. The drive to seek and secure a purely 
political and therefore Western model might continue to run into substantial difficulties. 
Afghanistan is an ancient country. Its people, however, do not live within a society that has 
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had over three hundred years to imbibe Western philosophical thought forms that underpin its 
state-centric approach to reality. The British soldier serving in this environment comes into 
daily contact with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations 
and the geopolitical goals of his/her government and the alliance they form a part of. It is 
distinctly possible that the ordinary soldier serving in the local district centres or in the 
‘Green Zone’ encounters the clash not simply of cultures but of fundamentally and radically 
different world views. Constructs in which religion and culture have a greater sense of 
validity than a Western construct of political imperatives. Afghanistan represents a social 
imaginary that remains largely untouched by the theory developed by Grotius and Lock. It is 
in many aspects a feudal society in which the concept of the individual, central to the 
development of the modern social imaginary in Western society, is largely absent in the rural 
provinces. As a consequence, modern Western political constructs, simply lack legitimacy to 
local Afghans, seeking to eke out a living in harsh and difficult conditions.    
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Chapter 5 
Selected Societal Factors 
5.1 Introduction 
It is important to briefly review the concept underpinning this particular chapter 
because it is significantly larger than would normally be expected in a doctoral thesis. The 
creation of a philosophical framework for use in examining the nature of the British soldier 
that was not culturally sited would be fundamentally flawed methodologically. The British 
soldier does not exist as an abstract idea but literally exists and functions in a socio- 
political/cultural setting. In this setting, something Taylor calls ‘a metaphorical common 
space’1, people who never meet, nevertheless understand ‘themselves to be engaged in 
discussion and capable of reaching a common mind’2. This public sphere is ‘a locus in which 
rational views are elaborated’ and which will guide government3. This chapter discusses the 
impact of societal factors and their impact on how the generic British soldier is understood 
and how this might influence the social imaginary. Instead of creating three distinct chapters 
of 8000 words each, this chapter will encapsulate the salient points in each section while 
seeking to present each topic as being an integral part of the tapestry that forms modern social 
life.    
Section 5.2.1 ‘Death as a Cultural and Historical Product’ will primarily focus upon 
the issue of death, as opposed to the process of dying or the issues involved with palliative 
care. It will examine death as a cultural and historical product through a consideration of the 
changing attitudes historically towards death. In section 5.3.2 ‘Death and the Military in the 
Twenty-First Century’, the possible impact the death of a serviceman/woman has or may 
have upon the social imaginary will be explored. The second main section in this chapter will 
consider the concept of the ‘Risk Society’ (5.3.1). It will begin by identifying the basic 
characteristics of risk and how it is manifested and understood in the twenty-first century. 
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This study will provide the foundation from which to examine how this post-modern 
phenomenon has been understood by governments and scholars working in the field of 
security and international studies in ‘Risk: War and Risk’ (5.3.2).  
Section 5.4 will continue to develop the central theme of this chapter, Selected
Societal Factors, through the consideration of three distinct and yet related ideas. In 5.4.1 the 
concept of a ‘Post-heroic Society’ will be examined, including the notion of post-heroic 
warfare. Sub-section 5.4.2 will consider the idea that Western societies manifest a ‘Post- 
modern Casualty Phobia’. Primarily focusing upon the experience of the United States, it will 
explore the origin of the idea and the extent to which Western societies are casualty phobic. 
The final sub-section 5.4.3 will consider the question of ‘The Feminisation of Society and the 
Military’. The definition of ‘man’, ‘manly’ and ‘masculine’ has shifted in response to 
prevailing social and cultural demands and how these are imagined in the public space. One 
of these demands in Western societies has been the cultural and sociological movement of 
feminism. This sub-section will consider how the hyper-masculinised hegemonic models of 
masculinity were challenged in the aftermath of World War Two and the implications not 
only for the notion of masculinity but the developing role of women in Western militaries.  
5.2 Death 
John Donne captures a simple and basic truth in his famous quote, ‘death comes 
equally to us all, and makes us all equal when it comes’.4 Each human being is therefore 
certain of facing their own distinct, personal death with an absolute conviction that one of 
life’s few certainties is no respecter of persons, status or wealth. The complexity resides in 
the recognition that death can be understood, culturally, religiously, sociologically, 
historically, biologically and as a physical reality. It is therefore necessary to briefly establish 
the parameters of this section. It is important to also make the initial distinction between 
death (the end of vital processes by which organisms develop or maintain themselves)5, dying 
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(the process that results in the cessation of what is legally defined as life)6 and loss and 
bereavement (how the surviving families, relatives and friends face the cessation of life)7, 
even though all three are interconnected8. This section will primarily focus upon the issue of 
death, as opposed to the process of dying or the issues involved with palliative care. The 
subject of loss and bereavement will be considered only as it impinges upon how death is 
viewed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and its possible impact upon how 
the deaths of UK Service personnel are viewed by UK society. The intention of this section is 
to highlight how social attitudes towards death might impact upon the nature of the British 
soldier as s/he resides in UK social imaginary.       
For the purposes of this section death will be interpreted as ‘the irreversible
discontinuation of the vital processes by which we are sustained’9. The definition provides a 
workable starting point from which to build a general framework within which the subject 
can be considered, without addressing the question of what we are and the conditions under 
which we cease to be10.  
5.2.1 Death as a Cultural and Historical Product11.   
The framework created by Philippe Ariès in his ‘magisterial survey of Western 
attitudes to death’12 is a useful point of departure13. Ariès gathers up ‘a long chain of 
centuries, approximately a millennium’14 (until the middle of the twelfth century) under the 
phrase ‘Tamed Death’. By this he means that death was such a part of everyday life and 
expectation that it was embraced as something to be prepared for15. Firstly, death was 
something to encounter in bed. Secondly, the ritual of death was presided over by the dying 
person himself16. Thirdly, the bedchamber was a public place to be entered freely17. The 
prevailing sentiment towards death during this period, according to Ariès is one ‘of 
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familiarity with death, with neither fear nor despair, half-way between passive resignation 
and mystical trust’18.  
This attitude towards death was partially altered in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Ariès refers to this as ‘one’s own death’19. This period lays the foundation for the two 
succeeding periods in a quite distinct manner, in that it ‘reveals the importance given through 
the entire modern period to the self, to one’s own existence, and can be expressed by another 
phrase, la mort de soi, one’s own death’20. One of distinctive manifestations of this 
development may be discerned in the individualisation of sepulchres or tombs21. The majority 
not wealthy enough to have an individual sepulchre continued to be buried in the great 
common grave, in France called fosses aux pauvres, the ditches for the poor. Ariès describes 
them as being several yards deep and wide22. Once they had been gradually filled up it was 
covered with earth. A new one was then opened and an old one reopened23, the bones 
removed and taken to the charnel house24. The modern idea of a specific location in which a 
person could be interred as the perpetual owner was utterly foreign during this period.  
Attitudes continued to change towards death in the modern period. The familiar ‘ritual 
became challenged and was furtively pushed out of the world of familiar things’25. Ariès calls 
this the period of ‘thy death’26. Walters maintains that ‘people became concerned less with 
what would happen to their soul or name when they died than how they would manage when 
their loved ones died’27. The ever-emerging individualisation of society increasingly led to 
the demise of the community’s involvement in the rituals of death. Of much greater 
importance was the ‘will’ of the dying person and the survival of the remaining family28. 
Instead of administering the rituals of death personally, the reading of the will delegated to 
the next of kin the powers that until that moment ‘he had jealously exercised’29. Death had 
become situated within the private confines of the home, in which the grief of the family was 
compounded with the fear of living with the practical effects of death. The Victorians, 
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however, have been described as celebrating death, because of their social rituals associated 
with public mourning, tasteless ostentation and morbid emotionalism30. Nevertheless, it may 
be viewed as an attempt to retain some vestige of public ritual, as death became increasingly 
removed from the public sphere.        
The impact of the First World War and the influenza epidemic ‘shattered what 
remained of the Victorian way of death’31. Western society had entered what Ariès calls the 
period of ‘Forbidden Death’. He describes it as a brutal revolution in traditional ideas and 
feelings, a period when death would become shameful and forbidden32. Gorer coined a most 
distinctive phrase to describe this sociological, historical, and cultural phenomenon. He 
referred to it as ‘the pornography of death’33. What he meant in using this striking phrase was 
that while sex had been the great social/cultural taboo of the mid to late nineteenth century 
(marked by public repression and prudishness), death had replaced it in the twentieth century. 
The concept of death as a modern taboo has been challenged by a number of scholars. 
Dollimore accepts that the way in which death is dealt with and discussed may involve 
something like denial; however, he argues that ‘in philosophical and literary terms there has 
never been a denial of death’34. Noys shares his opinion. He notes that to speak of death 
being a modern taboo is too simplistic and fails to deal with the ways in which death is 
invisible and highly visible in modern culture35. Walter’s use of the notion of the ‘revival of 
death’ may act as a helpful bridge between those who maintain that death has been a twentieth-
century taboo and those who noted the profound sociological and cultural changes in the 
attitude to death in the post-Victorian age36. The postmodern notion of individual choice 
underpins what he calls the Sinatra Syndrome, or the desire of individuals to take greater 
ownership not only of how they face death but also the process of their funeral and how this 
will be remembered after death37. 
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The transformation in Western attitudes towards death has been influenced by a 
multitude of factors, not least of which was the logical outworking of Enlightenment 
philosophy and the transition between the constitutional orders of ‘the state’. This transition 
between constitutional orders that characterised ‘the state’ is a useful framework within 
which to observe the changing attitudes towards death in Western society: specifically, the 
State Nation – Nation State – the Market State38 (see fig 10).     
Fig 1039 
One of the characteristics, according to Bobbitt, of the State Nation was that it 
assumed control (or domestic hegemony) of internal and external relations of its society. For 
example, internally this meant areas such as property rules, education systems, cultural 
institutions, and externally, treaties, boarders and armed forces40. State involvement in the 
rituals of death can be clearly seen in the control it began to exercise to control the disposal of 
corpses. Since ancient antiquity the living had made a point of keeping the resting places of 
the dead at a distance41, a process that was largely adhered to in Western cultures. However, 
the demographic shifts that occurred during the Enlightenment and subsequent Industrial 
Revolution meant that urban areas began to subsume areas that had been considered outside 
the city or town limits. Cemeteries were now embedded within the community of the living. 
Serious public concerns about rotting corpses, partially covered with soil, the removal of 
human remains and their storage led to state intervention and the embryonic form of what 
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Time scale  Pre-16th century   16th – late 20th century    Late 20th century to present 
Pre-modern   Early – Late Modern    Postmodern
Social periods        Renaissance Enlightenment  Industrial Revolution   Post-Industrial    
Ariès’ 4 Periods Tamed Death       One’s Own Death      Thy Death                    Forbidden Death 
Constitutional Orders*          Princely State     Kingly State     Territorial State      State Nation     Nation State     Modern State 
*(Bobbitt maintains that there have been six distinct constitutional orders of State since it first emerged 
during the Renaissance) 
would become the complete bureaucratisation, medicalization, rationalisation and 
professionalization of death42.  
In 1837 all deaths in England had to be registered. Walters observes that although
some may have wished to live at the fringes of society avoiding paperwork, it was impossible 
to get through death without it43. The medical professions have had an immense impact in the 
matter of death44. Average life expectancy at birth for a male in 1901 was 34 and 49 for a 
female. In 2001 it had risen to 77 for a male and 81 for a female45. The defining feature of the 
Nation State, according to Bobbitt, was the well-being of its people and to realise this through 
legal action46. This was not sociologically without price.  
As medical treatment became more sophisticated it frequently required complicated 
machinery, which in itself rendered the patient increasingly invisible as a person. The 
hospital is still regarded as a place of healing; however, it was a place of healing rather than 
care. Doctors became obsessed ‘with maintaining life at all costs’47. Though admirable in 
many respects, this attitude did lead to the practice of hope being suggested when there was 
little to be anticipated. ‘To admit that effective treatment is no longer possible is like 
admitting defeat’48. In Kübler-Ross’ studies into dying and the medical professions, she 
found that doctors and nurses found it difficult to speak openly or listen to the dying patient. 
She discovered that patients who were terminally ill had to wait twice as long as other 
patients before a nurse would respond49. In Western societies, the general experience was that 
many dying people were neglected and left to die lonely and in pain50.  
The hospice movement was a response to this phenomenon and came from the 
broader ‘death awareness movement’51. With the rise of the role of the state coroner, the 
medical professions, the hospice movement and the professional undertaker, death was no 
longer an individual matter but could ‘be the result of a vast and anonymous operation carried 
out upon us’52. Not only this, it became a process that in many instances was conducted at a 
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distance from the home. The family’s access to the remains of their loved one was now 
mediated through the death certificate from a doctor or the permission of the coroner, the 
registration of the death with the local authority, and the work of the undertaker. In this sense 
death had become dislocated from the community.      
5.2.2 Death and the Military in the Twenty-First Century.  
The main focus of this sub-section is the consideration of aspects of death and the 
military in the twenty-first century as it could possibly impact upon any narrative construct 
that seeks to address the nature of the British soldier. It is not intended to be an exhaustive 
examination of every conceivable element of death in our present cultural, political and social 
context.  
Regardless of the century or the historical snapshot of human involvement in warfare
chosen, ‘death and wounds are an inseparable part of battle, and confront the soldier in a 
myriad guises’53. Citing Steiner, Coker reminds his readers that ‘death was once the 
overriding theme of literature… death in battle had meaning in such a world. In our world it 
doesn’t54. While it is reasonable to maintain that our post-modern cultural context may not 
ascribe the same meaning to death it would have been afforded in the literature of the Iliad, it 
does not necessarily follow that it will be without meaning. Perhaps more importantly, it does 
not follow that its meaning should be considered as inadequate or less authentic to that from 
antiquity. For example, Ben-Ari has discerned the existence of what he refers to as an 
appropriate cultural script which validates the notion of a good death55. In this case, should 
his argument prove valid, the notion of ‘a good death’, at least to some extent presents the 
possibility of ascribing some element of value and therefore some degree of meaning to 
death.  
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Culturally, according to Ben-Ari, good deaths represent ideals that enact a symbolic 
‘victory over corporeal and social demise and the regeneration of life, while bad ones do the 
opposite, leaving survivors despairing and helpless in the face of meaninglessness and evil’56. 
In a military context, the social script that offers this symbolic victory over meaninglessness, 
involves death in combat-related activities and the retrieval of the whole body or all of its 
parts; the conduct of official commemorations (remembering within the soldier’s unit) and 
some psychological resolution for the next of kin57. Ben-Ari does, however, highlight a 
critical component to this cultural script; the involvement of soldiers killed in combat is 
located within an armed conflict or intervention that is considered by that particular society 
(i.e. in which the social script has validity) as being noble or a good cause58. Although the 
issue of risk, risk aversion and casualty aversion will be considered later in this chapter, it is 
worth noting at this juncture that it is frequently argued that a society’s attitude towards 
casualties or indeed casualty aversion is often presented as being directly linked to this notion 
of a ‘good’ or ‘noble cause’.   
Ben-Ari’s treatment of the concept of a good death is located within a body of current 
scholarship that focuses upon the armed forces and society. His observations concerning the 
civil and military social script will provide a useful framework within which to explore the 
issue of death and the military in the twenty-first century further in this part of the thesis. 
Although, it is hugely difficult to be exhaustive in any treatment of a subject, Ben-Ari fails to 
address a number of important issues. His reference to death ‘in combat-related activities’ 
seems to suggest that all deaths in a theatre of operations are caused by the enemy. They are 
not. He does not address what the military call ‘blue on blue’, the oxymoron ‘friendly fire’ or 
the politically sensitive ‘green on blue’59. Accidental death on the battlefield, even in the 
midst of battle, can appear ‘utterly pointless’60. Of the questions asked by grieving relatives 
of soldiers killed on active service, ‘how was he killed?’ is among the first to be raised61. 
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Death in contact with the enemy in a war-zone like Helmand is one thing; death as a result of 
a vehicle rolling into an irrigation ditch in the ‘green zone’ is another.    
There is also no reflection of the political nature of the death of the soldier in Ben-
Ari’s articulation of the cultural script within which the notion of a good death resides. It has 
already been noted that Noys reflected the notion that Western culture is dominated by a 
politics of death, thanatopolitical. In contrast King has contended that both the British public 
and media regard soldiers killed in either Iraq or Afghanistan as ‘beyond politics62. He asserts 
that the dead of Helmand – and even more so Iraq – are honoured in spite of the cause63. A 
critical part of King’s argument is based upon his idea of how the soldier is remembered.  
According to King, although the fact that they have died as soldiers is not forgotten, a 
renegotiation has in effect taken place. By way of contrast he refers to the cultural situation 
following the First World War. In this instance, the identity of those who died in this war 
remained that of a soldier and therefore King maintains, as a member of the nation. However, 
the dead from the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been domesticated. Now the dead 
soldier’s ‘family relations have become central to his identification in the moment of 
remembrance. Decisively, the soldier’s domestic relations have now become primary’64. The 
focus upon the human dimension of the death of a soldier killed enables the public to mourn 
for them as relatives, as though they (the public) had become imaginary family members65. 
The effect of this domestication and renegotiation is to place the death of an 
individual soldier beyond party political politics. If King’s argument were considered 
persuasive, it would indicate that Ben-Ari’s contention that a link was necessary between a 
soldier’s death and a noble cause, in order for it to be considered as a good death, is not 
essential in every case. Value is not located within the merits of the operation but within the 
normal human relationships of British society. This creates the conditions in which strangers 
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can empathise with the family and relatives of the fallen service person. What this argument 
might create though, is the idea that the dead soldier is a victim.  
‘Witnessing Wootten Bassett: An Exploration in Cultural Victimology’ is the title of
Walklate, Mythen and McGarry’s article examining the repatriations at the town of Royal 
Wootten Bassett66. The image of the British soldier as victim has a powerful history. The 
enduring mythology of the First World War ‘Tommy’ as a victim endures to this day in 
modern Britain. It continues to remain both influential and resistant to a disinterested, critical 
study of historical evidence. Harry Patch’s frequent assertion that war is nothing more than 
murder, chimes well with the popular image of the British soldier being led into a pointless 
oblivion. It abides as a haunting image of British soldiers being ‘lead like lambs to the 
slaughter’67, immortalised in the TV series Black Adder Goes Forth68. The image of a lost 
generation is also not as accurate as the popular mythology suggests. One third of British 
males of military age never served in the armed forces ‘and, that despite the vast numbers of 
injured, nearly ninety per cent… actually survived the war’69 [emphasis original]. Despite the 
mythology of ‘Douglas Haig & Co as cold-blooded slaughterers of innocent lambs’70, 
modern historical research has cast doubt on the accuracy of this. ‘Military historians have 
pointed out that Haig’s strategy of mass battles actually won the war, however bloody they 
were’71.  
How groups remember72, or even if they remember is a hugely complicated subject, 
much discussed but with very little agreement73. Collective memory is socially framed74. 
‘When people come together to remember, they enter a domain beyond that of individual 
memory’75. The man of private memory (homo psychologicus) and the man of socially 
determined public memory (homo sociologicus)76 is essentially one engaged in negotiation, 
suppression, distortion and interpolation77, in the marketplace of private or corporate 
associations78. In his observations on the witnesses of war Winter maintains,  
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Those people are involved in memory work, that is, public rehearsal of memories, 
quite often not in order to create social scripts or schemata for the interpretation of the 
war. They act in order to struggle with grief, to fill in the silence, to offer something 
symbolically to the dead, for political reasons. The dead are forgotten; peace does not 
last; memorials fade into the landscape79 [emphasis original]. 
Hugh McManners’ book80, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands: The Real Story of the 
Falklands War in the Words of Those Who Were There, powerfully illustrates Winter’s final 
point.  
In his work on war, personal narratives and commemoration, Hynes considers the
issues of memory, narrative and victimhood. He argues that in the process of myth-making, 
personal narratives both share in its creation and perseverance81. Later in his article he states, 
‘personal narratives are not victims’ stories either; no man with a weapon in his hand can be 
entirely a victim…every narrator believes himself to have been to some degree an agent in 
his personal war, and agents aren’t victims’82. The work of Walklate, Mythen and McGarry, 
however, creates space for the inclusion of another dimension to the notion of the soldier as 
victim or agent. They maintain that while the narrative of the soldier as hero is retained in the 
UK, ‘it has been twinned with a seemingly paradoxical emphasis on the soldier as victim’83. 
They recognise that the social expectations associated with soldiering do not lend themselves 
to understanding the soldier as a victim, which in itself implies vulnerability, weakness and 
passivity84. The hypothesis they offer is that in Britain it is possible to ‘mourn the loss of 
individually valuable men and to simultaneously reject the purpose of their death. Distant war 
on television is one thing…but when distant harms are paraded through the streets of the UK 
this creates a void for public sentiment, arguably one which has been filled by the mourners 
of Wootton Bassett’85.   
The image of a cortège driving slowly through a British market town brings this 
consideration neatly to Ben-Ari’s third component in the social script of a good military 
death. Such a death ‘involves the wholeness of the body, or at least the retrieval of all its parts 
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in order to re-make it, to assemble it as a whole again’86. In her comprehensive treatment of 
the subject, Samet notes that in the Vietnam War, what could be described as ‘a battlefield 
impulse turned into a national preoccupation for the United States’87. The apparent nobility of 
this gesture, she maintains, captured the American imagination, and was easier to ‘articulate 
than the less intuitive nobility of peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention’88. Up to and 
including the Falklands War the British practice had been to bury the dead where they had 
fallen89. Soldiers killed in the civil unrest or ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and those 
whose lives had been lost in the humanitarian and peacekeeping/peace enforcement 
operations in the Balkans, although returned to the UK did not receive the repatriation those 
who have been killed in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have received90. 
In the First World War the sheer scale of death became a vital matter of sanitation just 
as much as of morale and military exigency91. Notions of decency had to be altered. It was 
not uncommon for a ghoulish attitude towards the remains of the dead to immerge. ‘After 
heavy rain, corpses floated down the trenches, and were sometimes used to patch up the sides 
of trenches’92. With regard to the question of ownership of the body of the soldier, this was 
unequivocally answered; it was the property of the state’93. As such, a more pragmatic 
approach to the vast numbers of dead bodies had to be adopted than that which would have 
normally been accorded the burial of a dead person in the UK. As a consequence, and partly 
because of the limited number of army chaplains, many of the formalities of the religious 
burial were adapted to meet the needs of the situation. Mass communal graves were common 
at different stages of the war. However, as Bourke notes, this did not prevent some kind of 
religious service being performed over the dead94. As to the notification of families of the fate 
of their next of kin, the accepted practice even up to the Korean War had been to publish the 
names of the casualties in long lists including rank and regiment in The Times95. The current 
practice and MOD policy is for every family to have a sufficient number of Casualty 
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Notifying Officers to notify the next of kin of the dead or injured soldier of what has 
happened. The processes are continually monitored and revised in line with ‘best practice’96.  
Samet contends that retrieving the fallen reinforces connections between the soldier
and civic life97. Although her examination of the notion of ‘leaving no warriors behind’ is 
primarily sited within American culture, it is consistent with recent British experiences98. 
What is not in question is the ancient practice of recovering the fallen dead from the 
battlefield. In the Iliad, Samet notes that the imperative to retrieve a fallen comrade’s body 
from the field regardless of the tactical cost, suggests the pre-eminence of the dead over the 
living99. Richards has demonstrated how the treatment of the enemy dead in antiquity is 
remarkably similar ‘from Hector to Bin Laden’100. The image of the lifeless body of Hector 
dragged behind the chariot of Achilles in triumph before the walls of Troy, finds a striking 
echo with the image of an American Ranger dragged behind his killers’ jeep through the 
streets of Mogadishu. The mistreatment of the enemy dead was and is used as a weapon 
against the living. Although Greek warfare had evolved by the time of the Peloponnesian 
War between Sparta and Athens from that depicted in Homeric epic, Pericles’ funeral speech 
at the end of the first year of war locates the city-state’s war dead within Athenian civic 
polity. Samet observes that Abraham Lincoln re-imagined Pericles’ oration for his famous 
Gettysburg address101, in which an American President like his ancient Athenian counterpart 
located the civil war dead with the nation’s history and civic polity.     
5.2.3 Conclusions  
Cultural, social, religious attitudes to death, dying and bereavement have been shaped 
by many factors. The emergence and greater awareness of individuality and the philosophical 
ideas that under-pinned this helped shape how death was understood and encountered within 
social groups. What had been a settled attitude towards death for millennia, changed (in 
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historical terms) with increasing speed as it adapted to meet new ideas and concerns. This, 
coupled with evolving constitutional orders, created the conditions in which attitudes and 
practices towards the dead were adapted to fit the social script of a particular generation/
period. This observation may offer some explanation for the many conflicting ideas 
considered in the sub-section on death and the military in the twenty-first century. The post-
modern mind is perfectly at ease with holding competing ideas and concepts without the 
compulsion to create a unifying meta-narrative of a single harmonious approach. Ben-Ari’s 
observation that a social script exists within which the death of a soldier may be considered 
as good, is valid. It is however, juxtaposed beside the issue of the soldier being regarded as 
victim, hero and agent.  
The public expressions of sympathy evidenced in the repatriation of British soldiers
through Royal Wootton Bassett, suggests two other important concepts. Firstly, that although 
the fallen are beyond party politics the public (some might contend national) expression of 
remembrance locates them firmly within civil polity. The domestication of the identity of the 
dead professional soldiers facilitates this delicate juxtaposition. Secondly, Royal Wootton 
Bassett created the opportunity for a re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual. In a 
postmodern age, whenever the rituals and language of death have all but disappeared from 
every day public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude towards death found expression 
again. At least in this very specific sense, death became part of everyday public life.        
5.3 Risk 
No element of modern-day life is free from some form of risk analysis. This section 
will consider the concept of the Risk Society and its main characteristics (5.3.1 ‘Risk 
Society’). This will form the basis for an examination of how the modern phenomenon of risk 
has impacted upon international politics, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
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on 9/11(5.3.2 ‘Risk: War and Risk’). The sub-section will conclude with a brief survey of the 
different methodological approaches, identifiable within scholarship and their distinctive 
characteristics.            
5.3.1 Risk Society 
How ‘risk’ has been understood over the centuries has changed; indeed even the 
meaning of the word has altered reflecting this change102. In his study of the subject Bernstein 
begins by seeking to establish the link between gambling and fate103. ‘Gambling…puts us 
head-to-head against the fates, with no holds barred’104. Time, he maintains, is the opposite 
side of the coin to risk105 ‘for if there were no tomorrow there would be no risk’106. In the 
ancient world, life was lived in the face of fate or chance, the ‘whim of the gods’, or in the 
Judaeo/Christian tradition ‘the will of God’. In the classical age, security ‘referred to 
tranquillity and freedom from care’107. However, the natural, human desire to have a peaceful 
sense of well-being did little to quench humanity’s ‘search for a better life on earth’108. This 
was a time, Coker reminds us, when a different grammar was used to make sense of or 
interpret risk. There existed, he contends, the notion of a ‘good risk’ provided, that is, people 
had the courage to take it109.  
Life in the twenty-first century is very different. Modern life, Furedi contends, is 
marked and dominated by a culture of fear110. This naturally raises the question of whether 
life in the twenty-first century has actually/literally become more dangerous. While life in the 
Middle Ages was hazardous, there did not seem to be a notion of risk in any traditional 
culture111. For Giddens, the ‘idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control things and 
in particular, the idea of controlling the future. Therefore, although the idea of a “risk 
society” might suggest a world that has become more hazardous, it is not necessarily the 
case’112.    
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The popularity of the phrase ‘risk society’ is usually attributed to the work of the 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck113. Beck, in contrast with many social commentators, rejects 
the use of the term post-modern114. Instead, he prefers to use the term ‘reflective 
modernization’115. For Beck, social change is more suitably divided up into three stages: ‘pre- 
modernity’, then ‘simple modernity’ and finally ‘reflexive modernity’116. In this division, 
‘simple modernity’ is coextensive with industrial society and ‘reflexive modernity’ with what 
Beck calls, ‘risk society’. ‘Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards 
and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. Risks, as opposed to older 
dangers’, he argues, ‘are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization 
and to its globalization of doubt. They are politically reflexive’117 [emphasis original]. A risk 
society in Beck’s analysis ‘is a catastrophic society’. What he means by this is that ‘the 
exceptional condition threatens to become the norm’118. The logic of this argument is that 
what would previously have been regarded as exceptional increasingly takes on the 
characteristics of normality.    
Like Giddens, Beck locates the centre of risk consciousness in the future. ‘In the risk 
society, the past loses the power to determine the present. Its place is taken by the future, 
thus, as something non-existent, invented, as the “cause” of current experience and action’119. 
Although many risks are ontologically non-existent, other than as one of many potential 
futures, their effect in the present is such that the very possibility constrains actual experience 
and action. Beck refers to this as ‘a real virtuality’120. Commenting on this Rasmussen notes 
that, ‘it is not the present actions that are to produce future results, but perceived future 
results that produce present actions’121. This is what Beck refers to as ‘the risk trap’122.   
In such a social context, risks are no longer the dark side of opportunities. They can, 
however, frequently become market opportunities123. There is no risk, according to Giddens, 
that cannot be described without reference to a value. ‘When there is a clash of the different 
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types of risk, there is a clash of values and a directly political set of values’124. Once the 
notion of ascribing a value to risk is established as a principle, an economic and political set 
of cost benefits is also introduced; for example, ‘how much wealth should be sacrificed for 
how much health’125. Douglas and Wildavsky illustrate the issue by considering the so-called 
battle for clean water in America126. While this case may in itself be somewhat dated, the 
issues involved are not. There are 4.5 million known chemicals, with some 45,000 in 
commercial use127.  It takes, they argue, the use of some 300 mice in experiments conducted 
over a 2 to 3 year period, ‘and about $300,000 to determine whether a single suspect causes 
cancer’128.  
The reality of the situation is that the public are exposed continually to both natural 
and manmade chemicals within the water system129. The determination of just how much 
exposure is safe generates a value. This value has, at the very minimum, an economic and 
political component to it; ‘how much wealth should be sacrificed for how much health’. The 
number of risk related values with this particular case, are innumerable. This is only one 
example, in one area of modern life. For Furedi, the widespread public perception of fear, 
particularly with regard to the multitude of risk is evidence of what he describes as ‘society’s 
free-floating consciousness of risk’130.  
The ubiquitous sense of fear, according to Gardner, is one of the great paradoxes of 
our time. He makes the point that ‘we are the healthiest, wealthiest, and longest-lived people 
in history’131. It is not simply the perception that fear pervades almost every aspect of modern 
life; rather what imbues fear with its insidious character for those living in a post-modern age, 
is its liquid character. Zygmunt Bauman has pioneered the notion that concepts like Fear and 
Love are liquid in nature132. He contends that ‘fear is at its most fearsome when it is diffuse 
scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating, with no clear address or cause’133. 
Despite this they are, he maintains, ‘dangers whose probability we can (or believe that we 
145 
can) calculate’134. The modern response to this belief is the creation of more risk assessments 
and contingency plans, illustrating further the paradoxical nature of reflexive modernity. It is 
a powerful metaphor of risk’s omnipresence in twenty-first century Western culture.   
There was a time, Durant observes, when ‘if science said something was good for us,
then it was good for us’135. However, in a post-modern age, science no longer holds the key 
to allaying public fear concerning the infusive nature of risk. Gardner is blunt when he 
maintains that ‘fear sells. Fear makes money’136. For Furedi ‘suspicion towards science is 
particularly intense. Instead of trusting the expert opinion of the scientist, many people are 
disposed to look for a hidden agenda’137. While accepting that many scientists seek to be 
objective and rational, Beck contends that ‘sciences’ rationality claim to be able to investigate 
objectively the hazardousness of a risk permanently refutes itself…In dealing with 
civilization’s risks’, he argues, ‘the sciences have always abandoned their foundation of 
experimental logic and made a polygamous marriage with business, politics and ethics – or 
more precisely, they live with the later in a sort of “permanent marriage without license”’138. 
Douglas and Wildavsky also make the claim that science is often polarised and politicised 
resulting in profound disagreements within the scientific community139. This suspicion stands 
in juxtaposition with modern society’s increasing reliance both upon science and the 
technologies that much of modern life depends upon140.  
Another recurring theme within the literature on risk is the ethical dimension 
associated with it. This is largely derived from a societal appreciation that once risk has been 
identified, there is both the obligation to act, or modify one’s behaviour, accordingly and 
responsibly in light of the perception of risk or actual risk141. Furedi notes that ‘the 
prescriptive consequences of the etiquette constructed around risk consciousness have been 
widely commented on’142. In his reflection on this point, Beck states ‘that determinations of 
risks are the form in which ethics…is resurrected inside the centres of modernization’143 
146 
[emphasis original]. The ethics associated with risk and risk management/avoidance has 
introduced an ethical system and cultural etiquette that provides an alternative way of 
regulating human conduct. ‘This is’, Furedi argues, ‘an authoritarian morality that believes 
that it has the right to judge, censor and punish. Paradoxically, it presents itself as non- 
judgmental and as the protector of the powerless’144.  
The conclusion he draws from this is uncompromising. He maintains that this moralist 
imperative has created a puritanical climate in modern life, one that could not have been 
achieved through traditional means145. For example, he contends that where conventional 
morality failed to control society’s attitude towards sex, particularly with regard to the sexual 
revolution, risk introduced the basic concept that sex was a profoundly risky affair146. Today 
recreational ‘unsafe’ sex is increasingly dismissed as irresponsible147. The impact of this 
moral imperative, however, which has a ringing similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative, 
has grown and has arguably spread into most areas of life, for example: how much a person 
should eat, and the cost to society of obesity or any form of eating disorder; how much 
alcohol one should consume and calls for government taxation to limit or control the intake 
of alcohol. ‘Irresponsible’ behaviour that might incur a financial cost or burden to others has 
created a twenty-first morality that is, it can be maintained, more invasive that any other 
previous morality.       
5.3.2 Risk: War and Risk  
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. There are known 
unknowns; that is to say that there are things that we know we don’t know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know, we don’t know148.  
When Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, uttered this 
statement, many openly laughed at the apparent incomprehensible nature of the argument149. 
When he was subsequently awarded the ‘Foot in Mouth’ prize, the BBC in its report of the 
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accolade referred to ‘his now legendary remarks’150. However, many students who study the 
subject of risk in an age of war and uncertainty recognise that the US Secretary was speaking 
clearly and cogently, albeit using the language of risk and precaution151. The ‘unknown 
unknowns’ statement, in hindsight was the public articulation of a specifically new way of 
doing strategy152. It encapsulated the ontological sense of insecurity that pervaded not only 
America’s sense of security but also many Western governments.     
Although Beck’s notion of a ‘world risk society’ had been hugely influential among 
sociologists, the explosion of interest in the concept of risk in the field of International 
Relations and War Studies has only emerged relatively recently153. Jarvis has suggested that 
one of the central reasons why Beck’s thesis was embraced so readily was in no small part 
due to its timing154.  He states that, ‘Beck could not have foreseen that the publication of his 
first work on world risk society in May 1986 would coincide with a catastrophe of 
monumental proportions, namely the explosion of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, 
Ukraine, on 25 April’155. While this observation is self-evidently true concerning the 
coincidence of timings156, what he fails to recognise was the profound insight that Beck 
offered concerning the paradox of late modernity/postmodernity with regard to the sense of 
ontological insecurity in Western societies. There is general agreement in the literature on 
risk that the end of the Cold War, the rapid growth of trans-national commerce, globalisation, 
the actual or perceived spread of international terrorism, the imminent fear of catastrophic 
climate/environmental damage, heightened governmental and public fears concerning risk157.  
A pertinent example of the liquid or debounded158 nature of risk159 is clearly evident 
in what has become known as the ‘precautionary principle’. It was first used, maintains 
Williams, in the United Nations World Charter for Nature adopted by the General Assembly 
in 1982 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development where the concept 
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came into regular use160. In this declaration the precautionary principle is defined in this 
manner: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmenta1 damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as reason for postponing cost effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation161. 
The use of the word precaution when associated with risk means the prudent handling of 
uncertain or highly vulnerable situations162. What is hugely significant in the Rio Declaration 
is the commitment to act even in the absence of certainty or hard scientific evidence. 
However, what is perhaps even more significant is the implicit moral imperative to act in the 
absence of empirical evidence.     
9/11 has been and continues to be one of the few truly global and epoch-making 
events of late modernity163. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda was not simply another terrorist group164; 
unlike, for example, Hezbollah, the IRA or the Shining Path groups, which were generally 
associated with a specific country or territory. Al-Qaeda post 9/11 was proof that ‘a parallel 
globalisation of terror’165 existed alongside the economic, trade, political and social 
components of globalisation. Only three weeks after the attack on the Twin Towers, Paul 
Wolfowitz stated that ‘we must recognise that these strikes were not just an act of war – they 
were a window into our future’166. The picture outside the window did not make for pleasant 
viewing. Just as global capitalism appeared to be outside the control of states167, globalized 
security risks168 created an image of a world where risk was endless169 and enemies had 
become products of our imagination170 or our prejudices171. The heightened sense of fear 
following 9/11 coupled with the subsequent expansion of ill-defined if tangible threats 
resulted in the focus of many Western governments shifting to future risks, undesirable 
possibilities and the question of an appropriate response.  
If the West had been given a look at its future, the precautionary principle demanded a 
prudent response. For the Bush administration, the ‘War on Terror’, resulting in the 
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intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq was considered an appropriate response. Just as in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the lack or otherwise of empirical evidence was not 
considered a justification for inaction. In regard to the invasion of Iraq, ‘the Americans 
insisted that they could not wait for conclusive evidence of his [Saddam Hussein] WMD 
programme’172. 9/11 had created a distinct, political, narrative framework for the American 
administration through which everything was interpreted and re-interpreted. It is important to 
note that the precautionary principle is not philosophically incoherent173. However, when 
governments take the path of precautionary intervention in an attempt to manage risk, short, 
medium and longer-term unforeseen consequences may and can call into question the original 
intention of the intervention. This is frequently referred to as the boomerang effect174. It 
might also be expressed as the law of unintended consequences. It is questionable whether or 
not Americans feel existentially safer after the billions of dollars spent and the many tens of 
thousands of lives lost in the War on Terror175.  
Within the literature on risk and security studies three schools or distinct approaches 
can be discerned176: Critical Risk Studies, Political Risk Studies and Global Risk 
Management177. Each of these schools will be briefly considered in turn.   
In Critical Risk Studies the focus is on risk governance, the practices of governments
and companies178 and the political rationality associated with this179. Scholars who adopt this 
approach have been heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault180. Consequently, 
they are frequently referred to as post-structuralists181. Aradau and van Münster argue that the 
‘war on terror’ is not the advent of the risk society, contra Beck, but rather ‘a new form of 
governmentality that imbricates knowledge and decision at the limit of knowledge’182. 
Consequently, ‘risk can be understood as a dispositif183 to govern social problems in Michel 
Foucault’s sense of the term’184. The notion of a dispositif, according to Aradau and van 
Münster, enables all risks to be inked in a continuum, regardless of whether they are 
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everyday risks or catastrophic risks185. The result of this is that ‘risk management is seen not 
so much as concerned with governing risk, but with governing social problems and society 
itself through risk’186 [emphasis original]. Or in simple terms, the focus is not on the ‘why’ a 
risk situation has arisen but on the ‘how’ it is to be governed. What counts is not whether 
terrorism can be controlled or not, but the dispositif that is being deployed to make action 
upon the contingent occurrence of terrorism thinkable and practicable187.  
One of the main strengths of this approach to understanding risk in security studies is 
the determined focus upon the governmental approach to make action against risk intelligible 
and practicable. However, as Hameiri contends it is unable to explain why risk management 
has become so important at this particular historical period and secondly ‘and more 
importantly, they cannot explain variation in the adoption of risk depictions and modes of 
governance in different functional areas and geographic regions’188.   
Political Risk Studies primarily considers risk analysis across the disciplines ‘of 
political science, economics and international business, its historically disparate 
methodological strands and its impact on states, markets and transnational actors in the 
international system’189. Those who espouse this approach, openly aim at providing problems 
to specific problems190. Central to the goal of problem solving is the belief that empirical 
evidence exists and must be analysed when considering how to manage risk. In his critique of 
Beck’s world risk society, Jarvis repeatedly refers to the lack of empirical evidence to support 
Beck’s influential thesis, the implication of course being that such evidence not only exists 
but Beck did not make use of it when constructing his concept of a world risk society. After a 
detailed consideration of GDP figures, government spending and tax revenue, Jarvis states 
emphatically that Beck’s use of globalisation fails many empirical tests with relatively crude 
postulations. There is little empirical evidence, he confidently maintained, that supported 
Beck’s suggestion that the state was in systematic retreat, ‘that its fiscal base has been 
151 
eroded, or its expenditure abilities reduced’191. The global financial meltdown would suggest 
that the empirical evidence used by Jarvis to critique Beck was not as compelling as he 
maintained.  
The strengths of this approach, however, in dealing with risk are that it seeks to 
produce solutions to problems based upon empirical evidence and that this approach is not 
restricted to international relations or security studies. However, as amply demonstrated in 
Jarvis’ critique of Beck’s theory of a world risk society, many sociologists have called into 
question the validity of objective truth claims especially when working in cultural settings192.     
One of the central tenents of Global Risk Management is the distinction between 
threats, which are quantifiable and ‘can be precisely identified and measured on the basis of 
the capabilities an enemy has to realize a hostile intent’193 and risk, which is about the 
unforeseen, the potential and the possibility of harm194. Threats are predominantly a feature 
of the present, whereas risks can transcend time and space195. ‘Threats are finite because they 
emanate from a specific actor, with a limited amount of resources to support capabilities. 
Risks are infinite’196. Often referred to as a ‘weak’ constructivist approach197 because it 
(Global Risk Management) accepts the premise of Beck’s world risk society198, its primary 
objective is the consideration of how risk can be managed in a world of debounded risk 
where the notion of security, at least offered by the state nationally and internationally, 
becomes increasingly obsolete199. The main exponents of this position are Christopher Coker, 
Yee-Kuang Heng, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen and Michael J. Williams. Despite their 
differences, these scholars agree that the concept of risk has taken over how we think about 
security, particularly our thinking on war and strategy200. 
Yee-Kuang Heng maintains that a new vocabulary is needed to reconceptualise war in 
the post-Cold War era so that it can be sited within the cultural phenomenon that is twenty- 
first century risk management201. When applied to war studies, risk management does not 
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seek correctionalism202 but rather the application of what he refers to as utilitarian, ‘less than 
heroic’ strategies designed to simply reduce systematic risks203. In other words using risk 
management principles is not about trying to fix or correct a problem. The goal is only to 
mitigate it, and manage it to an acceptable level204.  
The main thrust of Rasmussen’s work The Risk Society at War, is that strategic 
studies had clearly defined the nature of threats205 and that this was subsequently translated 
into a means-end rationality that was in turn capable of bureaucratic administration206. The 
history of strategy in the twenty-first century, according to Rasmussen, is entering a new 
chapter, precisely because society itself has changed into a risk society207. The challenge for 
strategic studies is great. The UN and International Law are examples of the culmination of a 
means-end rational logic208 and function as bodies that have effectively outlawed war209. 
Both reflect, and are products of, a very specific and historic understanding of threat and how 
that threat should be countered or restricted. Rasmussen argues that both bodies are therefore 
ill equipped to deal with issues that are not directly related to state-on-state confrontations210. 
‘It is transnational organisations like al-Qaeda that present a challenge, because they reject 
the nation state as the unit of politics and replace loyalty to a state with loyalty to a faith’211. 
Consequently, strategic studies must acquire new insights into risk in late modernity by 
employing reflexive strategies212, so that it might acquire the rules to guide it213 in an age of 
risk.  
A comprehensive example of war as risk management is Coker’s War in an Age of 
Risk214. Like the other scholars in this school, Coker accepts Beck’s basic premise of a world 
risk society215. Having given up on utopian ideals216 ‘the West’, he argues, ‘is no longer in 
the business of building a New World Order but managing the Global Disorder instead’217. 
Insecurity and not security is the norm because the risk society grasps that the future cannot 
be secured218. What it can do, however, is seek to make it safer. Consequently, when this 
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principle is applied to war, military force is largely applied to one end, managing what he 
terms the ‘wild zone’, the fragile states and failing societies219. War in an age of risk has 
become so complex220, where everything is interconnected221, moves at a remarkable speed222 
generating unintended consequences223 that the primary consideration in modern warfare is 
consequence management, rather than some kind of decisive Clausewitizan victory. ‘In the 
risk age life is too complex,’ he contends, ‘to be reordered, and even if this were not the case, 
war is too imperfect an instrument to do the reordering’224. Consequently, ‘we are now in the 
business of “managing” insecurity or enabling greater or lesser stability’225.  
Global Risk Management is the analytical application of insights into risk in a 
security context that have been drawn from the research of leading sociologists. The main 
contribution this approach offers is its ability to philosophically examine the implications of 
risk in a security setting, particularly war, while simultaneously applying concepts from other 
academic disciplines. It seeks to explain ‘why’ risk has the impact upon societies and 
governmental responses to risk in an age of uncertainty. It also offers a critique of the way 
risk is manifested, thereby suggesting clues as to a potential response. However, and this is an 
observation applicable to philosophy itself226, Global Risk Management does not offer an 
effective ‘how’ risk should be handled. To use a medical analogy, it is akin to identifying that 
a patient is sick and being able to offer a cogent explanation of the origins of the sickness and 
the ability to outline its symptoms but is unable to offer the patient any credible medical 
intervention to cure the sickness.      
5.3.3 Conclusions 
Risk has always been part of what it is to be human. Every advance or stage in our 
developmental journey as a species has involved risk and the consequences associated with 
progress. However, how risk is understood in the twenty-first century and our reaction to it is 
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fundamentally different than earlier periods of history. The Enlightenment project offered 
advances in science, technology and industry at a previously unimagined pace. The certainty 
that characterised the philosophical underpinnings of modernity has been replaced in this post-
modern age with a fundamental suspicion of authority, absolutes and the existence of 
universal laws or norms. Beck’s reflective modernisation therefore does not adequately 
reflect this cultural dynamic. Although the phrase seeks to maintain a direct, albeit reflective, 
link with modernity and the Enlightenment project, it nevertheless fails to give sufficient 
weight to the fear that accompanies, as a practical consequence, the rejection of intellectual, 
scientific and universal absolutes. Not even science, on which so much of life in this century 
depends, is trusted to have all the answers. The ‘free-floating consciousness of fear’ is only 
one manifestation of the rejection of Enlightenment certainties in the ‘risk society’.    
Globalisation offers unparalleled opportunities while simultaneously generating an
almost unlimited source of potentially devastating risks, such as non-state international 
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Far from the ‘New World Order’ envisaged at the end of the 
Cold War, governments are faced with a future characterised by known and unknown (but 
anticipated) threats and an innumerable number of potential risks. The window to the future 
imagined by Wolfowitz still does not make for pleasant viewing. Governments are ensnared 
in what Beck calls ‘the risk trap’.  Although many risks are ontologically non-existent, other 
than as one of many potential futures, their effect in the present is such that the very 
possibility constrains actual experience and action, creating ‘a real virtuality’ that itself 
becomes determinative. The various schools of thought adopted by scholars in security and 
international studies are testimony to how complex and insolvable the issue of risk must be 
for governments, not least because of the moral etiquette constructed around risk and the 
ethical imperative to avoid unnecessary risk. Western societies that are increasingly fearful of 
risk and consequently are also increasingly risk averse may well be deeply suspicious of 
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narratives that seek to legitimise the use of military force and of asking its Armed Forces to 
accept risks that they as a society actively seek to avoid.            
5.4 A Post-Heroic and Feminised Society?      
The extent to which Western societies can now be legitimately described as post- 
heroic or are thought to embody a post-heroic condition, was discussed at an international 
conference at the Faculty of History, University of Oxford in March 2011. Key questions the 
conference sought to address were: does the condition exist? If it exists, does it posit an 
alternative set of military values for the modern age? Does this condition directly affect the 
relationship between military and civilian casualties and the nature of the relationship a 
society is prepared to accept? What is the relationship between self-sacrifice, citizenship and 
masculinity?227 This section will further develop the theme of the chapter through a 
consideration of three distinct and yet potentially related ideas: a post-heroic society 
(condition); casualties and public opinion; and finally the feminisation of Western society.        
5.4.1 Post-heroic Society 
The assumption implied in the concept of a post-heroic society, or post-heroic 
condition for that matter, is the idea that societies have reached a stage where the need for 
heroes as classically defined is no longer required. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 
‘the heroic age’ as that period in Greek history before the return from Troy, in which the 
legends of the heroes were set228. The Oxford Dictionary’s definition of hero is ‘a person, 
typically a man, who is admired for their courage, outstanding achievements, or noble 
qualities: a war hero’. It is clear from this definition that any suggestion that the age of 
heroes ended with the Greeks before their return from Troy is unsustainable. Individuals229 or 
groups230 have been admired for their ‘courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities’ 
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in almost every age. However, in an age obsessed with the management of risk and the 
ethical imperative to avoid unnecessary risk, the cultural context within which words derive 
their contemporary meaning is, it can be maintained, significantly different to previous 
ages231. In this section, post-heroic will therefore refer to the notion that the classical ideal of 
the heroic figure, i.e. noted for their courage, noble qualities, a war hero, resides uneasily in a 
risk-averse society.      
Post-heroism reflects the idea that modern society is no longer motivated by the same 
heroic concepts that marked earlier periods of history. ‘Willingness to kill or die for the cause 
of one’s socio-political community appears to be a phenomenon of an historical stage that 
Western states have long left behind or an indicator of nationalistic or religious 
fanaticism’232. Luttwak describes this as ‘a new season of war’, which he maintained was a 
consequence of the passing of the Cold War233. One of the first scholars to specifically focus 
upon the idea of post-heroic warfare, Luttwak argued that the Napoleonic type of warfare, 
with its grand purposes and the decisive employment of substantial forces in large 
operations234, was faced with a significant demographic change emphasized by the end of the 
Cold War235. Wars fought for grand purposes, Luttwak maintains, implies a willingness on 
behalf of countries to accept casualties in large numbers236. One of the characteristics of post- 
heroic war is the ideal of low casualty rates, ‘in order of priority, military personnel, civilian 
populations, and, if possible and profitable, the enemy’237. Luttwak ascribes the modern fear 
of casualties238 to the demographic change in birth rates239. In pre-industrial and industrial 
societies, it was common for families to have anywhere from 4 to 9 children240. In contrast, in 
post-industrial societies the statistical average is 2.1241. He makes the point that infant and 
child mortality rates were tragically high in pre-industrial and industrial societies. 
Consequently,         
To lose a young family member for any reason was always tragic no doubt, but death 
in combat was not the extraordinary and fundamentally unacceptable event that it has 
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now become. Parents and relatives who approve when their children decide to join the 
armed forces, now react with astonishment and anger when they are actually sent into 
combat, and they view their wounding or death as an outrageous scandal, rather than 
as an occupational hazard242. 
The first post-heroic war, according to Luttwak, was NATO’s intervention against 
Serbia for the sake of Kosovo243; the NATO campaign against Serbia being an example of 
what he would term, post-heroic military policy244. Hobsbawn called it the first ‘consumer 
war’245, Ash referred to it as the first ‘post-Westphalian’ war246 and Coker refers to it as an 
example of humane warfare247. One of the key features of this policy according to Luttwak, is 
that ‘U.S. ground forces are not available as instruments of U.S. foreign policy, except under 
very unusual conditions’248. His rhetoric of NATO’s deliberate casualty avoidance in the 
Kosovo campaign, for example releasing ordinance from what he terms ‘from an ultra-safe 
15,000 feet’, is scathing249. ‘In the calculus of the NATO democracies, the immediate 
possibility of saving thousands of Albanians from massacre and hundreds of thousands from 
deportation was obviously not worth the lives of a few pilots’250. Although it can be 
maintained that there is no single European way of war251, one trait shared by many Western 
democracies is a profound sensitivity to the impact upon public opinion of military casualties.  
Politicians in most if not all Western countries are exceptionally conscious of the need 
to garner public support in the decision-making process to commit their forces to armed 
conflict or indeed war252. Even if public support is broadly supportive at the beginning of a 
campaign it cannot be taken for granted that it will endure throughout it. Coker makes an 
astute observation when he comments that, ‘it is the public today that tends to desert, to insist 
that forces be pulled out’253. The ever-present specter of the propaganda of the deed254 
ensures that any armed conflict is conducted in several theatres simultaneously. Therefore, 
while a particular incident in a campaign may have little operational effect on the ground, it 
could generate strategic effect within public opinion of the country concerned and 
consequently on the world stage. This is especially true in a country that manifests traits of a 
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post-heroic society. Manigart’s study into Belgium’s withdrawal of its ground forces from 
Rwanda highlights this point255. 
On the 7th of April 1994 ten Belgium paratroopers were killed by Hutu government
troops while assigned to protect the Rwandan prime minister. This was the largest loss of 
Belgian military personnel killed in combat since the Korean War256. Manigart contends that 
the overwhelming public reaction to these deaths led not only to the immediate withdrawal of 
all Belgium’s military forces from the country, but it tragically precipitated the subsequent 
genocide257. What had been anticipated as a ‘risk free’ ‘Club Med’ holiday, according to 
Manigart, provided the basis for a fundamental reassessment of government and national 
policy.  ‘In postmodern societies that are more and more risk averse, and where “zero dead 
wars” have become a normal expectation, this fact can greatly complicate the recruitment and 
retention process for armed forces relying on the marketplace for filling their ranks’258.  
In 1997 a special Parliamentary commission by the Belgian Senate was established 
under pressure by the victim’s relatives259. One of the recommendations emerging from this 
commission was the requirement that the government and the military should make sure 
everything was done to guarantee the maximum safety of military personnel and to obtain 
maximal guarantees for the security of the troops in the field260. Manigart’s study into 
societal attitudes in Belgium revealed that the public continued to regard ‘the military as a 
high-risk occupation, even though it is objectively less the case than before’261. Although the 
public image in Belgium of its Armed Forces was positive, the prestige of the military 
remained low compared to other professions because it is still considered a dangerous 
occupation262. The deaths of ten paratroopers, while undoubtedly tragic and heartbreaking for 
the families of those killed, would not normally be expected to generate strategic effect on the 
battlefield.  
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This case, however, illustrates the sensitivity that surrounds military deaths in post- 
modern societies and the global strategic effect a small number of military deaths can have. 
Although this it maybe suggestive of a societal post-heroic condition, it does not establish it. 
In section 5.2.2 ‘Death and the Military in the Twenty-first Century’ it was maintained that 
public expressions of sympathy evidenced in the repatriation of British soldiers through 
Royal Wootton Bassett and latterly Carterton, placed the fallen beyond party politics but 
firmly within civil polity. The many thousands who ‘publicly pay their respects’ at a 
repatriation of a fallen British soldier or at the funeral service are doing more than identifying 
with the personal loss of a family. The personal attendance at memorial services of recently 
killed service personnel, and for that matter at Remembrance Day services, are public 
statements that the death of the soldier(s) warranted public recognition through their 
attendance. The issue is not whether the UK is an entirely post-heroic society; Royal Wootton 
Bassett263 clearly demonstrates that it is not. Rather the issue is that the areas of public life in 
which a display of heroism might be expected or manifested have been in a process of steady 
decline in Western, post-modern, risk-averse societies.   
5.4.2 Post-modern Casualty Phobia 
It is frequently maintained that America, and for that matter most Western 
governments and peoples, had developed such a profound dread of war casualties that this 
specific phobia directly influenced national policies264. This alleged phobia or dread of large 
numbers of casualties appears to stand in direct contrast to either the history of Western 
countries or their willingness to suffer eye-wateringly large casualty numbers during either 
civil wars265, the First and Second World Wars or the Korean War266. Bennett and Flickinger 
note in their brief historical survey on this subject, that America’s reluctance to confront the 
Nazi threat was greatly influenced, in part, by the fear that any such war would result in 
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heavy casualties267. Despite this, after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, America was prepared 
to pay a heavy cost; in the Second World War the US lost 250,000 – 260,000 soldiers, sailors 
and airmen268.  
Casualty figures from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, of British and US military 
personnel, would suggest that the notion of casualty phobia is more complex than counting 
numbers269. This section cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of this complex subject270. 
Nevertheless, it will consider the idea of casualty phobia or casualty aversion and its alleged 
impact upon policy, particularly US policy271. This section will also examine the main 
suggested reasons for this phenomenon.  
It is important to define what is meant in the phrase casualty phobia or casualty 
aversion. Smith makes the point that ‘concern for casualties is healthy; casualty aversion or 
phobia is not’272. Record, however, states that ‘casualty aversion is healthy; casualty phobia is 
not’273. While the distinction between Smith and Record may well be only semantic, it is 
nevertheless important to carefully define the concept of casualty concern as opposed to 
casualty aversion or phobia. The idea that a state should be concerned about military 
casualties should not come as any surprise. Levy maintains that the ‘state has sought a 
balance between the capacity to employ military force and the domestic limitations deriving 
from the low level of legitimacy for sacrifice’274. This was reflected in the Weinberger 
doctrine of 1984, which proposed the rules for avoiding costly military operations that were 
considered low priority275. The same basic tenet is explicitly noted in the US Army’s Field 
Manual 100-5, ‘the American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary 
casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their 
support should any of these conditions not be met’276. In essence, ‘the public would always 
like to pay less of this cost if possible, but a non-zero human cost does not mean the public 
will oppose war’277.  
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This, however, supposes that ‘the public’ is some form of homogeneous whole. They 
are not and different sections of ‘the public’ may take or adopt different positions on this 
subject278. In America, according to Smith, 30-35 per cent of the public are what he terms 
‘solid hawks’; 20-25 per cent are ‘defeat phobic’279; 20 per cent are casualty phobic’280; and 
10-30 per cent are ‘solid doves’ and who are opposed to almost all use of force281. 
Consequently, there is usually a base of public opinion that can be built upon by political 
actors282. For Smith, ‘casualty aversion, strictly defined, refers only to that segment of view 
between convinced hawks and persistent pacifists’283. Gelpi, et.al., suggest that we should 
understand public opinion as existing on a continuum of casualty sensitivity, ranging from the 
minimally sensitive to the maximally sensitive284. This is a much more nuanced view of 
public opinion than has sometimes been presented.  
America’s ‘zero-deficit mentality’285 in the Balkans was an operational driver that had 
tactical implications; bombing from 15,000 feet in Kosovo is a very public manifestation of 
this mentality. The Weinberger doctrine articulated in 1984 and the US Army’s doctrinal 
awareness of the need to avoid unnecessary casualties are examples of the profound change 
in tone concerning how both the government and the public understood core national 
interests. Scholars frequently cite the experience and remembrance of the Vietnam War as the 
source of America’s casualty phobia or of its ‘zero-tolerance’ to casualties in the later 
decades of the twentieth century286.     
Vietnam, according to Coker, was America’s first ‘postmodern’ war287 and the most 
searing war experience for America since The Civil War288. It was also the first war in which 
combat imagery was widely available289 and where censorship was virtually non-existent290. 
Although public support for this war showed little change up to the Spring of 1968 despite 
the Tet offensive291, disenchantment with the war grew and spawned a mass anti-war 
movement. Returning American troops were vilified for their cruelty and received no victory 
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parades and no national acts of expiation292. ‘The search for “the lessons” of Vietnam 
dominated strategic discussions in the years following the inglorious evacuation of the U.S. 
embassy in Saigon’293. Vietnam produced, according to Record, a generation of political and 
military leaders that was much more reluctant to use force294 and if it did, it would have to 
adhere to a different political and military policy. It was this generation of politicians and 
military leaders who directed the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon and 
Somalia295 and implemented the ‘zero-tolerance’ policy in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
It was widely believed that the American public could not stand the ‘body bag 
factor’296 as a result of its experience of the Vietnam War. The deaths of eighteen US 
Rangers in Mogadishu on the 3rd of October 1993 is frequently cited as evidence of how 
negative public opinion and media pressure forced President Bill Clinton to withdraw 
American Forces from Somalia297. John Mueller made the observation that, ‘in essence, when 
Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of 
thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero’298. He went on to state 
that, ‘the British, Canadians, French, and others came to this same conclusion regarding their 
own soldiers’299. The images of dead American soldiers, stripped naked and dragged through 
the streets of Mogadishu, were and remain shocking. For Dauber the photographs of the dead 
soldiers work as ‘enthymemes, that is they are arguments that invite the reader to supply the 
final missing conclusion, in this case that the circumstances mirror those of Vietnam’300. He 
continues and states that, ‘unlike Desert Storm, this was no Nintendo War’301. Did public 
opinion, fuelled by the powerful images of dead American soldiers, and combined with 
media pressure change America’s involvement in Somalia. Or has this episode been 
misinterpreted as Smith contends?302 
The response in the American media to the media coverage from Mogadishu was 
dramatic303. At the time, maintains Smith, about 40 per cent of Americans believed that their 
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forces should be withdrawn. However, ‘up to 60 per cent wanted to send in more forces to 
punish the perpetrators of the outrage’304. In his analysis of the role of the media in the 
Somalia crisis, Mermin contends that if television ‘inspired American intervention in 
Somalia, it did so under the influence of governmental actors’305. If this were indeed the case, 
it seems a reasonable assumption to make that a similar relationship possibly existed in the 
aftermath of the deaths in October 1993306. Burk notes that the rhetoric about public 
intolerance of casualties ‘may simply mask an intra-elite struggle’307 taking place in the US 
administration at the time of the American deaths. Although the popular image is of a rapid 
withdrawal of American troops, Mueller notes that ‘after the Somalia fiasco, the Americans 
stayed on for several months and, since none were killed, scarcely any attention was paid or 
concern voiced’308.  
Nevertheless, what is referred to as the ‘Dover Test’ is a powerful concept309. This is 
reflected in the article written by Ted Rall (an American citizen) published on the Al Jazeera 
website310. Rall’s argument is not subtle. ‘What about the bodies? During the 1960s and early 
1970s television viewers and newspaper readers in the US were regularly treated to images 
from the front that prompted even the most fervent proponents of the war to question 
themselves’311. In essence he laments that while Vietnam was a total media free-for-all, the 
US media have, in his opinion, accepted government censorship, effectively hiding the truth 
of America’s wars. Rall’s article is hardly a scholarly piece of work. It is however, evidence 
of how powerful and politically sensitive images of dead soldiers, in this case American 
soldiers, returning home in flagged draped coffins is thought to be312.  
American political elites, according to Kaplan, hold as ‘an article of faith’ that the 
public are unwilling to tolerate combat deaths313. ‘The public’, he states ‘is defeat-phobic, not 
casualty-phobic’314. In contrast, ‘Reagan and Clinton may have been reticent because the 
group most likely to recoil from casualties happens to be the very elites who attribute the 
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tendency to the public’315. Opinion polls following the attacks on September 11, 2001 
showed that a large majority supported military action, even if it meant thousands of 
American deaths and the war lasting years316. Julian Glover’s analysis of opinion poll for the 
Guardian during one of the bloodiest periods in Afghanistan for UK forces concludes that 
support for the war in the UK had increased, although he makes the point that it is not a 
popular war317. For the American public, ‘so long as the president is not panicking at the sight 
of casualties, neither will the public’318. The American public are not indifferent to the human 
cost of American foreign policy; however, casualty rates ‘have not driven public attitudes 
towards the Iraq War’319. ‘Under the right conditions, the public will continue to support 
military operations even when they come with a relatively high human cost’320.  
In their analysis of public opinion, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, conclude that public 
tolerance of the human cost is shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: belief about 
the rightness or wrongness of the war and beliefs about the likely success of the war321. They 
contend that those who are sceptical of the rightness of the war yet expect to win may be 
willing to pay higher costs that those who believe in the case yet expect to lose322. How does 
the public interpret success? Gelpi et.al., state that,  
The American public does not measure success in terms of whether U.S. soldiers are 
being killed or wounded nor whether the terrorists and insurgents are being killed or 
wounded. The measures adopted by the public are rather different, and indeed come 
closer to the winning-the-hearts-and-minds idea that most experts (and Bush 
administration rhetoric) would identify as the critical factor323. 
It is important to recognise that President George Bush was reliant upon the work of Gelpi, 
Feaver and Reifler and that their work has been subjected to a critical review by other 
scholars within the research community324. Berinsky and Druckman for example have raised 
methodological concerns, that ‘gives some hesitation to the conclusions of Feaver, Gelpi and 
Reifler’325. One of the main criticisms of the scholars from Duke University is their 
contention ‘that support for the war is heavily influenced by pre-existing political judgments 
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and the balance of elite rhetoric’326. Although this is a well-made point, it does not of itself 
necessarily undermine the main conclusions of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler. Any perceived 
failure to take cognisance of any pre-existing political judgments, does not alter the actual 
responses of members of the public to a survey at a given point in time.    
At a superficial level there appears to be considerable similarities between the
reaction of the public in Belgium to the deaths of the 10 paratroopers in Rwanda and the 
public outcry in America over the 18 Rangers in Somalia. Both incidents appear to lend 
weight to the notion that Western countries had become casualty-phobic. However, as this 
examination has shown, American public opinion is more complex and nuanced. Gelpi, 
Feaver and Reifler’s suggestion of a continuum of casualty sensitivity harmonises well with 
Smith’s breakdown of American society: 30-35 per cent solid hawks; 20-25 per cent defeat 
phobic; 20 per cent casualty phobic; and 10-30 per cent solid doves. With regard to the 
withdrawal of American forces from Somalia, the intra-elite struggle in American politics, 
combined with a public belief that there was little chance of military success in Somalia, is a 
more credible explanation for the withdrawal of American forces than simple casualty 
phobia; especially as there had been a massive public appetite to send additional troops to 
exact punishment on Aidid’s forces. The significant number of US and UK deaths and 
injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consistent level of public support for American and 
British service personnel, in their respective countries, would suggest that the public in both 
countries are not casualty phobic, as some have maintained. The phenomenon of Royal 
Wootton Bassett, and the public expressions of sympathy at the loss of British military 
personnel, would also demonstrate that the public in the UK has a genuine concern about 
military casualties.                 
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5.4.3 The Feminisation of Society and the Military 
Taylor reminds us of the ‘fundamental importance of equality in our social and 
political lives’ in a Western social imaginary327. Instead of being ‘a society permeated by 
relations of personalized hierarchy’ we have ‘gone over to one based on impersonal 
equality’328. Old forms have been dissolved and ‘replaced by a general and impersonal 
recognition of equal status’329. This journey however was not simple. Equality as an ideal, for 
the elites who embraced it330, would have meant a different thing for women in the eighteenth 
century. Indeed, Taylor notes that there had been a recurring fear ‘that men might lose their 
manly virtues and become “effeminate”’331. This section will briefly consider the idea that 
Western societies reflect a process of feminisation332 and the impact this has had on women 
in the military and whether or not they should serve in combat roles. The relevance of this 
section is directly linked to ‘how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in 
contemporary British society.’   
For the vast majority of cultures, war has been the context in which a man could 
define himself as a man333. Until the introduction of modern weapon systems334 male bodies 
were better suited to wielding heavy metal (bronze or iron) weapons; men are ‘generally 
taller and more robust than female[s], with longer thicker muscles, and larger lungs, heart, 
and limb ratios, as well as the inability to become pregnant and thereby sacrifice valuable 
fighting time’335.  Masculinity, argues Braudy, has been tinged with, even steeped in, 
nostalgia for a lost masculinity and consequently embodies a myth of an historical connection 
with past models336. The Victorian love affair with chivalric myths and Arthurian legends is 
only one example of this historic nostalgia337. In America, just at a time when ‘the New 
Woman threatened to feminize the public sphere, the Second World War provided a crucial 
opportunity for men to demonstrate characteristics such as strength, bravery, and usefulness 
that had been called into question during the 1930s’338. Posters calling upon American men to 
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mobilise for war portrayed the male physique in comic book proportions, with steel-like 
bodies, chiselled jaws, and dogged determination, prepared to do battle with equally comic 
book-like depictions of the hyper-masculinised Nazi fatherland339. For Jarvis, the male body 
was used to literally and symbolically represent the health of the American nation340.  
‘The hyper-masculinised hegemonic models offered during World War II’341 were 
idealised in the narratives contained in the films that endeavoured to represent this ‘good 
war’342. The film the Sands of Iwo Jima, released in 1949 staring John Wayne, is an example 
of this narrative creation343. However, as Carrigan, et.al., note, ‘most men do not really act 
like the screen image of John Wayne or Humphrey Bogart’344. The cultural image of the 
idealised nuclear family, with the husband as the hard working, courageous head of the 
family, is contemporaneous with this and located in popular mythology in the decade of the 
1950s; although, as Evans contends, ‘for millions of people in Britain and the USA this 
dream had no basis in fact or lived experience…it was nevertheless an influential dream in 
which cohesive nuclear families were sustained by male labour in the workplace and female 
labour in the home’345. This dream while having some basis in lived experience346, had a 
large, completely fictional aspect to it. The film Saving Private Ryan, or the TV series Band 
of Brothers is a more realistic depiction of actual combat than the Sands of Iwo Jima.  
Feminist scholars ruthlessly attacked what they and their supporters defined as 
hegemonic masculinity, along with its socio-political, economic and cultural implications347. 
Hegemonic masculinity348, according to Connell, is dominant in what he describes as the 
gender order in societies, including all other masculinities and femininities in that society349. 
Although this form of masculinity is frequently held up as an ideal form of masculinity350, 
Connell maintains that few men actually meet the ‘normative standard’351. For Seidler, the 
origins of modern notions of masculinity may be traced to the scientific revolutions of the 
seventeenth century, and as a result men have ‘suffered from an identification of our 
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masculinity with our reason’352. The dualism introduced by Cartesian metaphysics, according 
to Brittan, created a sharp division between the body and society, the person and the context 
and between man and woman353. The philosophical equation of subject and object (dualism), 
created simplistic notions of binary formulas: for example, subject/object, man/woman, 
winners/losers, and oppressors/oppressed.    
Although early manifestations of industrialisation created appalling conditions for 
men, women and children354, working and middleclass women contested their economic 
dependence on men as the factory system developed355. However, the rise of Fascism with its 
naked reassertion of male supremacy and the subsequent world war to defeat it halted the 
move towards equality for women that had been evident in many Western countries356. The 
women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s, also described as second wave 
feminism357, should be viewed as one element in the process of questioning of Enlightenment 
certainties (binary formulas) after the Second World War. The challenge from feminism in 
this period was frequently and deliberately confrontational. Radical feminists charged men as 
being women’s enemies and oppressors; the ‘Redstocking Manifesto’ claimed that ‘all men 
have oppressed women’ and that ‘we do not need to change ourselves, but to change men’358. 
While the focus of feminist critique in the twenty-first century has shifted to the analysis of 
gender and masculinities, men can still on occasion be portrayed as violent aggressors, with a 
‘propensity to the enactment of paranoid-schizoid fantasies’359.  
One of the principle projects of the feminist movement was the application of a 
deconstructionist methodology with the intention of undoing gender or what Gardiner calls a 
‘feminist degendering movement’360. Evans contends that ‘the influence of Michel Foucault 
was pivotal in determining arguments which accounted for sexual identity in terms of 
constructed “discourses” rather than naturalistic givens’361. For many feminists, gender itself 
was a socially constructed discourse and many of the gender inequalities evident in Western 
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societies were the result of men and women being socialised into different roles362. Since 
gender does not exist outside of history and culture, argues Brittan, both masculinity and 
femininity are subject to a process of reinterpretation363. Needless to say, there is 
considerable debate between the nature or nurture camps as to whether gender is biologically 
determined or socially conditioned and learned364.  
In recent years, the nature of this debate has itself come under criticism by some 
sociologists. ‘Rather than seeing sex as biologically determined and gender as culturally 
learned, they argue that we should view both sex and gender as socially constructed 
products’365. Older binaries, comments Gardiner, seem simplistic and potentially 
distorting366. Even the concept of what is masculine is fluid and open to a variety of 
interpretative models367. The protracted fight for the right of gay men to be officially 
accepted in the militaries is one example. Halberstam’s article, ‘An Introduction to Female 
Masculinity: Masculinity without Men’ is another recent example368. Outside the military, 
concern has been raised in some quarters that the ratio of male teachers to female teachers in 
British primary schools is creating a feminisation of primary education. Skelton argues 
convincingly that the issue has little to do with the sex of the teachers, or a statistical 
examination of ratios, but rather the models of school governance and practice, which she 
maintains is masculine rather than feminine369.  
The feminisation of Western society cannot be reduced to a simplistic zero-sum 
conception of power370 or that gender traits historically associated with women such as ‘a 
special relationship to peace and pacifism’371 now pervade Western societies. Rather, it 
should be located in the recognition that life in a post-modern world is fluid and complex. 
Issues of gender, sex and masculinities are, at least in large part, social constructs and 
consequently undergo continual negotiation and renegotiation372. The masculinity epitomised 
by John Wayne in the Sands of Iwo Jima no longer enjoys unrivalled, or unchallenged 
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dominance373. Consequently, the process of denaturalisation374 has had a significant impact 
upon Western militaries.  
Post-modern militaries375 were restructured to offer both a ‘peace dividend’376 and to
reflect the profound changes the end of the Cold War was thought to have inaugurated. In a 
unified Germany, for example, the appropriate normative image of the role of soldier in the 
new democratic state was discussed and implemented377. In the UK the Sex Discrimination 
Act of 1975 reflected changing public attitudes towards employment roles for women378. The 
end of the Cold War, concern about male recruiting and continuing public pressure for better 
career opportunities for women in the military, resulted in increased integration for women 
within the military and an increased access to a wider range of roles379. This process has been 
far from smooth. In both the UK and America, women faced sexual harassment380, assault381 
and discrimination. Recent studies, however, have demonstrated just how much progress has 
been achieved in postmodern militaries382. The influence of some forms of feminist critique, 
however, in this process has been mixed383. For Titunik, the first wave of gender integration 
in the military has been successful; women fit ‘extraordinarily well into the military culture 
and have successfully internalized its norms’384. The change in public opinion towards gender 
equality in every sphere of public life, and the successful integration of women into the 
armed forces, has resulted in women today being eligible for military service across the 
various Corps, Arms and Branches385, with the exception of the Infantry, the Armoured Corps 
and the Marines.   
The British Government is required by a European Community Equal Treatment 
Directive to review the exclusion of women from certain ground close combat environments 
every eight years386. The last review was undertaken in 2010. The statement by Defence 
Personnel Minister, Andrew Robathan on 29 November 2010, reiterated the UK 
government’s position of excluding women from certain roles in the military387. In his 
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statement the Minister said that ‘their capability is not in doubt; they win the highest 
decorations for valour and demonstrate independence and initiative’. However, he also stated 
that the evidence of whether they should be required to fight face-to-face with the enemy is 
inconclusive388. Commenting on this the BBC Defence correspondent Caroline Wyatt, said 
that ‘there has been little or no public clamour for change in the UK, and little from within 
the armed forces or from women themselves serving in Afghanistan’389. The conclusion from 
the study undertaken by the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory into the role of 
women in combat roles found that they were unable to ‘identify any empirical, scientific data 
examining the effects of women in close combat teams, especially within the UK Armed 
Forces, and it appears currently that no such information exists’390. The report went on to 
state that, ‘information provided by those nations that do employ women in combat roles 
suggests that there is little evidence of a negative impact on the effectiveness, cohesion or 
readiness of military teams, a finding which is supported by the academic literature’391. 
In America the pressure to open combat roles to women has been growing. Unlike the 
situation in the UK one of the main intellectual arguments revolves around the issue of 
military service and citizenship.  Snyder states that most discussions about the role of women 
in the military curiously fail to mention citizenship; a feature, she maintains, which dates 
back to ancient Greece and the civic republican tradition392. Col McSally, the most senior 
combat pilot in the USAF393, argues that ‘from the birth of our nation, citizenship provided 
certain rights like voting, but those rights were connected to the obligations of paying taxes, 
jury duty, and military service if needed…Citizens’ rights and responsibilities should be 
gender neutral’394. Col McSally’s argument is premised on actual experience of combat in an 
asymmetrical theatre of war like Afghanistan. She correctly contends that the notion of a 
frontline is largely irrelevant and that all military personnel must be prepared and capable of 
actively participating in any engagement with enemy forces395. In February 2012, the 
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Pentagon announced that the military was formally opening up thousands of jobs to women 
in units closer to the front lines to better reflect the realities of modern warfare396. The plan 
also included allowing selected women officers to undergo the Marine training course. In 
October it was announced that the two officers who volunteered to take the course failed to 
complete it, along with thirty of their male colleagues397. In January 2013 the US Defence 
Secretary Leon Panetta announced the intention to lift the restrictions on women serving in 
combat roles398.  
The purpose of this section was not to make a judgement on the merits or otherwise of 
the notion that Western societies have become feminised but to briefly consider some of the 
main historical and philosophical arguments that have been and are associated with this 
phenomenon. The feminisation of Western society cannot be reduced to some vulgar zero- 
sum contest between winners and losers. Rather, it is the story of how simplistic binary 
formulas deriving from Enlightenment rationality became outmoded in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Life in a post-modern, twenty-first century is distinctly more complex and 
fluid than that depicted in the films or deriving from the myth of the 1950s, resulting in 
concepts such as gender, sex, masculinities and femininities being liquid and malleable.  
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter his examined selected societal factors and their impact on how they 
might influence the social imaginary through the discussions that occur in the public sphere, 
from which a common mind may emerge. Any narrative construct that seeks to address 
where the generic British soldier resides on the continuum imagined in the thesis question399, 
must incorporate powerful and influential societal factors such as, how death is understood 
within that society; how risk shapes, influences or controls the ordinary lives of that society’s 
citizens or indeed the government of that society; does the idea of a weapons platform sit 
173 
more at ease with a post-heroic ontological character; does it have an attitude towards the 
casualties consistent with combat operations; and how does the modern phenomenon of the 
feminisation of Western societies effect where on the continuum the generic soldier should 
reside?  
Despite this cultural shift in attitudes towards death in contemporary British society,
soldiers who are killed in service for their country are located firmly within civil polity. This 
chapter has shown that in a post-modern age, whenever the older rituals and language of 
death have all but disappeared from everyday public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude 
towards death found expression again with its re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual for 
its fallen war dead.  
The post-modern rejection of absolutes and its fundamental scepticism of authority
creates the environment in which apprehension about potential risks perpetuates a ‘free- 
floating consciousness of fear’. Post-modern societies are, as a consequence, increasingly 
risk-averse. The fear of potential futures dominates the present generating what Beck calls 
‘real virtuality’. The implication of this is significant. The warrior, historically, accepted the 
possibility and actuality of intimate violent warfare, whereas the battlefield 
technician/weapons platform is removed from actual personal contact with the enemy. 
Societies that are inherently risk-averse may struggle to create and maintain a narrative that 
sustains the concept of the warrior. The difficulties inherent in this scenario are magnified if 
risk-averse societies are also intrinsically post-heroic.  
The ethical etiquette of avoiding known or imagined risks is a strong cultural driver in 
reducing the areas of public life in which a display of heroism might be expected or 
manifested. The UK is not a thoroughly post-heroic society. The public remembrance of the 
fallen in armed conflict and the respect shown in the repatriation of soldiers killed on active 
service would suggest that a significant percentage of the general public value and appreciate 
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martial notions of sacrifice, valour and duty. Inevitably, there is a tipping point when the 
balance between recognition and subsequent acceptance of the need of the heroic wanes and 
gives way to increasing reluctance to manifest heroic traits. There is little reason to envisage 
that the UK will not become increasingly post-heroic.  
The significant number of British deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
consistent level of public support for service personnel, would suggest that the public in the 
UK is not, at least at this moment, casualty phobic. It does have a profound concern about 
casualties and the families of servicemen and women. Whether or not this acceptance of 
relatively high numbers of casualties in combat operations will continue to be the case in any 
future armed conflict, is uncertain. Previous generations who reluctantly accepted high 
casualty numbers were not marked by the same aversion to risk or manifested the same post-
heroic traits.             
One of the most controversial conclusions of this chapter may well be the logical 
consequence of the sub-section on the feminisation of Western societies and their militaries. 
As the twenty-first century develops it seems highly likely that the concept of the warrior will 
become increasingly gender neutral. Historically, the notion of the warrior was essentially 
male in most cultures. Today, though, concepts such as gender, sex, masculinities and 
femininities are recognised as being more liquid and malleable than had previously been 
understood. The ‘narcissism of minor difference’ may finally vanish in post-modern societies 
where boundaries are fluid and ill-defined. This, however, may well be dependant upon the 
character of future conflict and the wars that the British Armed Forces may be engaged in.
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Chapter 6 
The Future Nature of Conflict 
6.1 Introduction 
Conceptually, chapter 4 is a philosophical exploration of the nature of war. Chapter 6 
in contrast, is an examination of the current thinking in government and scholarship 
concerning the nature of future conflict and the wars that British Forces may be engaged in. 
Or put another way, chapter 4 established the conceptual skeleton and chapter 6 attempts to 
place some flesh on the bones of chapter 4 by examining the anticipated operational Sitz im 
Leben of service for the British soldier set within the overarching context of what the nature 
of future conflict will look like and the type of adversaries the generic soldier can expect to 
face.  
The public sphere associated with a Western social imaginary1 is ‘the locus of
discussion potentially engaging everyone’2 where ‘rational views are elaborated that should 
guide government’3. Although an ‘extrapolitical’ concept, it nevertheless is supposed to be 
listened to by political power4. ‘With the modern public sphere,’ maintains Taylor, ‘comes the 
idea that political power should be supervised and checked by something outside’5. This 
concept is so common to us that Taylor observes that ‘we have trouble even recalling what it 
was like before’6. The question this thesis is examining is: 
If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us 
about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary 
British  society?
The relevance of this chapter is based on the premise that the nature of war in combination 
with the type of future conflicts, and their environments, involving the UK’s Armed Forces, 
may directly influence ‘how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in 
contemporary British society’. Public doubt about British involvement in military operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan7 is one example of an on-going discussion in the public sphere that 
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has informed political considerations. The decision of the House of Commons regarding UK 
military involvement in Syria is a recent example8. The prime minister in response to the 
defeat in the House of Common said, ‘people are deeply concerned about the chemical 
weapons attacks in Syria, but they want us to learn the lessons of Iraq’9.  
In his book Strategy for Chaos, Colin Gray states that ‘politics rules’10. It is therefore 
necessary to begin with an examination of ‘HM Government’s Assessment of Security and 
Defence’ requirements and planning assumptions (6.2). One of the central components in this 
section will be a consideration of the government’s ‘Conceptual Framework’ (6.2.1) set 
against its strategic goals, core objectives and the series of threats identified in the National 
Security Strategy. This will also involve an analysis of the 2010 Strategic Defence and 
Security Review and the assumptions contained in Future Force 2020. Sub-section 6.2.2 will 
examine how Government’s conceptual framework was received by commentators, security 
experts and scholars.  
The second main section in this chapter (6.3) will explore ‘Future Conflict: Themes
and Expectations’. Therefore in 6.3.1 ‘Trends and Drivers’ the subjects of increasing 
instability, globalisation, climate change, contested resources, urbanisation and ideological 
radicalisation will all be assessed against the background of future conflict and their influence 
upon it. Sub-section 6.3.2 will explore the implications of the Western way of war juxtaposed 
an adaptive adversary. Although the US and UK militaries had little difficulty in defeating the 
Iraqi military in Gulf War II, both struggled against the insurgencies that evolved in Iraq and 
subsequently in Afghanistan. This sub-section will consider the notion that a manoeuvrist 
ideology was unsuited against an adaptive asymmetric enemy. Sub section 6.3.3 ‘Hybrid 
Threats’ develops the previous sub-section by seeking to unpack why US and UK forces were 
unprepared to deal with an effective and determined insurgency. In sub section 6.3.4 the 
concept is further explored through examining the idea that the 2006 war between Hezbollah 
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and Israel may become the paradigm of future conflicts between Western and non-Western 
state and non-state actors. In this sub-section the implications for the British Army in future 
contested/urban environments will be examined. 
6.2 HM Government’s Assessment of Security and Defence   
The publication of the UK’s National Security Strategy (NSS)11 and the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR)12 in October 2010 had been much anticipated13 and 
was guaranteed to generate significant political, economic and scholarly comment and 
critique14. The background and political context to the SDSR was complex. Writing less than 
a year before the general election in 2010, Cornish and Dorman maintained their belief that 
the global economic crisis was about to overwhelm government spending which in turn would 
have extensive implications for defence: indeed they suggested defence in the UK was in 
greater trouble than many realised15. Although the Labour Government produced an NSS in 
2009, calling it an ‘Update’, it had not conducted a comprehensive Defence Review since 
1998. In other words, although it was prepared to talk about policy ends, it failed to produce a 
document outlining the ways and means of achieving those stated ends. In July 2009, the 
Defence Secretary, Bob Ainsworth, announced that a Defence Review would be conducted in 
the next Parliament16. It was. Not by a Labour Government, but a Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat, coalition government.      
In the second paragraph of the 2010 SDSR the financial drivers that pervade the entire 
document are clearly set out, ‘restoring a strong economy is critical to sustaining the 
effectiveness of our national security’17. This reflects Duncan Sandys’ Defence White Paper 
in 1957, which states that, ‘Britain’s influence in the world depends first and foremost on the 
health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade. Without these, military 
power cannot in the long run be supported’18. The speed with which such a comprehensive 
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Defence and Security Review was undertaken and completed was breathtaking. What makes 
this all the more notable is that it was conducted while UK forces were engaged in an on- 
going war in Afghanistan19.  
6.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
In May 2010 the prime minister established a National Security Council (NSC)20. The 
NSC according to No 10 ‘is the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s 
objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them in the current financial 
climate… A key purpose of the Council is to ensure that ministers consider national security 
in the round and in a strategic way’21. There are currently three ministerial sub-committees of 
the Council, their tasks are to consider22: 
· threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies including a restricted group to consider 
intelligence matters, 
· nuclear deterrence and security, 
· the UK’s relationship with emerging international powers. 
In addition, the government created the role of a National Security Adviser (NSA) on 12 May 
2010; the role is a prime ministerial appointment and based in the Cabinet Office. The NSA 
heads up a team called National Security Secretariat, and formulates the NSC’s structures. 
The Parliamentary, Intelligence and Security Committee hold the NSA and National Security 
Secretariat to account.  
The NSS was created to achieve two main objectives: 1, to set out the government’s
analysis of the strategic context in which the UK finds itself; 2, to define the high-level 
objectives (ends) which would guide the overall strategic approach23. It is abundantly clear in 
the introduction that the coalition government wished to give the impression that there was a 
distinctive and new approach to this NSS, as opposed to those conducted by the previous 
Labour government. One recurring theme throughout this document and the subsequent 
SDSR is the specific articulation of a ‘whole of government’ approach to security. In 
paragraph 0.11 we read about ‘a whole of government approach, based on a concept of 
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security that goes beyond military effects. It places greater emphasis on domestic resilience 
and a stable global environment’24. The government’s core objectives in part 1 and 2 of the 
NSS are:   
· ensuring a secure and resilient UK – protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, 
territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and 
· shaping a stable world – actions beyond our borders to reduce the likelihood of 
specific risks affecting the UK or our direct interests overseas25.   
In its analysis of the security context, the NSS states that, ‘we face a real and pressing threat 
from international terrorism’ (1.2) of which ‘Al Qaeda remains the most potent terrorist threat 
to the UK’ (1.3). It recognises that traditional espionage continues to pose a threat (1.7) as 
does terrorist groups linked to Northern Ireland (1.7). However, embedded in this security 
analysis, is the assertion that the largest single challenge facing the Government, affecting 
security and all other areas of public policy, is the urgent task of returning the nation’s 
finances to a sustainable footing (1.9). In paragraph 1.11 it states that ‘we face no major state 
threat and no existential threat to our security’ and that although many future wars will be 
among the people, resembling the insurgency in Afghanistan (1.26), the next 20 years may 
see threats from a range of sources (1.33).     
One of the most critical sections in the NSS is the National Security Risk Assessment
(NSRA)26. This risk assessment forms the basis on which the NSC made its decisions ‘about 
the relative national security capabilities and where to focus investment and savings’ in the 
SDSR27. It is based, according to the NSS, upon subject-matter experts, analysts and 
intelligence specialists’ identification of existing and potential threats over the next five to 
twenty year horizon (3.7). The NSC ‘identified 15 generic priority risk types, and allocated 
them into three tiers’ (3.14). Tier one is considered to be the highest priority and is based on 
four groups of risks: 
· International terrorism and or a significant increase in levels of terrorism relating to 
Northern Ireland. 
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· Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cybercrime. 
· A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response. 
· An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK.  
The risk of major instability, insurgency or civil wars that may create an environment that 
terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK is a second tier risk type. The ends of the NSS are 
achieved through eight new National Security Tasks, which the SDSR will, according to the 
NSC, provide detailed information about the polices the government will pursue to achieve its 
two core objectives (4.02). 
Part one of the 2010 SDSR begins with a detailed outline of the eight national security
tasks and planning guidelines28. It is clear that the ‘whole of government’ approach articulated 
by the NSC in its NSS is continued in the SDSR. There is an unambiguous desire to view 
security as a blended approach across the whole of government. The UK’s international 
development programme while seeking to reduce poverty as an overall objective, nevertheless 
also has the strategic objective of making an effective contribution to national security. This is 
intended to tackle the root causes of instability through coupling civilian and military 
stabilisation capabilities in combination with targeted programmes in countries posing the 
greatest threat to the UK. It is only in national security task 3, ‘Exert influence to exploit 
opportunities and manage risks’ that the planning assumption requiring a strategic capability 
of a military based ability to project power to deter, or contain potential threats is introduced. 
This is significant. The 2010 SDSR was widely anticipated because there had not been a 
Defence Review since 1998, a point emphasised by the coalition government in SDSR 
paragraph 1.3. Indeed in the introduction to the SDSR it states that, ‘we must avoid the twin 
mistakes of retaining too much legacy equipment, or tying ourselves into unnecessary 
capabilities’ (1.3). Placing the UK’s military capabilities within the wider conceptual 
framework of security, SDSR effectively establishes the parameters within which the huge 
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cuts to those capabilities can be justified. Defence, the SDSR repeatedly maintains, must play 
its part both in the stated security tasks and in the rebalancing of the UK economy29.   
In security task and planning assumption 5, there is the requirement to have ‘military
capabilities to help protect the UK from major terrorist attack’, and maintain ‘an independent 
ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily’. In security task and planning assumption 
6, there is the requirement to have ‘Armed Forces capable of both stabilisation and 
intervention operations’ along with ‘the military ability to help evacuate UK citizens from 
crises overseas’. In security task and planning assumption 8 there is the stated desire to focus 
on capabilities valued by allies, especially the United States, and an undertaking to share 
military capabilities with allies such as France, while maintaining a defence industrial and 
technological policy that secures independence of action for our Armed Forces.  
In part 2 ‘Defence’ there is a brief note on the future character of conflict. In this it
states that: 
Globalisation increases the likelihood of conflict involving non-state and failed-state 
actors. State on-state conflict will not disappear, but its character is already changing. 
Asymmetric tactics such as economic, cyber and proxy actions instead of direct 
military confrontation will play an increasing part, as both state and non-state 
adversaries seek an edge over those who overmatch them in conventional military 
capability. As a result, the differences between state-on-state warfare and irregular
conflict are dramatically reducing30.
Based on this assessment of the future nature of conflict and for planning purposes, military 
operations, as envisaged by SDSR, are divided into: standing comments31, intervention 
operations32, and stabilisation operations33. These are then further divided into: non-enduring 
operations34 and enduring operations35. General Wall (Chief of the General Staff) refers to 
these interventions as ‘in some way discretionary rather than linked to self-interest or direct 
self-defence’36. SDSR states that these new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that the 
Armed Forces will be sized to conduct: 
· an enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) 
with maritime and air support as required, while also conducting:  
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· one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and  
· one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel).  
Alternatively:  
· three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring 
operation;  
or:  
· for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off 
intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support  (around 30,000, 
two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).  
The imagined Future Force 2020 in SDSR is comprised of three broad elements: The 
Deployed Force37; The High Readiness Force38; and The Lower Readiness Force39. It then 
addresses the key resources (means) of delivering the security tasks and planning assumptions 
for each of the three armed Services40.  
In 2.A.7 the capabilities of the Land component of Future Force 2020 are laid out. 
They will include: 
· five multi-role brigades (comprising armoured, mechanised and light infantry) 
· 16 Air Assault Brigade 
· precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 
· a new range of medium weight armoured vehicles 
· protected support vehicles 
· heavily armoured vehicles (including Warrior, AS90, Titan and Trojan and 
Challenger) 
· range of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
capabilities 
· Army helicopters (including Apache and Wildcat) 
· Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) 
· counter IED capability 
· a fully deployable divisional headquarters, with a second to prepare and train 
subordinate forces 
· Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)41 
The consequence of this policy direction means that, the SDSR directed the Army to: 
significantly reduce the number of regional non-deployable brigades from 10 to 8; reduce the 
UK’s support to ARRC; reduce its deployable divisional HQs from 2 to 1; reduce the number 
of deployable brigades from 6 to 5; reduce the Challenger 2 capability by 40 per cent; reduce 
its AS90 capability by 35 per cent; and rationalise wider equipment holdings42.  
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The formal response by the Army to the planning assumptions in the SDSR was issued 
in July 2012 in a document called, Transforming the British Army: Modernising to face an 
unpredictable future43, known simply as Army 2020 within the service. The first strap-line in 
this brochure is the declaration that this work ‘has been carried out by the Army, for the 
Army44. It asserts that this transformation will provide highly adaptable capabilities and that it 
will ‘for the first time’ fully integrate Regulars and Reservists within a single force structure. 
In the section ‘Force Development Deductions’, it affirms that brigade and divisional levels of 
command will be reset and that it will have armoured infantry as the core capability. It 
promises to ‘institutionalise the integration of “soft effect” into manoeuvre and reset the 
precision/suppression balance of fires. In the section ‘Structural Changes’ it refers to the 
requirement in the SDSR to make adjustments that will enable the right balance of capabilities 
to fulfil its role in a Joint and Multinational environment. This rebalancing will be achieved 
through the reduction of 23 units from across the Army. Critical to the delivery of Army 2020, 
according to the document, is the full integration of the Reserves into the Army structure. 
Without this, the reduced regular force would be unable to complete all of the tasks set out in 
the SDSR. The envisaged integrated force of 112,000 will be achieved by 2020. 
6.2.2 Reception and Evaluation of the Government’s Conceptual Framework 
SDSR is viewed as being ‘fundamentally flawed by parliamentarians, defence 
professionals and expert commentators alike’45. Even the basic premise on which the whole 
process was constructed was challenged and presented as questionable46. Although the SDSR 
promised a radical reassessment, Ritchie maintains that the final result was a largely ‘cost- 
cutting opportunity that missed a crucial opportunity to challenge prevailing assumptions 
about what defence and security mean for British citizens in a post-9/11 era of complex 
globalization’47. The question that Ritchie asks is entirely reasonable. It asks a basic, first 
198
order question: are British grand strategic objectives best served through having significant 
expeditionary war-fighting capabilities? Does the NSS or SDSR articulate the reasons why 
Britain requires the capacity to deploy ‘three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 
30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003)?’ This seems a pertinent question 
whenever the NSS specifically states (1.11) that ‘we face no major state threat and no 
existential threat to our security’.  
Taylor maintains that the 2010 SDSR ‘did not change things too much on the policy
front’48. Indeed when Labour’s SDR and the coalition government’s SDSR are placed side- 
by-side, the essential idea of what kind of military actor the UK should be is virtually 
identical49. In the 1998 SDR it states that, ‘As a Permanent Member of the UN Security 
Council and as a country both willing and able to play a leading role internationally we have a 
responsibility to act as a force for good in the world’50. In the 2010 SDSR the opening 
sentence states that, ‘Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. 
We have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no 
less ambition for our country in the decades to come’. The Foreign Secretary William Hague 
in a speech at Georgetown University declared that, ‘In Britain we have never shirked - and 
under this government never will shirk - the international responsibilities conferred on us by 
our economic and military strength…So Britain will remain a first rate military power and a 
robust ally of the U.S. and in NATO well into the future. As Secretary Clinton recently said, 
the U.K. “will remain the most capable partner” for U.S. forces’51. However, in his speech 
Hague wants to ‘correct the mistaken idea that we are in some way sacrificing our national 
defence to meet budget deficits. Strong defences require strong finances’52.  
This speech encapsulates the inherent tensions and weakness of the 2010 SDSR. On 
the one hand the new coalition government had to deal with an economic crisis. It had made 
the political decision as outlined in the NSS and SDSR that defence had to play its part in 
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rebalancing the deficit. Every government is required to make political/financial calculations. 
That said, the same government also wanted to retain its global and international status as a 
major political player and ‘first rate military power’. It is difficult therefore to avoid arriving 
at a similar position to Cornish who observes that the ‘strategy review could be characterized 
as yet more “muddling through” – an outcome which was foreseeable and to which the UK 
seems innately predisposed in some way’53. Dover and Phythian conclude that ‘the SDSR was 
little more than a collection of separate, rather that joined-up and meaningfully prioritised, 
statements of broad national interest designed to reassure the military, parliament and public 
that the forthcoming defence cuts were strategic rather than simply Treasury-led’54. Similar 
concerns were apparently shared by the then Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox shortly before 
the SDSR was finalised for publication. In a letter to the prime minister he maintains that, 
‘frankly this process is looking less and less defensible as a proper SDSR and more like a 
‘super CSR’55 [comprehensive spending review].  
The political decision to balance the UK’s finances was both a political necessity and 
an expedient course of action. However, as Gray notes, ‘defence debaters appear not to have 
noticed that Britain chooses, rather than is compelled, to spend approximately £35 billion a 
year on defence out of a total annual government expenditure of around £700bn. There is no 
physical, legal, moral or divine set of reasons why Britain could not choose to spend very 
much more or very much less on defence’56. Although there may not be the reasons 
mentioned by Gray, there are historical lessons that Prins argues have been ignored or 
forgotten57. He is of the firm opinion that ‘today’s governing class seems to feel no shame 
about its ignorance of history, nor does it seem aware of how risky that ignorance can be’58. 
The central argument in Prins’ paper is that the tension between balancing the budget
and how much could be spent on defence is a frequent occurrence in British history. For 
example, Lord Chatfield59 when speaking about Treasury reaction to the second Defence 
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Requirements exercise (July 1935) recalled, ‘Time after time the Services were told that the 
financial dangers to the country were greater than military ones’60. One cannot help but think 
that this has a strikingly familiar tone to it. Commenting on the Ramsay McDonald coalition 
government, Prins contends that, ‘the Ten Year Rule was used to justify “taking a gap” in 
capabilities in the language of the 2010 defence review, which was likewise underpinned by a 
Ten Year Rule logic’61. Today, the financial concerns of the Treasury in the 1930s may be 
viewed as narrow and difficult to comprehend with the real threat of war looming over 
Europe.    
For many scholars, the UK’s decision to intervene militarily in Libya is not simply the 
latest example of defence planning assumptions being made to look inadequate by world 
affairs. What makes it quite distinct is that OPERATION ELLAMY62 was undertaken within 
a few months of the publication of the SDSR. In this it is remarkably similar to the Nott 
Review in 1981 that brought about ‘significant naval cuts, only for the 1982 rescue of the 
Falklands Islands to rely fundamentally on a naval task force’63. In the 2010 SDSR it states - 
in relation to retaining an aircraft capability until the new class of carrier is introduced - that, 
‘we cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike 
capability previously planned’64. There seems little doubt that had the UK retained the aircraft 
carrier Ark Royal and its Harrier aircraft that these would have been an ideal and cheaper 
option than flying sorties from Italy using Typhoon in combination with Tornado65. This 
however, is a second or third order issue. The first order issue is that within a few months, the 
coalition government had broken its own planning assumptions based upon its own recently 
published strategic posture. Dover and Phythian are blunt in this respect, ‘SDSR has been 
fatally undermined by the decision to intervene in Libya’66.  
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6.2.3 Conclusions 
The Libyan campaign may be presented as a continuation of British preparedness to 
intervene militarily when the government makes the political calculation to play a major role 
on the world stage using ‘hard power’. Any government must react to world events in relation 
to the political judgements and assessments it makes at the time of crisis. Equally, each 
government must make its assessment of its strategic aims and objectives in light of its 
assessments of the global context the UK must function in. In this, the establishment of an 
NSC along with an NSA is a positive development. The NSS correctly, it seems to the author, 
views security as wider than military/defence capabilities. Cyber attacks (warfare) are a 
contemporary reality. It was wholly appropriate that the NSS and SDSR reflect this. Equally, 
the desire to configure the Armed Forces so that they are prepared and equipped to contribute 
to delivering UK defence and strategic aims post Iraq and Afghanistan was necessary and 
required. However, the traditional tension between Treasury requirements and strategic 
capabilities has generated that most British of outcomes: a carefully crafted muddle. In the 
conclusion of its review of the 2010 SDSR, the Parliamentary Defence Committee contends 
that:      
The Government appears to believe that the UK can maintain its influence  while
reducing spending, not just in the area of defence but also at the Foreign Office. We
do not agree. If the UK's influence in the world is to be maintained, the Government 
must demonstrate in a clear and convincing way that these reductions have
been offset by identifiable improvements elsewhere rather than imprecise assertions of 
an increased reliance on diplomacy and 'soft power'. If the Government cannot do so, 
the National Security Strategy is in danger of becoming a 'wish list' that fails to make 
the hard choices necessary to ensure the nation's security67.
6.3 Future Conflict: Themes and Expectations  
Predicting the future is fraught with difficulties. The IMF economist Prakash 
Loungani observed that, ‘the record of failure to predict recessions is virtually 
unblemished’68. The central premise of Gardner’s book, future babble, is that expert 
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predictions not only fail but do so with an uncanny predictability. The 1970s, he claims, was 
an example of the enormous demand to know what might lie ahead, whether that was in 
regard to ‘oil, terrorism, recession, unemployment, deficits and debut’69. Most of the 
predictions made by experts in the 1970s, he asserts, ‘turned out to be wrong, some 
hilariously so’70. His reflection of the work by psychologist Philip Tetlock is a sobering 
reference point from which to continue any exploration of anything associated with the future. 
Tetlock, according to Gardner, recruited ‘284 experts – political scientists, economists, and 
journalists – whose jobs involve commenting or giving advice on political or economic 
trends’71. Guaranteed anonymity, each expert offered their assessment on the future, with 
Tetlock and his team collecting 27,450 judgements about the future in all. The conclusion of 
this experiment, according to Tetlock, was that ‘the experts would have been beaten by “a dart-
throwing chimpanzee”72.   
6.3.1 Trends and Drivers 
Despite the difficulties in predicting the future, this sub-section will nevertheless 
briefly outline the trends and drivers that are expected to shape the context of future conflict 
and the operational environment that the British Army may be expected to conduct military 
missions in. 
Increasing instability: Shortly after the start of hostilities in the first Gulf War, 
President George Bush delivered his famous ‘New World Order Speech’73. However, far from 
an anticipated and hugely optimistic ‘New World Order’, following on from the hoped for 
peace dividend74, the general consensus today is that the trend is towards increasing instability 
and opportunity for confrontation and conflict75. ‘Arguably, the world is becoming more 
complex with, inter alia, the rapid movement of ideas, people, capital and information’76. As 
a consequence, national governments and world bodies, such as the UN, face what scholars 
refer to as ‘wicked problems’77. These are problems of such complexity that they defy the 
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logic of process driven management78. Coker maintains that they cannot be solved only 
‘managed until someone finally decides to stop managing it, or the managers run out of 
resources, time or money’79.  
Globalisation. The imagined ‘New World Order’ emerging after the demise of the 
Cold War was to some extent based upon a continuation of the nation state. However, what 
arguably was not envisaged was ‘the end of the constitutional order of the twentieth century 
nation state’80. As noted earlier in this thesis, the very concept of the state has evolved since 
its emergence. Its latest iteration in liberal Western democracies according to Bobbitt, is what 
he refers to as the ‘market state’ with a defining characteristic being the requirement to offer 
its citizens choice81. One of the key features of globalisation is ‘likely to be the continuing 
internationalisation of markets for goods, capital, services and labour which integrates 
geographically dispersed consumers and suppliers’82. Choice is no longer restricted to the 
local high street or trip to the nearest city. The internet or World Wide Web has opened up a 
‘virtual’ global market place that exploded ‘into ubiquity within a couple of decades’83. It is 
highly likely therefore that there will be ‘winners and losers in a global economy lead by 
market forces’84. This in turn may lead to increased global ‘inequality within and between 
societies’, which in turn may lead to ‘disorder, violence, criminality, terrorism and 
insurgency’85.  
Climate Change. This has been a major international political issue for many years86. 
It is also a vivid example of the kind of ‘wicked problems’ confronting the international 
community87. ‘It is’, Coker explains, ‘a highly complex policy issue involving multiple causal 
factors, such as energy-intensive industries and energy consumers, and new emerging powers 
like China, are a key part of the solution’88. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change89 is an international treaty designed to set 
emissions targets for signatories to the protocol and illustrates Coker’s point. Although most 
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developed nations signed the treaty, the US did not ratify it and Canada later withdrew. This 
withdrawal reveals just how contentious agreement is on how best to tackle the issues90. 
Unfortunately, ‘global emissions have showed no sign of slowing down…In that sense, the 
Kyoto protocol has been a failure’91. Regardless of why Kyoto failed to generate the hoped 
for change in emissions, there is a general consensus that climate change will be a significant 
factor in the twenty-first century. The threat of rising sea levels due to the melting ice caps, 
progressive thermal expansion of the oceans and the increasing acidity of sea water may well 
have a serious effect upon available land for habitation and agriculture92.  
Contested Resources. The twentieth century saw an unprecedented rise in the world’s 
population, rising from 2.6 billion in 1950 to just over 6 billion in 199993. In October 2011 it 
was widely reported that it had reached 7 billion94. UN predictions are that the human 
population will reach 8.9 billion by 205095. It seems reasonable therefore, to conclude that the 
demand for resources will only increase. Although ‘the earth is blessed with vast quantities of 
most vital materials – water, arable land, minerals, timber, and fossil fuels – there are practical 
limits to what can be extracted from the global environment’96. Vasquez and Henehan argue 
that historically, ‘territorial issues are usually the ones that are involved in war’97. They also 
suggest, however, that globalisation may enhance the prospects for peace as ‘major states will 
have no economic need to claim the territory of other states’98. Klare also contends that global 
market forces will encourage negotiated solutions to most conflicts over resources99. There 
will, he contends, be many instances where resource scarcity will become critical. In this 
instance conflicts, he describes as ‘resource wars’, will revolve around the pursuit or 
possession of critical materials’100. DCDC’s evaluation on this is simple and direct, ‘some 
states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national survival 
and will act accordingly’101.     
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Urbanisation. ‘One of the most notable global transformations of recent years has 
been the change from a predominantly rural world to an urban one’102. According to the UN, 
North America remains the most urbanised of all the major geographical areas with 82 per 
cent of the population living in urban areas103. In Latin America the figure is 79 per cent, in 
Europe 73 per cent, 64 per cent in Asia, whereas Africa still has the lowest percentage with 39 
per cent104. In 2006 the global urban population exceeded the rural population for the first 
time105. Hills is convinced that urbanisation will provide a critical interactive context for 
many future operations106. DCDC shares this assessment. The Future Operational 
Environment (FOE), according to this concept paper, will be congested. ‘In particular, 
densely populated urban and littoral regions, especially those lacking effective governance, 
will provide havens in which criminal elements, terrorists and insurgents shelter, organise and 
operate’107. It will also be a cluttered environment, providing opportunities for concealment 
and in which few spaces are likely to remain neutral ‘with hospitals, schools and places of 
worship forming part of the operating landscape’108. Consequently, potential adversaries ‘are 
likely to contest any and all environments, often using novel asymmetric methods’109.   
Ideological radicalisation. Modern history is full of examples of ideological clashes 
between various ethnic, religious and cultural groups110. The invention of the printing press 
revolutionised the ability to convey new, often radical ideas111. Further technological 
advances112 provided greater flexibility in spreading ideas to an even greater audience using a 
variety of methods. The ubiquitous growth of the internet is the latest manifestation of this 
phenomenon. Today the lives of millions of people are a mixture of their daily ‘real’ world 
and a ‘virtual’ existence113 or have seamlessly fused both through social media networks such 
as Facebook, MySpace or Twitter. While the internet has offered an unparalleled access to 
information and ability to communicate with family and friends instantly over incredible 
distances (for example, Skype), it has also been used for darker and more sinister ends114.  
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Tensions between religions have existed for many centuries. Historically, religion has 
been used either to justify violence or it has been the pretext for violence. Although the major 
world religions are not inherently violent, conflict is often a characteristic associated with 
aspects of their histories. For example, ‘the Sunni – Shi’a contest is thirteen centuries old’ 
notes Peters before arguing that ‘we have re-entered the long river of struggles over elemental 
issues: God and blood’115. The assessment by DCDC is that although religious ideology will 
continue to be a generally ‘positive influence on behaviour, it may also be a source of tension 
and conflict’116. Burleigh contends that the internet has not only facilitated this, it has 
provided a combination of nationhood and morality for elements of Islam which has 
radicalised many117. The use of the internet in promoting ideological radicalisation is not 
limited to religious radicalisation. Lonsdale maintains that ‘certain non-state actors are 
defined and exist as strategic players almost entirely due to cyberspace’118.   
6.3.2 The Western Way of War confronts Adaptive Adversaries  
Like the last Labour government119, the present coalition government’s general 
assessment is that the UK does not face a major state, or existential, threat to its security. The 
2010 NSS also stated that ‘although many future wars will be among the people, resembling 
the insurgency in Afghanistan (1.26), the next 20 years may see threats from a range of 
sources (1.33). At least two deductions can be taken from this: firstly, that a conventional 
attack by a major state is unlikely; and secondly, that future wars that may involve UK forces 
‘will be among the people’120, resembling the insurgency NATO forces have encountered in 
Afghanistan and derive from a range of sources. When Labour published its SDR in 1998 it 
also concluded that, ‘the emergence of democratic states throughout Eastern Europe and in 
Russia means that there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western 
Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat’121. There is, however, no 
reference to potential insurgent threats or ‘wars among the people’, although there is a 
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reference to ‘low-intensity conflict’122. Within five years of the 1998 SDR being published the 
strategic and tactical environment confronting the UK and Western governments had 
changed. Why? 
The concept of insurgency is not new123. A classic historical example is the Jewish
revolt led by Judas Maccabaeus against larger Seleucid armies124. In the First World War, TE 
Lawrence understood that local tribal tactics confounded ‘ordinary’ tactics125; his reflections 
are now quoted in both UK and US COIN doctrine126. Perhaps one of the most widely read 
theories on how to defeat a larger conventional opponent is Mao Zedong’s On Guerrilla 
Warfare127. Britain128 and America129 both have a long history of countering various forms of 
guerrilla warfare/insurgency. The question therefore that confronts the student is why did the 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to catch both militaries by surprise?  
To consider the American military first, perhaps one of the fundamental reasons is that 
‘the predominate view of the U.S. military as a whole is that its role is to “fight and win the 
nations wars,” it would seem unlikely that the military would embrace counterinsurgency’130. 
Rather than being exceptions that prove the rule, according to Davidson, America has had two 
centuries of experience fighting small wars, countering insurgency and engagement in nation 
building131. It is World Wars I and II that are the exceptions in American military history132. 
A central reason why the American military failed to learn, maintains Davidson, from its own 
extensive history is that it struggled to become a ‘learning institution’133 and quickly forgot 
many of the lessons learned from hard fought experience134. Counterinsurgency was also 
incompatible with the way it wanted to fight war135. Written in 1999 following an experiment 
on battlefield digitisation Leonhard observes that, ‘by the end of the experiment, we had 
retrained ourselves in our beloved attrition theory: Warfare was ultimately about killing the 
enemy with battlefield fires faster than they could kill us. The Army continues to insist that 
the best way to defeat an enemy in war is through long-range destructive fires’136. One is 
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reminded of the US policy of ‘Shock and Awe’137. Dower is blunt in his assessment, 
‘American leaders drew no serious lessons about irregular warfare from Afghanistan – or 
from the earlier quagmire in Vietnam’138.   
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the British Army ‘adopted a manoeuvrist 
approach to the conduct of all operations’139. In a brief analysis of the 2006 Lebanon War, 
DCDC concluded that Hezbollah ‘exploited an Israeli inability to conduct combined arms 
air/land manoeuvre’140. The British Army’s stated position is that ‘the ability to conduct what 
is called combined arms manoeuvre is, and always has been, at the heart of an army’s ability 
to fight effectively’141. One cannot help wondering why therefore, the British struggled 
against the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is it a simple matter of learning how to 
conduct manoeuvrist operations better, or is it possible that a manoeuvrist approach to twenty- 
first century counterinsurgency has profound limitations? One potential limitation is that it 
suggests that a military victory is possible against a non-state actor in such an insurgency. The 
review of the 2006 Lebanon war by the Winograd Committee142, according to Gal, was 
mistaken in the ‘belief that a “clear military victory” had been possible’143. In other words, 
even after the war the Israeli state was still thinking in a traditional format that a military 
victory is possible against a non-state actor such as Hezbollah.  
Regarding the British and the insurgency in the south of Iraq, Ledwidge is 
uncompromising. Far from victory, his assessment is that by 2007, the Americans thought that 
the British had been ‘basically defeated in the South’144. He asserts that of the 7,000 soldiers 
in Basra only 200 were available for patrolling the streets of Basra145. This is hardly a 
manoeuvrist approach to counterinsurgency. Ledwidge is just as harsh in his assessment of 
the British approach to Afghanistan. He asserts that regarding the British approach to 
Helmand, ‘the counterinsurgency lessons of the old campaigns of imperial history had been 
ignored’146. Like their American ally, British forces had struggled to become a ‘learning 
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institution’147. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan perhaps illustrate the possibility that 
manoeuvre warfare has limitations148, against a determined counterinsurgency.    
6.3.3 Hybrid149 Threats. 
Prior to the attacks on 9-11, bin Laden was convinced that ‘superpower America 
would prove acutely vulnerable to non-state, low-intensity, asymmetrical warfare’150. The 
insurgencies that emerged in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then evolved in 
Afghanistan would appear to give credence to this evaluation. There is, however, nothing 
specifically new in bin Laden’s observation. Large conventional armies (for example, armies 
that are configured to fight against other similarly configured armies) have consistently 
encountered serious military problems when confronted by an asymmetrical opponent with 
the desire and the will to mount a determined opposition151. What the insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have shown, is how unprepared the America and UK militaries were to deal with 
an effective and determined insurgency.      
The Cold War generated specific military threats152. Threats, unlike risk, can be 
calculated with a degree of accuracy153 and a strategy developed to meet the ends and means 
at the disposal of one’s enemy to realise those ends154. The result in the West, according to 
Black, was the ideology of a very specialised and very high-cost military’155. When used in a 
conventional role, it was devastatingly successful against the Iraqi Army in 1991. Indeed, the 
first Gulf War not only appeared to be a model for future war but was presented as a triumph 
of technology and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs156. UK defence planning then 
moved, however, from a Cold War threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach in 
the 1998 SDR157. In essence it retained a broad spectrum approach to conventional 
capabilities, albeit on a smaller post-Cold War scale. The peacekeeping operations in the 
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Balkans, the intervention in Sierra Leone and Gulf War 2158 appeared to validate the UK’s 
move to a manoeuvrist posture and capability.    
In its analysis of the future character of conflict DCDC asserts that ‘smarter
adversaries have adapted to counteract the Western preferred way of warfare’159. Non-state 
and state actors have studied the Western way of warfare in order to avoid its strengths and 
exploit what they consider weaknesses160. China and Iran are examples of state actors who 
have developed asymmetric capabilities in response to the threat posed to them by the 
West161. Non-state actors, most without the resources of states like Iran and China162 
nevertheless have a wide range of options at their disposal. Commentators like TX Hemmes 
are convinced that Fourth-Generation War (4GW) is an example of the type of warfare 
Western states now face and can expect to face in the future163. Although the concept of 4GW 
has been heavily criticised164, there is a broad consensus that Hemmes’ analysis of modern 
insurgency and its characteristics is accurate165. Hemmes contends that: 
It uses all available networks – political, economic, social, military – to convince the 
enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or 
too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency…4GW makes 
use of society’s social networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations, it 
does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces…Fourth-generation 
wars are lengthy – measured in decades rather than years166.
Freedman, who cites the quote above contends that, ‘it is hard to think of any recent conflict, 
including those involving clashes of regular forces, which did not involve the use of social, 
economic and political instruments in conjunction with the military’167. His observation is 
self-evidently true but that is to miss the central point168. 4GW, at least to some extent, 
articulates some of the reasons why experienced professional armies and their respective 
governments, each with extensive political structures have struggled badly against the 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Critics like Freedman do not appear to recognise that there are major distinctivenesses
in a twenty-first century operational environment. From the emergence of the first web pages 
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in 1991, the World Wide Web today is accessed by billions of people and offers virtually 
instantaneous access to incredible amounts of information. Today, an attack on a potential 
enemy target, resulting in unintended civilian causalities, is more than an unfortunate reality 
of war; it can have potentially strategic consequences169. The battle of the narratives is 
critical170. Professional armies understand that an adversary may well conduct a successful 
operation171. However, with a global media and significant social and political transparency in 
Western states, an inconsequential military incident may be transformed in a strategic 
event172.   
One subject that generates significant comment within the military, governments and 
media circles is ‘lawfare’173. It can be maintained that this particular issue is an increasingly 
prominent characteristic of hybrid conflicts174. For example, Burleigh makes the contentious 
claim that ‘certain legal firms simply migrated from defending IRA Provos to representing 
Islamist jihadists in their grim determination to thwart the police’175. Admiral Boyce, a former 
Chief of the Defence Staff, has voiced concern that the armed forces are ‘under siege’, and 
‘pushed in the direction in which an order could be seen as improper or legally unsound’176. 
The idea, however, of the military being under ‘legal siege’ according to Ledwidge is nothing 
new177. For example, soldiers serving in Northern Ireland during ‘the troubles’ were required 
to adhere to the rules of engagement contained in the ‘Yellow Card’. The concept of lawfare, 
argues Dunlap, is more complex than simply an enemy tactic178. He contends that it is a 
legitimate and ‘serious activity to ensure that the military adheres to the rule of law and 
democratic values’179. He does, however, concede that ‘such rules encourage the enemies to 
do exactly what we do not want them to do. That is, they surround themselves with innocents 
so as to immunize themselves almost entirely from attack’180.  
The article by Dunlap is nuanced and carefully argued. While it can be maintained that 
the basic tenants of his argument are sound, it is specifically related to the US legal system. 
212
The UK government and military face a more complex legal environment than its US ally. A 
number of hugely significant cases have either been examined by the European Court of 
Human Rights or are in the process of going through the courts at the moment involving the 
British military and specifically the Army181. The operational impact of the rulings already 
given and the potential impact of the judgements yet to be decided are enormous, particularly 
in an operational environment of modern insurgency182. It is possible that the ability to 
conduct interventionist operations might in the future be framed, not by the foreign policy of 
the UK Government but by the European Court of Human Rights, in such a manner that 
generates a strategic and operational effect, one that may offer potential adversaries 
significant scope for exploitation (for example, that UK forces failing to apply the European 
Convention on Human Rights are consequently unlawful). This could be hugely damaging in 
any battle of competing narratives. Potential adversaries may not be as concerned to apply the 
principles of International Law or the European Convention on Human Rights183.  
6.3.4 Intelligent Adversaries and the Spectre of Urban Warfare 
Hezbollah is an interesting case in this regard. Hezbollah is not a state but a state 
within a state, a political/religious movement and the largest real-estate owner in Lebanon184. 
Although it had prepared for an anticipated but unspecified future war against Israel, it had 
not anticipated the severity of the Israeli response to the July 12 kidnappings185. Embedded in 
Hezbollah’s strategic planning was the concept of exploiting ‘the perceived weakness of the 
IDF and to ensure that Hezbollah would survive Israeli assault for long enough to allow 
international pressure to restrict the IDF’s actions’186. Hezbollah used high-technology 
asymmetric warfare187 against a Western styled military force, while simultaneously relying 
on international pressure to restrict Israel in its military response. Today, much of Europe has 
turned its back on war and has culturally rejected it188. The outcry of protest against the US 
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for its refusal to either condemn Israel’s attack on Hezbollah and its delay in calling for a 
cease-fire189 came as no great surprise. Indeed, it is entirely possible that such a vehement 
reaction by many in Europe to Israel’s attack had not only been anticipated but factored into 
Hezbollah’s strategic plan.       
Despite 650-750 fighters killed in the war compared to Israel’s 119 combat 
fatalities190, Hezbollah was widely perceived to have won the war191. According to John 
Keegan this is because it has ‘been widely misunderstood, largely because the anti-Israel bias 
in the international media’192. Simms offers this insightful observation, ‘I found myself 
wondering whether Hezbollah might not have suffered a setback, but was too clever to 
admit it; and whether the Israelis might not have scored a long-term success, but were too 
narrow-minded to realise it’193.  
In his study of How the Weak Win Wars, Arreguín-Toft maintains that historically 
‘since 1816 strong actors have won more than twice as many asymmetric conflicts as weak 
actors’194. This, however, has not been the trend in the later part of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. He suggests that there are four competing explanations for this: the nature of 
the actor; arms diffusion; interest asymmetry and his own, strategic interaction195. The central 
thesis of Arreguín-Toft’s concept of strategic interaction is succinct: ‘when actors employ 
similar approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) relative power explains the outcome: 
strong actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite strategic 
approaches (direct – indirect or indirect – direct) weak actors are more likely to win, even 
when everything we know about power says they shouldn’t’ [emphasis original]196. Cohen- 
Almagor and Haleva-Amir make the same essential point in their consideration of the 
Winograd Committee’s work and the Israeli government’s decision to go to war. They state 
that ‘the way to respond to guerrilla warfare is by guerrilla warfare’197. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s argument is similar; however, they maintain that it takes networks to fight 
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networks198. The logic of Arreguín-Toft’s concept of strategic interaction is simple: when 
states employ conventional tactics (direct) against a non-state actor employing an asymmetric 
insurgency (indirect) the non-state actor is more likely to succeed.  
Arreguín-Toft recognises that strong actors loose wars for a variety of reasons, for
example: against the Boer, the British approached the conflict ‘piecemeal, ill-equipped, and ill 
trained’199; the US had the right forces to defeat the NVA but ‘it had systematically gutted its 
COIN capabilities’200; and the Russians ‘were unsuited in every imaginable way to prosecute 
a COIN war in mountainous terrain’201. His central thesis offers an imaginative framework to 
analyse why the weak win wars. It seems, at least to this student, intuitively correct that a 
conventional force structure configured to fight a similarly configured force will struggle 
against an adversary who deliberately avoids major direct battles but chooses to settle for a 
long process of harassment and attrition. This situation is made significantly more 
problematic if the adversary simultaneously seeks to prosecute a coordinated media operation 
to a receptive world press.    
It is likely that in the future the British Army will get drawn into operations in the 
urban and littoral regions where the majority of the world’s population live202. Such an 
eventuality will present the government of the time with significant challenges. In her study 
on future war in cities, Hills contends that Western politicians and public will have difficulty 
in accommodating the realities of urban warfare203. The reason for this is very simple; the 
reality of war in an urban context has remained ‘remarkably consistent across the decades’204. 
There are, she argues, three linked and dominant trends over the last 60 years: the tenacity 
defending forces usually display; the advantage that accrues to the side with least regard for 
civilians; and the increasing irrelevance of restraint in the face of heavy losses205. The 
dilemma that consequently confronts democracies, Hills maintains, is identifying the proper 
balance between protecting one’s own troops and collateral damage206. ‘War fighting’, she 
215
asserts, ‘usually results in close combat in which a soldier’s experience, training, cunning and 
motivation are more valuable than advanced technology or innovative doctrine…Such war 
makes the regression of industrialised societies to pre-industrial styles of war’207. Any 
intelligent, future adversary will undoubtedly see both the attraction and the tactical 
advantage an urban environment offers against a conventionally configured high-tech 
manoeuvre army.   
In the first section of this chapter, it was noted that the British Army is planning to 
rebalance itself as it is restructured following the direction contained in the 2010 SDSR. This 
process is called Army 2020. The Army, according to Phillips, is ‘reverting back to the 
combined arms manoeuvre approach’208. Recently Exercise Agile Warrior was run as an 
experiment to determine if the Army was ready to meet the demands of operating in urban 
areas. The conclusion, according to Phillips is that, ‘the Army is not ready, in both preparedness 
and capability terms, for the demands of future urban operations’209. The Army’s planning is 
based on the emergence of ‘hybrid threats’ and is drawing heavily from the experience of Israel in 
its war with Hezbollah; it is therefore, planning for states and non-states to exploit all modes of 
war210. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach is correct is a matter of debate211. Hope makes the 
point that the ‘promises of manoeuvre warfare support only preparations for short, decisive 
wars’212. He argues that in manoeuvre doctrine, ‘manoeuvre becomes an end in itself’213. The 
operation post-Gulf War II in Iraq and OPERATION HERRICK in Afghanistan were anything 
but short and decisive. One cannot help but think of the Stanley Baldwin’s famous statement ‘that 
the bomber would always get through’214. This was an untested article of faith rather than a 
calculated military doctrine based upon careful analysis, as the events of the Second World War 
showed.   
It is possible that the development of multirole brigades that draw from a range of assets 
might assist in intelligently managing complex, contested and cluttered operational environments. 
If this concept can be embedded within a manoeuvrist approach, it might offer additional 
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competences. Indeed, the integration of Reserves capabilities into its future force structure might 
be a foundational key in rebalancing the Army for future operations in complex urban settings. 
Ledwidge makes the point that Reservists have civilian skills essential to the running of any 
society215. The interaction between the Army and other agencies is understood as a vital part of 
any operation among the people216. It seems self-evident that someone whose normal ‘day job’ 
fulfils an essential part in the running of a ‘normal’ society will have a capability that a 
professional infantry/armoured/artillery officer simply may not have. However, Davidson’s 
assessment of interagency between the US military and non-military organisations is salutatory. 
She states that it is only ‘PowerPoint deep’ and reflects a lack of theoretical consensus217. The 
same lack of theoretical consensus exists, according to Phillips, in the British Army regarding 
how to achieve interagency coherence218. It is, however, worth noting that the same Generals and 
senior officers, who according to Ledwidge, displayed a tragic lack of strategic planning in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, are the very same senior officers and Generals undertaking the restructuring of 
the Army219. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The New World Order envisaged following the end of the Cold War has not materialised 
in the fashion expected by many Western governments. The end of the twentieth and the 
beginning of the twenty-first centuries have been marked by an increasing proliferation of 
‘wicked problems’ that defy simplistic answers or approaches. This combined with the challenges 
of globalisation and a globalised media centric communication environment has generated 
significant issues for traditional constructs of the nation state. Climate change, the prospect of 
contested resources, discontented losers in a global economy all contribute to the context within 
which ‘wicked problems’ may have to be confronted. Added to this mix is the reality of 
increasing global urbanisation; there is little evidence that this will trend will do anything other 
than increase over the next ten to twenty years. Stabilisation/Intervention operations in such 
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congested environments, consequently, may well be highly contested by groups or non-state 
actors opposed to outside Western involvement. 
Ideological radicalisation may well continue to be a persistent feature of twenty-first
century life. Ancient conflicts may continue to find violent expressions fuelled by pockets of 
radicals who because of the globalised communications environment will have a reach 
disproportionate to their profile. On-line communities of the disaffected will not only re-enforce 
their specific worldview/interpretative framework but may seek opportunities to manifest their 
perceived grievances using vehicles of otherwise legitimate concern resulting from demographic 
changes, climate changes and the impact of an increasingly globalised market. Such groups are 
likely to be adaptive, intelligent and may model their approach upon the experiences of other 
disaffected groups of non-state actors who were perceived to stood up to the liberal democracies 
of the West. It is highly likely that future adversaries will have studied the insurgencies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan for insight on how to confront a Western style of warfare. 
The 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War may become a paradigm for other non-state and some
state actors for how to confront a Western way of warfare. Although the UK and the US may seek 
to draw some comfort from their assessment that Israel failed to conduct manoeuvre warfare, the 
strategic performance of the UK in Iraq and Afghanistan may offer some case for concern. This 
implies no criticism of the tactical performance of British soldiers ‘on the ground’ against a 
determined adversary. Indeed, the courage and professionalism of the British soldier in 
Afghanistan stands in the best traditions of the Army. However, Exercise Agile Warrior, appeared 
to show that the British Army is not presently configured, ready, or equipped to confront the type 
of hybrid threat anticipated in a complex, congested urban operational environment against an 
intelligent adversary determined to avoid fighting British forces in a conventional manner. It is 
possible, however, that if the increase in the Reserve Force is achieved and fully integrated into 
the British Army as anticipated, that this might offer critical additional capabilities that will be 
essential in future ‘wars among the people’. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach to warfare 
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will prove to be a doctrinal triumph or another military article of faith in future ‘wars among the 
people’, is likely to be further tested in this century.   
SDSR that ‘carefully crafted muddle’ provides little in terms of genuine strategic
thought required to prepare the British Armed Forces to face the kind of hybrid, asymmetric 
threat an adaptive, intelligent state, non-state actor presents. In budgetary terms the 2010 
SDSR has been a successful CSR. However, as a genuine attempt to rebalance UK forces in 
preparedness to face the likely nature of future conflict, history will judge of whether or not 
HMG’s decision to take capability holidays for a decade, while still conducting major land 
based operations, was a master-stroke of careful and balanced judgment. Or perhaps it will 
rank beside the long list of spectacularly disastrous political decisions that generated short- 
term savings at enormous medium and longer term costs.            
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Chapter 7 
Future Technology 
7.1 Introduction 
Today, much of Europe has turned its back on war and has culturally rejected it1. 
While this may not necessarily be the case for the UK, the experience of Iraq and 
Afghanistan has created a sense of war-weariness in the nation2. Evidence of this may be 
detected in the discussion over potential military action against the regime of Bashar al-Assad 
in Syria. There was obvious reluctance in London, Paris and Washington to see Western 
‘boots on the ground’3 and it was public knowledge that the main option under consideration 
was the use of missile strikes4. Nevertheless, the UK Government's motion to support 
military intervention in Syria was defeated by 285 to 272 votes in the House of Commons in 
August 20135. In his response the Prime Minister said, ‘it is very clear tonight that, while the 
House has not passed a motion, the British Parliament, reflecting the views of the British 
people, does not want to see British military action. I get that, and the Government will act 
accordingly’6. In his response the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Ed Miliband said, ‘that the 
House of Commons had spoken “for the people of Britain”… ‘People are deeply concerned 
about the chemical weapons attacks in Syria, but they want us to learn the lessons of Iraq’7. 
Although the UK government’s motion was defeated in regard to military action in Syria, 
stand-off, remote and robotic weapons offer the potential to engage in military action 
remotely, whenever the political climate is permissive.  
This chapter will explore the concept of the soldier, who, operating a weapons system 
remotely, functions as a battlefield technician or weapons platform. The spectrum articulated 
in the thesis question was also intended to represent the following metaphor:  
Warrior      = ‘at close hand’ and experiences ‘hand-to-hand combat’. 
Battlefield Tech   = ‘at a distance’ and ‘dislocated experience of the battlefield’.
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As set out in chapter 1 the use of either concept (warrior and weapons platform) is solely to 
establish the left and right of arc of the imagined spectrum. This thesis does not seek to 
suggest or maintain that there has been, or is, some ‘progression’ from the notion of the 
warrior to the concept of the weapons platform.  
The focus of this chapter will be on the ‘at a distance and dislocated experience of the 
battlefield’ as encountered by the soldier when functioning as a battlefield technician/
weapons system. This will be achieved by a consideration of the weapons systems that 
soldiers are either using or trialling and the ethical, philosophical and practical implications 
associated with using robotic weapon technology in combat. It is in this regard that role of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), particularly in regard to some of the legal concerns over 
their use in targeted or extra juridical killings will be considered. Although UAVs are 
normally controlled by airmen rather than soldiers, they are used in support of land based 
operations and many of the issues surrounding their use are likely to be replicated if or when 
remote operated land based weapons systems are used by ground troops against enemy forces.  
7.2 Future Technology: A Context 
The ability to kill one’s enemy at a distance has been and continues to be an attractive 
proposition for decision makers or leaders of state and non-state actors. ‘From the javelin and 
the arrow’ notes Fuller ‘to the super-fortress and the rocket bomb, the very power to destroy, 
first slowly and then at terrific speed, has intoxicated man’8. Technology has caused ‘the 
conduct of war to change and change again’9. As the Industrial Revolution changed the 
conduct of war10, and the First World War accelerated the development of automotive 
technology, Singer is convinced that ‘the war on terror’ will accelerate the development of 
robotic technology11.  
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The First and Second World Wars left a deep and indelible mark upon those countries 
who felt its full force. Many Western countries after the end of the Second World War simply 
turned their backs on war, culturally rejecting it12. Indeed, the growth and development of 
International Law, the 4th Geneva Convention, the creation of the United Nations and the 
European Convention on Human Rights are all mechanisms designed to limit war and define 
its parameters morally and legally. Despite this, war and warfare have remained a consistent 
feature of life since the end of World War 2. One can therefore understand the American 
desire to replace men with machines; this has been an official policy, according to CH Gray, 
‘since World War II’13. Coker maintains that the West has instrumentalised war, viewing it as 
purely utilitarian, while the existential dimension that made war a human activity has been 
eroded14. The irony of course, is that while the West attempts to make war more humane 
through its use of technology, war/warfare in a non-western setting has become increasingly 
less humane15.        
Vietnam was the first conflict to witness the use of cybernetic warfare16; it was also a 
conflict that saw the application of a managerial/bureaucratic systems approach to warfare17. 
The result as Bousquet states was a dramatic failure18. ‘Weapon for weapon the United States 
should have won the war. But wars are not fought by weapons’, argues G and M Friedman19. 
Neither are wars won by the simple application of military and industrial processes. A 
seminal work on this in relation to the Vietnam War is James Gibson’s The Perfect War: 
Technowar in Vietnam20. Gibson argues that ‘technowar’ essentially focused upon 
maximising the enemy’s body count, regardless of means. He maintains that ‘by adopting 
microeconomics, game theory, systems analysis, and other managerial techniques’, the 
Kennedy administration advanced ‘limited’ war to greater specificity, making it seem more 
controllable, manageable, and therefore more desirable as foreign policy21. The context to the 
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adoption of these various managerial techniques, according to the Friedmans, is the rise of 
what they refer to as the scientist strategist22.      
‘Modern warfare’, they contend, ‘has always borrowed from the technology of the
modern scientist in such fields as explosives, civil engineering, and aeronautical engineering, 
but such enterprises were not seen as central to military success’23. In contrast the Second 
World War proved and validated the worth of both the scientist and technology to the 
military24. The development of the atomic bomb, according to the Friedmans, required the 
military to ask the scientists who created it not only how to use it but how to develop a 
strategy for its use25. ‘The scientists, having no intrinsic understanding of a military analysis, 
naturally turned to their own frame of reference – scientific method and mathematics’26 and 
embraced a concept called ‘operations research’27. In this methodology a ‘common sense’ 
approach was considered an insufficient mechanism for management. ‘Mathematical 
precision was necessary’28 and the scientists of the Rand Corporation applied a mathematical 
model to nuclear warfare29. The industrialist and later US Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara30 developed the concept of ‘operations research’ by seeking to apply it to non- 
nuclear warfare. Instead of choosing ‘strategic goals, McNamara generated analytic 
principles and operational norms’31. These were then translated into ‘precise increments of 
force to achieve the desired end’32. The great success story of this process, systems approach 
to conflict was the Cuban missile crisis. It is no surprise therefore, that quantitative 
methodologies permeated the Vietnam War33; it had proven so successful in the Cuban 
missile crisis.  
America’s incremental approach to the use of force in Vietnam is one distinctive 
feature of their approach to this conflict.  Johnson, according to Lonsdale, was conscious of 
escalating the war, fearing that China or the Soviet Union might be brought into the war. ‘In 
the early stages of the war, Johnson was reluctant to conduct large-scale conflict for fear of 
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distracting attention away from his domestic political programme’34. In this political context, 
the methodology employed by the US has an internal logic to it. The use, for example, of 
technology and quantitative methodologies are epitomised in the US bombing campaign 
known as ‘Rolling Thunder’. In this campaign some of the world’s most advanced bombers 
were utilised, while the overarching methodology remained ‘faithful to the industrial 
theory’35. To aid American delivery of their technological superiority, the US deployed an 
unprecedented telecommunications network in the field in Vietnam and a wide scale 
cybernetic system that operated on similar principles to US domestic air-defence systems36. 
As a result, incredible volumes of data were generated. However, rather than providing 
excellent actionable intelligence on enemy movements, the sheer quantity of information 
frequently overloaded the system37 significantly reducing its value38.  
The methodology and logic is succulently emphasised in Gibson’s contention that 
‘General William Westmoreland’s strategy of reaching the “crossover point”, defined as 
when the enemy casualties exceeded replacements, The Perfect War demonstrated the war 
manager’s logic in not having US soldiers occupy land, but instead moving them relentlessly 
around the country in helicopter and mechanised search-and-destroy operations in order to 
kill Vietnamese opponents as quickly as possible’39.  
Victory should have been a forgone conclusion. Indeed, the story is told of how when 
the Nixon administration took over in 1969 various pieces of information were fed into a 
Pentagon computer concerning the US and North Vietnam. When asked when the war would 
be won, the computer apparently replied, ‘You won in 1964’40. One of the fundamental 
problems, maintains Bousquet, was that the systems approach used in Vietnam, ‘assembled 
under cybernetic warfare had been designed to combat other similar systems’41. While a 
complex war like Vietnam cannot simply be reduced to the influence of systems analysis42, 
nevertheless, it was a major contributory factor in why the US failed to defeat what appeared 
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to be a militarily inferior opponent. It also highlights an important point; technology or its 
application was not in itself the panacea it was presented to be before the Vietnam War.  
Two striking examples of the successful application of technology and the Western
way of war are the two Gulf Wars (1990-91 and 200343). In 1991, despite having significant 
conventional capabilities, compared to other states in the region, and substantial time to 
prepare their defences against an American-led coalition, the Iraqi military were swept aside 
and comprehensively defeated in only 100 hours after the commencement of the ground 
campaign. Benbow notes that ‘the conflict therefore appeared to be a convincing vindication 
of post-Vietnam developments in US military doctrine and training as well as confirming the 
potential of various new technologies introduced in the 1970s and 1980s’44. For Gibson the 
‘1991 war against Iraq at first seemed like a complete validation of ‘Technowar’45. The Gulf 
War thrust the concept that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had or was occurring in 
the mainstream of strategic studies and military planning46.   
Although the basic concept of RMA was briefly considered in chapter 447 it is 
necessary to unpack this subject a little further. In his detailed treatment of this subject, Gray 
argues that there have been three great RMAs48. He accepts that there have been other kinds 
of RMAs, of varying magnitude and in different periods, however, he maintains that all 
RMAs share a common structure49. Nevertheless he does want to ‘alert readers to the fact that 
a decade of intensive and extensive work on the subject has left answers even to the most 
basic of questions’50. Gray’s note of caution in 2002 was well judged. In 2000, for example, 
Steven Metz proclaimed that ‘speed, knowledge, and precision will minimise casualties and 
lead to the rapid resolution of wars, thus minimizing the problems associated with the 
challenges to the political utility of force’51. Such claims, however, must be weighed against 
the harsh realities of the violent and bloody insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the high 
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fatality rates among US and UK forces. Metz though was only one of a great many 
proclaiming the absolute certainty of the information and technological RMA.  
Two early and key proponents for RMA were Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Their books, 
The Third Wave (1980) and War and Anti-War (1993) were hugely influential52. The central 
thesis was that human civilisation was entering a third wave, the information age53. 
According to Bousquet, in the ‘hands of RMA evangelists, The Third Wave translated into a 
vision in which the future of the military was computers, information networks, and precision 
munitions’54. A key tenet of this RMA is information55. ‘A military’ argues Metz, ‘which 
masters network-centric warfare…will achieve information superiority, reach out long 
distances with precision weapons and collapse an enemy’s will through the shock of rapid 
and closely linked attacks’56. The Toffler’s imagined that this could also be achieved using a 
much smaller force57. Donald Rumsfeld adopted the concept, favouring a ‘minimum force 
using high technology weapons’58 and planned a smaller ‘transformed’ force that he believed 
could achieve the same results as an older, much larger force59. 
The spectacular success of the war fighting phase of the Second Gulf War initially 
appeared to confirm the expectations of the RMA advocates60. A smaller, networked, enabled 
force using all arms manoeuvre warfare in conjunction with precision munitions swept 
through the Iraqi military, however, as Singer observed ‘not all was well with the 
revolution’61. He maintains that ‘the business assumptions behind network-centric warfare 
had been particularly selective’62. What had appeared as a ‘shiny picture of techno-
supremacy’ was in reality, according to Singer, a cobbled together, hodgepodge military-built 
networking technology that frequently crashed or suffered badly in the desert heat as 
equipment designed for use in the office struggled on the battlefield63. For Cordesman 
though, much of the asymmetry between the US and British forces and their enemy ‘was the 
result of the fact that the United States was using a new mix of strategy, tactics and 
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technology and Iraq was not’64. Many of the key weapons systems, he maintains, took 
decades to evolve and can be traced to Vietnam and other conflicts65.  
7.3 Examples of Battlefield Technology 
One of the most distinctive characteristics between the first and second Gulf Wars, 
according to Keegan, was the brevity of the air campaign66. This was due, he maintains, to 
the precision of the weaponry delivered and that this in itself marked a revolution in accuracy 
since 1991. This however, stood in stark contrast with the experience of the infantry soldier, 
who after the war-fighting phase had to deal with a growing and violent insurgency and cope 
with a rapid growth in the complexity and use of Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs67. 
According to DL Wright, ‘it took a while for these lessons to catch up to the leaders at the 
Pentagon and the policy makers in Congress who controlled the purse strings that would lead 
to technology advancement and fielding new equipment’68.  
In 1972 Lt Col Peter Miller invented and used a remote control platform that became 
known as the ‘Wheelbarrow’69. Described as a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) this 
application of technology has been labelled as ‘the single most influential factor in the 
evolution of bomb disposal techniques. They maximise the amount of work that the bomb 
technician can carry out from a distance, reducing the risk to life significantly’70. Initially the 
wheelbarrow was controlled by cables (90 metres long) attached to a control box. Today 
modern examples can be operated remotely from as far as 1.25 miles away using radio 
control71.  
The Wheelbarrow
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The Talon, designed by Foster-Miller a wholly owned subsidiary of QinetiQ72, and the 
PackBot, designed by iRobot, are two of the latest editions of an ROV73.  
The Talon74 (Foster-Millar)  PackBot75 (iRobot)
Some designs like the UK MOD’s Dragon Runner are designed to be ‘man’-portable.  
The Dragon Runner76 
Building upon the commercial success of the Packbot, iRobot introduced the Warrior77. 
Warrior
Foster-Miller likewise has produced a larger version of the Talon; this is called SWORDS 
(Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System).  
SWORDS78
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On their website Foster-Miller state that: 
The SWORD variant will further extend the versatility of this platform and it can be 
used to protect ground forces and operate in dangerous and hazardous environments. 
The operators, who can be located some distance away, are able to control their 
missions from a position of relative safety. Of significant importance is that the 
operator remains in direct control of the SWORD at all times and a person has to 
make the final decision to engage the target79. 
The SWORD variant is already being replaced with an even more advanced robotic weapons 
platform called the MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System). 
MAARS80
The South Korean SGR-1 sentry robot is one example of how robotic technology may 
influence how defensive positions are guarded in remote locations that require constant 
vigilance. Samsung Techwin America has also produced a mobile security robot. 
SGR-181   STAR-1
The STAR-1 is an autonomous enhanced version of the Mini STAR vehicle. It is reported 
that it can ‘detect targets at up to four (4) kilometres (approximately 2.5 miles) and a laser 
rangefinder helps track them at up to two (2) kilometres (approximately 1.2 miles), with 
distances halved at night’82. These vehicles are designed to provide mobile surveillance in 
large spaces such as armament depots or in hazardous environments83.  
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The US Navy’s MK15 Phalanx Close in Weapons System was originally designed to 
identify and fire at incoming missiles or threatening aircraft84. This is a ‘last defence’ system 
against targets that have gotten past all other defence systems. However, the MK15 was given 
a land-based role in protecting military camps in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this role it became 
known as Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar technology or CRAM85.  
MK15 Phalanx (Ship role)
Robotic or autonomous weapons platforms are not limited to bomb-disposal, 
reconnaissance, sentry duty (static or mobile) or even as close-in last defence systems against 
missiles or incoming artillery shells. The range of battlefield technology available almost 
covers the entire range of military arms. For example: 
Artillery 
The JUMPER (autonomous artillery for ground forces)
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According to reports this weapons platform only needs to be located on a flat surface and 
requires no crew86. Each unit has a total of 8 missiles, each with a range of 50 kilometers and 
is guided either by its own internal GPS or can home in on a laser designation87.  
K10 ARV 
This particular vehicle is claimed to be the world’s first fully automated robotized AFV 
designed to supply a self-propelled 155mm howitzer88.  
Multirole Combat Vehicle  
The Gladiator89
Logistics 
Lockheed Martin’s Squad Mission Support System (SMSS) 
On their website Lockheed Martin state that ‘four SMSS vehicles were successfully tested by 
soldiers in Afghanistan in 2012 as transport and logistics vehicles to lighten the load for 
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soldiers in combat operations’90. The company also revealed that they had successfully 
conducted controlled tests via satellite from a distance of 200 miles in February 2013.  
Oshkosh’s TerraMax
The TerraMax is another autonomous vehicle. However, this particular example uses short- 
range radars to enable it to navigate without relying solely on the use of GPS or direct input 
from a human operator. It apparently has the capacity to plot its own course to its 
designation using its own radars91.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
The use of UAVs in war is not a new phemonomon. The Teledyne Ryan AQM-91 
Fire Fly flew 3,435 missions in Vietnam, however, because of the classified nature of their 
use and missions, there was little public knowledge of their relative success92.   
Today many states (including non-state actors like Hezbollah) have either developed their 
own range of UAVs or have simply bought versions commercially available. UAVs come 
in a range of sizes and capabilities, with some carrying sophisticated weapons systems. For 
example: 
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The Desert Hawk            The Raven  
The Elbit Hermes 450 WatchKeeper93       The Predator / MQ-9 Reaper Hunter / Killer94  
The Taranis95 
The Taranis (named after the Celtic god of thunder) is a prototype stealth combat vehicle 
developed for the UK MOD by BAE Systems. 
Soldier / individual advanced technology 
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XOS by Sarcos 
The XOS is a second-generation robotic suit, developed by Raytheon, for the US Army. It 
is described as a ‘wearable robotic suit’ that enhances the ‘human strength, agility and 
endurance capabilities of the soldier inside it’96.   
HULC by Lockheed Martin 
The HULC is another example of an exoskeleton designed for the individual soldier97.  
The Land Warrior integrated fighting system for USA infantry soldiers 
The US Land Warrior integrated fighting system was originally designed to enable the 
individual infantry soldier to have ‘enhanced tactical awareness, lethality and survivability. 
The systems integrated into Land Warrior are the weapon system, helmet, computer, digital 
and voice communications, positional and navigation system, protective clothing and 
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individual equipment’98. In other words, the individual soldier forms part of an enhanced 
and comprehensive tactical system99. In his book Warrior Geeks, Coker seeks to show, 
broadly speaking that ‘humanity and war have co-evolved’ and that not only did it mould 
the way humans understood themselves, it also determined the way they fought it100. His 
contention is that war helped create different ideas about human nature across time and 
different cultures but that today technological changes are rewriting our understanding of 
what it means to be human101.  
7.4. Man and his Use of Technology 
The blurring of man and the machine ‘is in essence the post-human condition’102. 
Some commentators adopt a positively evangelical approach to the question of humans and 
technology. Andy Clarke in his book Natural Born Cyborgs argues forcefully that humans 
are natural-born cyborgs103. ‘When our technologies actively, automatically, and 
continually tailor themselves to us and we to them – then the line between tool and user 
becomes flimsy indeed’104. Consequently, he finds the term post-human a dangerous and 
mistaken image105. His illustration of the humble wristwatch as an example of the 
transparent symbiotic relationship we already have with technology is compelling106. 
Approaching the relationship between man and technology from an evolutionary scientific 
perspective, Timothy Taylor contends that it is not possible to understand man’s evolution 
apart from his development and use of technology107. It was our use of technology, he 
maintains, that altered our physical and mental evolution108. The argument that to be 
human is to have some form of relationship with technology, regardless of whether that is a 
flint knife, bladed farming tool, sword or clock is difficult to resist109. That man can have a 
positive relationship with technology is not, however, the main area of concern. Rather it is 
the speed of technological development and issues that this is producing.   
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Lanier maintains that a tiny group of engineers have tinkered with our ‘direct 
cognitive experience’ in regard to technology110. It is, however, the speed associated with this 
that is so striking. Referring to the pace that computer technology has developed Lanier 
offers this analogy: ‘it’s as if you kneel to plant a seed and it grows so fast that it swallows 
your whole village before you can even rise to your feet’111. Singer has suggested that ‘a 
knight of the Middle Ages could go their entire life with maybe one new technology 
changing the way they lived’112. The exponential change in computer technology is 
encapsulated in ‘Moore’s law’113. Kurzweil contends that ‘we won't experience one hundred 
years of technological advance in the twenty-first century; we will witness on the order of 
twenty thousand years of progress (again, when measured by today's rate of progress), or 
about one thousand times greater than what was achieved in the twentieth century’114.  
The rapid development of technology calls humanity’s ability to cope with, let alone 
master, these changes into question. There is the possibility that humanity will simply 
continue to be passively changed by technology as its development outstrips our capacity to 
master the changes. Douglas Noble suggests that educators in America may have 
‘unwittingly adopted a framework of a larger military/scientific enterprise’115 and that 
schools ‘serve as both laboratory and production site’116 for the ‘production of “mental 
material”’117. He claims that ‘the underlying goal of military attempts to understand human 
capacities is the eventual replacement of human beings by autonomous weapons and 
battlefields’118. In the same book, CH Gray states that ‘just as modern war required modern 
soldiers; post-modern war needs soldiers with new military virtues who can meet the 
incredible requirements of high-technology war’119.  
Whether or not the US military has deliberately sought to influence the educational 
system in America to meet its own requirements is a matter of debate. There is none however, 
concerning the purpose underpinning the development by the US Army of the computer 
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game called America’s Army, released on the 4th of July 2002. It was deliberately offered as a 
free download specifically for online play120. Those associated with the project offered some 
explanation as to the original purposes of the project: 
America does not know the real Army. In contrast to previous eras, today’s citizens 
have relatively few portals of insight into the Army as a profession. Increasingly, 
youths and those who influence them are in touch with an Army that does not exist, 
but is instead the product of Hollywood, the media and marketing121.  
Since its launch this game has had over 9 million registered users and has gone through 
several versions: the latest being America’s Army 3 in 2009122. Not only did this project 
become a public relations sensation, recruitment for the Army rose significantly123.  
The success of this project stands in marked contrast to an earlier attempt at using a 
computer game for military purposes. In 1995 a Marine Corps Lieutenant and Sergeant had 
the radical idea of altering the hugely popular video game Doom124 to teach soldiers certain 
skills at a low cost. Although it received considerable media attention at the time125 it failed 
to achieve anything like the success of America’s Army. According to Urlocker and Smith 
one of the reasons ‘for this was that senior leaders simply did not understand the potential of 
the new technology’126. Chambers et.al., observe that ‘Gen Y moves easily through the 
digital economy, having never known a world without computers. For Gen Y, technology is 
the defining element of their lives. Unfortunately, the Army runs last among the services in 
Gen Y’s perception of technological sophistication’127. In the space of a few years senior 
leaders within the US Army not only grasped the significance of computer games and the 
internet but sought to tap into its potential.    
America has not been alone in its development of computer games as an effective 
means of inculcating its message within a specific youth culture. In 2001 the Syrian publisher 
dar Al-Fikr released the game Under Ash which depicts the ‘plight’ of a young Palestinian 
man during the second intifada128. In 2003 the Central Internet Bureau of Hezbollah released 
the game Special Force129: ‘a first person shooter based around the armed Islamic movement 
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in South Lebanon’130. Many of the objectives of Hezbollah echo those underpinning 
America’s Army131. Unlike many video games produced in the West, Under Ash and Special 
Force are considered to be ‘the first truly realist games in existence’132. In contrast, games 
like America’s Army are considered to be realistic, rather realist. For Galloway the central 
distinction between realistic and realist is narrative. The narrative of Under Ash, he argues, is 
not fantasy escapism but rather it takes on an almost documentary quality depicting current 
scenarios133. It is this weaving together of narrative and lived experience that makes Under 
Ash a realist game rather than another first-person-shooter game.  
One of the important distinctions between the America’s Army, Under Ash and 
Special Force is the depiction of who the enemy is. In a first-person-shooter game this is a 
central element in the development of a game’s internal narrative. In Under Ash and Special 
Force the enemy is clearly defined. It is Israel and in particular the Israeli Defence Force134. 
In contrast those who developed America’s Army have been careful to create an abstract 
enemy; something Allen calls the ‘unreal enemy’135. This according to Allen, ‘is an enemy 
with minimal cultural, linguistic, or ethnic indicators and therefore one which is 
simultaneously anonymous yet potentially anyone…everywhere and nowhere at once’136. The 
ambiguous nature of the enemy in America’s Army illustrates Galloway’s point that it is 
realistic rather than realist in terms of narrative. That said, what America’s Army, Under Ash 
and Special Force may reflect is the potential of embedding ‘real social critique in players’ 
experiences of their virtual worlds’137. In other words, they share the belief that modern youth 
culture can be heavily influenced through the use of technology that offers a version of life 
embedded within a virtual world.  
Although there have been a number of studies that have suggested that ‘violent video 
games are related to aggressive cognitions, affect and behaviour’138, Weber et.al., maintain 
that ‘there is still a controversial discussion about the validity of these’ studies139. Other 
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studies have cast doubt on the suggestion that violence in computer games is actually 
rewarding for those who play them140. A suitable degree of caution is therefore warranted in 
making judgements about the effects of on-line gaming, especially first-person-shooters such 
as those described in this section. However, a number of scholars continue to raise substantial 
concerns over the metaphysical impact of technology and life in the virtual world of the 
internet. For example Coker maintains that ‘we know that technology is changing our habits 
and lifestyles and sometimes even our identity; what we do not know is whether the virtual 
world in which we now live at least part of our lives is changing us culturally’141. One of the 
consistent features of many of the robotic weapon platforms identified earlier in section 7.3 is 
that they have been designed to be used by a youth generation who have spent a significant 
part of their lives in a virtual computer world.  
The work of Baroness Susan Greenfield in this field is particularly relevant142. In the 
past, previous generations had the options of being Someone or Anyone143. However, in the 
twenty-first century there is now a third option: being ‘Nobody’144. ‘The Nobody world’, 
according to Greenfield, ‘is the province of cyber space’145. She notes that in a recent survey 
‘a child in the UK spends, between their tenth and eleventh birthdays, on average 900 hours 
in class, 1,277 hours with their family, and 1,934 hours in front of a screen – be it television 
or computer’146. ‘The screen based lifestyle’ she contends ‘is an unprecedented and pervasive 
phenomenon…prolonged and frequent video-gaming, surfing and social networking cannot 
fail to have an unprecedented and transformation effect on the mental state of a species 
whose most basic and valuable talent is a highly sensitive adaptability to whatever 
environment in which it is placed’147.  
Potentially, one of the most significant aspects of this is in regard to our capacity to be 
empathetic. Greenfield cites a report based on a study of 1,400 college students in the USA, 
where the participants ‘showed a decline in empathy over the last thirty years, with a 
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particularly sharp drop in the last decade’148. While she accepts that a declining ability to be 
empathetic and the popularity of the internet does not prove a causal link, she does however, 
suggest that it is a starting point for further investigation149. An internet addiction, Greenfield 
speculates, may lead to ‘an absence of an internally generated past or planned future, in 
favour instead of just the atomised present. Could one stark and extreme possibility be that, in 
the end, such people may have simply no identity?’150 (emphasis original). Taken together, 
the picture offered by Greenfield is quite terrifying: a ‘Nobody’ people, living in an atomised 
cyber-world of a perpetual now, potentially deficient in their capacity to empathise with 
others and devoid of personal identity. The use of robotic weapons systems by operators 
dislocated from the battlefield will generate significant legal and ethical questions.  
7.5 Conflict: Some Legal Issues in Using Robotic Weapons Platforms  
On the 24 May 2013 President Obama publically announced that the overall 
programme for the US use of ‘drone151 strikes’ would be subjected to tighter oversight and 
follow stricter targeting rules152. Despite this announcement the speech was nevertheless also 
interpreted as a strong and continued commitment to the use of drones by the Obama 
administration153. While the UK’s use of UAVs such as the Predator or Reaper is not as 
extensive as that of the US154, the relocation in 2013 of flight operations from the US to RAF 
Waddington in England generated significant protests by peace campaigners opposed to the 
use of drones flown from the UK155. The debate concerning the use of this particular 
weapon’s platform continues to generate significant interest from a range of parties156.  
The use of robotic platforms in conflict is not new; therefore, it is important to clarify 
how the term robotic will be used in this section. The word robot ‘was first coined by the 
Czech playwright Karel Čapek who derived it from the Czech word robota, which meant 
forced labour’157; it also had a secondary meaning of ‘drudgery’158. Čapek’s play R.U.R. 
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(Rossum’s Universal Robots) is similar in tone to Fritz Lang’s film Metropolis, particularly 
in regard to the production line nature of the modern factory. According to Singer a robot is a 
machine ‘with three key components: “sensors” that monitor the environment and detect 
changes in it, “processors” or “artificial intelligence” that decides how to respond, and 
“effectors” that act upon the environment in a manner that reflects the decisions, creating 
some sort of change in the world around the robot’159. The exact level of autonomy associated 
with individual robotic machines can vary greatly160. Unmanned robotic weapons are often 
divided into three categories: 
Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force only 
with human command; 
Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force 
under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robot’s actions; and 
Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and 
delivering force without human input or interaction161.  
Many of the issues associated with the use of UAVs like Predator and Reaper, may also in the 
future be associated with the use of some of the infantry specific robotic weapon platforms 
highlighted in section 7.3. Consequently, the focus will be upon both UAVs and weapon 
systems like the MAARS.  
UAVs are an accepted part of the military inventory of many states162 and even some
non-state actors163. There is a general expectation that not only will UAVs become more 
prevalent, they might eventually take ‘over most or all of the tasks currently undertaken by 
manned systems’164; it is even anticipated that they will become more autonomous in the 
future165. The position of the UK on the legal status of UAVs is very straightforward: 
Most of the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and planned systems are well 
understood and are simply a variation of those associated with manned systems. An 
aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, is commanded and therefore its use is 
governed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) in 2 ways. Firstly, weapons law 
guides whether a weapon and its generic uses are lawful; secondly, targeting law 
determines whether the use of a particular weapon is lawful on a specific mission or 
in specific circumstances. This also defines the framework for the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE). 2 The LOAC is based largely on the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the 1997 Additional Protocol 1, of which the UK is a signatory166. 
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The logic of this is simple. If the weapon fired from a UAV is the same as that fired from a 
manned platform and is in compliance with weapons law, the use of that weapon is legally 
compliant. A Hellfire missile is a Hellfire missile, regardless of the platform from which it is 
fired167. Secondly, if a target is engaged it is done so in compliance with the UK’s ROE, 
which are composed in relation to the LOAC168. The legal reality however, is much more 
complicated, regardless of this simple declaration by the UK’s MOD.         
The issue is not one of using direct or indirect fire in support of troops actively 
engaged in hostile action against a clearly defined target, such as enemy fighters. A missile 
launched from a manned or unmanned platform in this instance is not the central point 
legally; there may well be an ethical point but that will be considered later. In active contact 
with enemy forces, the LOAC is often quite straightforward, and if it is not ‘UK forces go to 
great lengths to avoid civilian casualties, at times risking mission failure as a result’169. 
However, when war is fought among the people, in theatres of operation like Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the tactical situation can be fiendishly complex. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian 
Burridge, giving his perspective on the use of drones in Iraq, stated that ‘post-modern 
conflicts confront us…with ambiguous non-linear battlespaces’; in this context ‘UAVs can be 
a useful asset in classic three-block warfare…’ because ‘they can be sent into areas assessed 
as being too dangerous for ground troops in the broad reconnaissance role’170. It is the use of 
UAVs as an independent capability to achieve military and or political effect that generates 
so much of the recent controversy. This is particularly the case in relation to civilian 
casualties in situations of ‘targeted’ or as some prefer to define them, ‘extra-judicial 
killings’171.   
Commentators like Conor Friedersdorf are uncompromising. It is his contention that 
‘the Obama Administration isn't just assassinating an unprecedented number of individuals. It 
is doing so in a secret, unaccountable manner’172. Legal opinion on the legitimacy of targeted 
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or extra-judicial killing is divided. Experts like Mary O’Connell are adamant that the US 
policy is contrary to International Law173 which she argues, prohibits the right to kill outside 
of actual armed conflict174. She utterly rejects the US administration’s argument that its use 
of drones is an act of self-defence against legitimate combatants175. For O’Connell terrorist 
acts are akin to acts of criminality rather than an act of armed aggression that would 
legitimise an armed response176. In her opinion, the use of ‘combat drones’ is illegal under 
International Law177. Other legal experts like JJ Paust maintain that ‘self-defense can be 
permissible against non-state actor armed attacks, and measures of self-defense can occur in 
the territory of another state without special consent of the other state or imputation of the 
armed attacks to that state as long as the measures of self-defense are directed against the non-
state actors’178.  
Some contend that the reason for this stark division within eminent legal opinion is 
the simple reality that ‘international law, accustomed to regulating actions by states, is in 
unchartered legal territory when dealing with non-state actors and their involvement in the 
changing face of war’179. This, however, is a concept that O’Connell rejects utterly180. 
Because O’Connell makes the assumption that inter and trans-national terrorists are criminals 
rather than combatants, she does not adequately address how the US, or any other state for 
that matter, should deal with those who are alleged to have plotted or are plotting terror 
attacks against US and Allied forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  
Gross suggests that terrorists and guerrillas maintain two stances. ‘On the battlefield’, 
he observes ‘they are something like combatants; off the battlefield and at the time they are 
targeted, they are something like civilians or some other non-combatant’181. He maintains that 
guerrillas are not civilians ‘who lend an occasional hand…but fighters who maintain their 
status off the battlefield as they prepare for battle, lay plans, tend to their weapons, and 
maintain their fighting capability’182. In this regard, Etzioni asks an interesting question, ‘why 
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would one hold that we ought to grant extra rights to people just because they fight us in an 
unfair way (so to speak), and, at the very least, illegally, seems difficult to comprehend’183. 
While some may sympathise with Etzioni, perhaps a partial answer to his question may be 
found in article 148 of the Lieber Code, which expressly forbids assassination, designating it 
as an ‘outrage’184. The Lieber Code, however, was not constructed against the context of 
modern transnational terrorism or with combatants who deliberately reject on principle 
International Law. In his examination of the implications of the Lieber Code, Gross argues 
that ‘it is best to understand targeted killing as an adaption of the war convention that permits 
soldiers to kill one another in the absence of uniforms’185. Until there is an agreed 
international protocol on the use of UAVs, legal opinion is likely to remain deeply divided 
and their continued use, highly contentious.      
While a remotely controlled robotic weapons platform like the MAARS system could 
be used to attack the occupants of a building (be that house, factory, compound etc.,)  the 
current technology is such that it is unlikely that it would make tactical sense to operate it 
thousands of miles away. Nevertheless, it is possible that the issue of targeted killing could 
generate similar legal challenges to those associated with UAVs. For example, the operator of 
the MAARS is removed from the immediate contact area just like the operator of the UAV. 
The attack itself could be designed to kill a specific target or targets using remote technology, 
without endangering ground troops in any attack. The use of thermal imaging capabilities 
combined with rocket propelled grenades and GPMP machine gun might offer a form of 
precision strike against a target. Although this may sound like a scene from a science fiction 
film like Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines, it would seem only a matter of time before the 
robotic weapon platforms being tested at the moment (see section 7.3) enter into operational 
service. Consequently, the ethical, philosophical and practical implications of using this 
technology could be significant and will form the core of the next section.   
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7.6 Conflict: Ethical, Philosophical and Practical Implications of Using Robotic Weapons 
The existence of battlefield robotic weapons technology is an established reality. 
Indeed Singer notes that Congress has ordered the Pentagon to show a preference for 
unmanned systems; ‘if the US military was going to buy a new weapon it would now have to 
justify why it was not a robotic one’186. Although Coker maintains that ‘the future is not 
destiny, it is a choice’187 he is convinced that ‘robots are on the march…and there is no going 
back’188. Few would disagree with his observation that the coming of robots is a cultural 
watershed, a Rubicon we have decided to cross189. It is not difficult to grasp some of the 
practical attractions robotic technology offers. Gordon Johnson, of the Joint Forces 
Command at the Pentagon, said: ‘they don't get hungry, they’re not afraid, they don’t forget 
their orders. They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better 
job than humans? Yes’190. The first practical implication, therefore, is the recognition that 
conflict in the twenty-first century will see an increasing use of this technology and of the 
debate concerning the ethical and philosophical use of these weapon systems.  
The concept of human-robot interaction (HRI) is an ‘ever-growing research field with 
connections to both the military and civilian application’191. Soldier-Robot teams are no 
longer the product of science-fiction writers192 but the subject of serious and detailed 
academic research193. ‘An important feature of future battlespaces’, Barnes and Evans 
contend ‘will be a greater use of intelligent systems to supplement traditional manned 
forces’194. Using intelligent systems however, has generated difficulties for their operators195. 
Studies have shown that ‘gunners were not able to conduct their primary task effectively if a 
second robotic task was added to their inventory’196. To help overcome this it was found that 
‘using automated targeting recognition aid (AiTR) helped operators overcome their 
attentional deficits’197. Automation is considered to be ‘an obvious solution to the increased 
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workload of future military systems’198. In the conclusion of their overview Barnes and Evans 
state that ‘future robots will be able to make many tactical decisions on their own’199.  
One of the major areas of concern both practically and ethically is the extent to which
the human component is the weakest link in the chain. Significant studies have been 
conducted to determine the safe human-robot ratio, which apparently is Nh=Nv+Np+1 (where 
Nh is the number of humans, Nv is the number of vehicles, Np is the number of payloads and 
the +1 is a safety officer)200. A recurrent theme in this study is the phrase ‘out-of-the-loop’ or 
OOTL. In this instance the ‘loop’ refers to the decision-making loop, articulated by John 
Boyd during the Korean War, which became known as OODA (observe, orient, decide and 
act)201. Whenever a system has higher degrees of automation ‘it is harder for the human to 
react to a problem correctly in time because the human does not retain the necessary 
situational awareness for control of the process’202. In the future, the decision-making loop 
will not be measured in minutes but microseconds203. The MK15 Phalanx (section 7.3) offers 
one particular example of this. The seconds between the identification of an incoming missile 
or shell leaves little human response time; in this regard it is a ‘last defence’ automated 
system. While few would find the use of this form of autonomous weapons platform 
controversial, the example of Iran Air Flight 655 may offer a salutary example of what can 
happen when autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems make a catastrophic error 
and are not over-ruled by their human operators. 
On the 3rd of July 1988, Iran Air Flight 655, a European built A300 Airbus, was shot 
down by two missiles fired by the USS Vincennes204. The Aegis computer system on-board 
the USS Vincennes’ determined Flight 655 to be an Iranian F14 fighter jet205 with hostile 
intent206. According to Singer, throughout this incident the Aegis system was on 
semiautomatic mode. Although the hard data was telling the crew of the US warship that the 
aircraft was not a fighter jet, ‘not one of the eighteen sailors and officers on the command 
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crew was willing to challenge the computer’s wisdom’207. In this instance, having the human 
‘in the loop’ failed to correct a computer error than led to the deaths of 273 humans on board 
Flight 655. Part of the human tragedy in this particular incident was that the human operators 
deferred to the wisdom of the computer rather than overrule a profound mistake208. Because 
the crew believed an F14 fighter jet was descending to attack they convinced themselves that 
the hard data (i.e. that the civilian jet was actually ascending209) was incorrect. Arkin refers to 
this as the ‘human psychological problem of “scenario fulfilment”’210. 
One of the major areas of concern for many is the development of what some refer to 
as killer robots, or Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs)211; in other words, robot weapons 
systems capable of taking the decision to kill without direct human involvement in a specific 
decision. On the 30th May 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns in his address to 
a UN sponsored conference on LARs held in Geneva began by asking:  
Is it acceptable, from the perspective of protecting life and human dignity, that any 
kind of weapon that is used to kill humans - whether in peace or war - will be 
controlled by autonomous robots? … This is really a huge jump for humanity to say, 
we are now going to allow machines to kill human beings212.    
Groups like Article 36, Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International 
Human Rights Clinic also contend that the development of LARs should be banned213. 
Although the UK Government has stated that ‘the operation of weapons systems will always 
be under human control’214 this has not satisfied opponents of LARs (i.e. Article 36). What 
does ‘human control’ mean in the context of the microseconds involved in the decision- 
making loop? It is possible that although humans may remain technically in the loop, they 
may function more as ‘a supervisor who serves in a fail-safe capacity in the event of a system 
malfunction’215. Sadly the example of the USS Vincennes illustrates that this is far from full- 
proof.  
The battlefield has always been a dangerous place216. Despite the controversy over 
LARs, the use of robots has already saved the lives of thousands of soldiers in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan217. According to Singer ‘they simply make too much sense to the people who 
matter’218. Although focusing upon remote and semi-autonomous weapons platforms 
(primarily UAVs) Strawser contends that there is a moral duty to use non-human weapons 
systems rather than place humans in harm’s way219. Arkin, however is much more strident in 
his advocacy of the case for ethical autonomy of robotic systems220 being ‘convinced that 
they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of performing’221. Arkin 
cites the disturbing evidence of the report from the US Surgeon General’s Office (2006) 
which assessed the battlefield ethics and mental health of soldiers and marines deployed on 
Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ as supporting evidence. ‘It is unrealistic’, he argues, to expect 
‘normal human beings to adhere to the Laws of Warfare when confronted with the horror of 
the battlefield, even when trained’; this he maintains is ‘the case for the use of ethical 
autonomy in unmanned systems’222. One advantage, Arkin sees, of having autonomous 
systems working as part of a soldier-robot team is the potential ability of the robot to monitor 
ethical behaviour on the battlefield, might lead to a reduction in ethical infractions223.  
Throughout history, soldiers have committed acts of savagery and barbarism. Bourke 
states that in the Second World War ‘servicemen of all ranks were unperturbed by most…acts 
of lawless killing’224. In his book On Killing, Grossman describes ‘the dark power of 
atrocity’225. Viewed from one perspective, the findings from the report from the US Surgeon 
General’s Office (2006) may be presented as Arkin has done. However, as Tonkens observes, 
Arkin’s use of the statistics in the 2006 report is not as overwhelming as he suggests226. 
Using the same set of statistics, Tonkens contends that ‘the great majority of soldiers, despite 
their flaws and limitations, do not intentionally mistreat non-combatants’227. Indeed, there is 
significant evidence that the resistance to kill is so strong that ‘in many circumstances, 
soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it’228. Modern conditioning 
techniques though have made a significant impact on this point229. Sadly, the cases of torture 
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and abuse in Iraq230 reveal that although the majority of US and British soldiers have acted in 
accordance with the very highest of ethical values, some have not231. Nevertheless, Arkin’s 
point that the presence of robots on the battlefield might act as a moral reference point is 
appealing232. This however, is not the central issue; rather, the very idea of using autonomous 
robots capable of killing humans on the battlefield is the main focus of scholarly debate.  
The British robotics expert Noel Sharkey is a prominent opponent of the development 
and use of autonomous weapons233. He acknowledges that there is a desire in the American 
military to use robots as force multipliers on the battlefield with the soldier as the ‘nexus for 
initiating a large-scale robot attack’234. In regard to the concept of in-the-loop, to, on-the-loop 
and out-of-the-loop235 he notes that there is a ‘continuum from totally human operated to 
fully autonomous’236. The fundamental problem, as he sees it, with supervised systems is the 
speed with which decisions will have to be made237. Whereas, with so called intelligent 
systems, he was absolutely convinced that ‘no robot or AI system can determine the 
difference between a combatant and an innocent civilian. No visual or other sensing system is 
up to that challenge’238. He invites his readers to ‘just think of children being forced to carry 
empty rifles or of insurgents burying their dead’239. For Sharkey no AI system is capable of 
having the situational awareness necessary of understanding other people’s intentions and 
their likely behaviour240. Does the US ‘really want to have a robot represent them as a 
strategic corporal?241’         
Anderson and Waxman contend that there is an ‘incremental march toward automated 
technologies’242.  Both they and Singer use the threat of snipers as an example. A number of 
robot makers have already added ‘counter sniper’ capabilities to their machines243. If the 
technical ability exists to identify and engage a sniper that shoots at peacekeepers244, some 
Western populations might not understand why such technology was not used to help avoid 
casualties245. However, this defensive/counter-punch capability is dependent upon ‘the robot 
257 
executing its own programming’246 and raises the question of ‘what constitutes the tipping 
point into’ permissible/impermissible autonomy247. This raises an interesting question. How 
can militaries ‘hope to win hearts and minds by sticking armed robots in the face of an 
occupied population’?248 Will the use of LARs take us further away from ‘the responsibilities 
we owe our fellow human beings’?249    
Ignatieff observes that ‘the tacit contract of combat throughout the ages has always 
assumed a basic equality of moral risk: kill or be killed. Accordingly violence in war avails 
itself of the legitimacy of self-defence. But this contract is void when one side begins killing 
with impunity’250. Soldiers have always lived, as Coker phrases it, ‘in the same community of 
fate’ as their enemies251. It is this willingness to sacrifice, argues van Creveld, that ‘represents 
the single most important factor’ in modern war. ‘War does not begin when some people kill 
others; it starts at the point where they themselves risk being killed in return’252. Kahn 
describes it in this manner, ‘combatants are allowed to injure each other just as long as they 
stand in a relationship of mutual risk’253. It is the willingness to sacrifice life that redeems 
war254, and in this process it reveals a nation’s true values and purposes. It is sacrifice that 
makes war humane255, a human experience. LARs offer a vision of inhumane war regardless 
of how sophisticated they are, because they are not sentient beings with an understanding of 
sacrifice.  
The ultimate purpose of war, as classically defined, is peace256. But what if war 
becomes largely risk-free through the use of robotic weapons?257 While there is little ethical 
merit in refusing to use a weapon simply because one’s enemy does not have access to it258 
war could increasingly resemble little more than an advanced computer game259, in which the 
operator of the LAR engages digital images or pixels on a screen260. The fear inherent in this 
context is that ‘the elimination of icons on a computer screen might make the experience feel 
the same way for otherwise normal troops’261. Physical dislocation might increasingly lead to 
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moral disengagement262. What then of something that resembles a first-person-shooter video 
game, where the individual is under no physical threat of death from any engagement with an 
enemy (despite this the US Government had planned to award UAV pilots with a medal that 
ranked higher than a Bronze Star with valour for their contributions)?263 Aerial and land- 
based robotic weapons systems offer a version of war in which many of its terrible realities 
are greatly reduced (at least for one side), perhaps even making their use increasingly more 
attractive264. However, as Kahn has argued, ‘the pursuit of national interests through military 
means is restrained by the expectation of loss. If that expectation disappears, what are the 
sources of constraint?’265 Rather than the brutal cost of war being the greatest incentive to 
peace, LARs and UAVs perversely not only make war more likely but encourages terrorism 
as the natural response to their use266. ‘Riskless warfare may be a prescription for short-term 
success and long-term disaster’267.   
7.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has placed future battlefield technology within a variety of contexts, for 
example: historically; in terms of current and on-going technological development; legally; 
and ethically, philosophically and practically. The desire to use a technological advantage in 
order to kill one’s enemy, especially at a distance, is very old. In recent history, the example 
par excellence is America. However, American success with its use of advanced technology 
against its enemies has been mixed at best. In Vietnam the ideological premise underpinning 
‘techno war’ was essentially flawed, leading to a failed tactical use of its undoubted 
technological superiority. The two Gulf Wars in contrast offered, at least initially, an 
impressive example of just what could be achieved when an enemy failed to take measures to 
counteract the reality of overwhelming technological superiority. It is highly unlikely that 
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future enemies will make the same mistakes Iraqi forces made when faced with such ‘techno 
war’.  
Section 7.3 briefly considered examples of future battlefield technology and noted the
increasing drive towards semi and fully automated support and weapons systems. The land 
warrior integrated fighting system, envisages the individual soldier as part of an enhanced, 
computer integrated, tactical weapons system. The GI of the twenty-first century is portrayed 
as a systems operator, controlling his/her semi or autonomous systems across the range of 
combat and combat support functions.  The implications of this will be explored in chapter 8. 
The ability of man to keep pace and master this technology is a pressing issue for many 
commentators. Humanity may well be natural born cyborgs as Clarke maintains. However, 
the sheer speed of technological change and the manner in which it may affect our sense of 
our identity is cause for concern. Greenfield’s picture of a ‘Nobody’ people, living in an 
atomised cyber-world of a perpetual now, potentially deficient in their capacity to empathise 
with others and devoid of personal identity, is truly frightening.  
The vision of a risk free ability to conduct military operations is fraught with legal,
practical, ethical and philosophical problems. The use of UAVs to kill one’s enemies on and 
off the battlefield is hugely contentious. It is only the opening acts of what may well become 
the increasing drama concerning use of lethal semi- and fully autonomous weapons systems, 
where the soldier functions as a technician dislocated from the immediacy of the battlefield. 
While some may imagine robotic weapons systems that come straight out of a Hollywood 
film, in reality the march towards the use of LARs is likely to be incremental. For example 
the merging of two or several existing components to produce a new capability is not 
necessarily problematic, especially if those components already comply with existing 
weapons law. However, in the case of robotic weapons systems, the question of where the 
permissible tipping point is between meaningful human control and allowing machines to 
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make their own tactical decisions, will become even more complex in this incremental march. 
Although the use of various forms of robotic machines became common in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the concept of human-robot combat teams as an increasing standard operating 
procedure is, as far as this author is concerned, inevitable. Future combat teams will comprise 
soldiers who accompany robotic platforms on tactical missions, while a larger group of 
operators will monitor/command and supervise, the robotic machines deployed on the 
ground.  
The ethical implications of this approach to future combat are profound. Even if Arkin 
is correct and an advanced ethical programme can be developed for robotic systems, 
operational success is not merely a matter of either killing your enemy in greater numbers or 
of stopping your enemy from killing you. War among the people imagines a battle of 
narratives as much as actual kinetic battles. America, it could be argued, was not defeated 
militarily in Vietnam. That however, was utterly irrelevant to the overall outcome of the war. 
If peace is the ultimate outcome of war (otherwise it is morally questionable), willingness to 
sacrifice and suffer loss is likely to continue to be as important in the future as it has been in 
the past. Peace must be established between people, and until robots are considered to have 
rights equivalent to those of humans, it cannot be between people and robots. What chance of 
peace if one side uses robotic weapons systems to enforce their will while simultaneously 
placing their own humanity in question?              
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Chapter 8 
Analysis and Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
As articulated in chapter 1 and re-emphasised throughout, this thesis is an 
examination of the suggestion that a spectrum or continuum of meaning exists upon which 
the words ‘warrior’ and ‘weapons platform/battlefield technician’ maybe located. The idea of 
a spectrum with Achilles and the soldier as a battlefield technician/weapons platform at 
extreme ends of the imagined spectrum, establishes the space within which the generic 
British soldier in the 21st Century may reside in the social imaginary of the UK public. The 
focus throughout the thesis has been on the generic British soldier as imagined in the public 
sphere in twenty-first-century Britain and not upon what a warrior is or whether or not there 
has been some evolutionary journey from an Achilles warrior figure to a man/machine nexus. 
Consequently, the research question addressed in this thesis has been:   
If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us 
about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary 
British  society?
Located within a philosophical setting and indebted to Charles Taylor’s modern social 
imaginaries, a number of sub-questions were derived which functioned as the mechanism 
used to explore the thesis question in the six research chapters. They were: 
• How is identity constructed in contemporary Western society?
• Does narrative shape concepts of identity?
• Is the difference between warrior and battlefield technician the difference between
‘being’ and ‘doing’?
• If the concept of the soldier as weapons platform/battlefield technician represents an
instrumental notion of ontology (i.e. a unit of utility), does a focus on ‘doing’ 
potentially undermine ‘being’ and therefore the sustainment of fighting power?
• What societal factors shape where the generic British soldier might be imagined on
the spectrum?
• Has war, or is war, changing and what impact does this have on the future nature of
conflict and does this in turn impact on what is expected of the generic British 
soldier?
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• How does the development of robotic technology impact upon what is expected of
the generic British soldier?
The research chapters may be envisaged pictorially like this when placed on a spectrum of 
meaning: 
Figure 11 offers a suggestion of how they might exist on the continuum of meaning 
for illustrative purposes only. One advantage with this diagram is that it visually highlights 
that most of the subjects examined in this thesis reside on some form of imagined sliding 
scale. For example, the difference between ‘risk acceptance and risk aversion’ is a concept 
that the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ will intuitively grasp. ‘He’ will readily grasp the 
possibilities of the two potential extremes and is likely to appreciate that when one moves the 
two extremes in sync towards the centre, a point will be reached where definition becomes 
difficult. In a similar fashion our ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ will also intuitively grasp 
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Fig 11 
  
the concept that an Achilles figure (involved in hand-to-hand combat) may be imagined 
residing at an extreme, whereas a soldier operating a robotic platform (remotely, miles from 
the battlefield) resides at another.   
There are, of course, a number of obvious drawbacks with such a pictorial approach. 
Firstly, it presumes that the inter-relation exists in a nicely structured and orderly manner. 
This is clearly not the case as subjects like identity are inherently complex and fluid. 
Secondly, it presents each of the subject areas neatly going in the same direction. While it is 
possible that some might be imagined as residing in a similar direction as others, social and 
political life is undoubtedly much more complex. Thirdly, it is clearly a two dimensional 
chart. While acknowledging these legitimate observations, figure 10 nevertheless offers a 
visual aid to assist the reader to imagine at least one possible manner in which these subjects 
might exist on a spectrum or continuum of meaning.  
Figure 12 offers a more complex but 3 dimensional visual suggestion:  
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Fig 12 
Figure 12 invites the reader to imagine the various subjects discussed in this thesis residing in 
a three dimensional setting. The complexity of the image illustrates, in a helpful manner, the 
multifaceted nature of various concepts co-existing as ideas in any construct of the public 
sphere. Any modern Western social imaginary, where societal existence is imagined, will be 
hugely complex. However, there is an important drawback to this approach. It presupposes 
that the realm, in which the generic British soldier resides in the twenty-first century, is 
singular. In chapter 4 the concept of sub-universes of reality or modes of being was 
discussed. In a postmodern world of multiverses, such a singular approach is clearly 
inadequate. While this objection has utility, nevertheless figure 12 offers at least one 
possibility of how some of the issues might exist in a multi-dimensional world of interacting 
and connecting thought and ideas.   
This is the nature of the theoretical, philosophical framework this thesis envisages. It
is not the systematic analysis or examination of an existing theory. Rather it is a construct 
within which different subjects have been considered with the purpose of enhancing our 
understanding of how any interaction between the subjects selected assist in comprehending 
the effect that collaboration might have on the research question.  As humans we live an 
interpreted life in which the narratives we create enable us to make sense of the world around 
us as we construct, invest and give meaning to our lives. The British soldier exists within a 
lived setting, shaped and moulded by a multitude of social, cultural, political, religious, 
philosophical, historic, economic and technological theories, ideas, or constructs. The nature 
of the generic soldier in the twenty-first century emerges from the crucible of this community 
of themes and is continually shaped and moulded by that interaction.  
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8.2 Using the Philosophical Framework 
One way of imagining how this framework might be used is to imagine a bespoke, if 
fictional, 3D graphic equaliser (for illustrative purposes only see figure 13). 
In their simplest forms, stereo equalisers are a mechanism for the user to set the balance they 
require between simple bass and treble components of a music track. Most car stereo systems 
have them. Equalisers used by professional musicians, in contrast, are significantly more 
complex. A graphic equaliser offers the user the advantage of seeing a visual representation 
of the subtle changes made in the frequency response of the audio system. With most home 
recording studio software, the user has the option of a number or pre-set functions that can 
then be individually tailored by the user to achieve the exact tone he/she is seeking (for 
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example, small, medium, large concert hall or church or music hall). When using a graphic 
equaliser, the user can visually see the changes taking place.  
The limitations of this approach are clearly obvious and are similar to those raised for
figures 11 and 12. Although this thesis has maintained that there is a link between the 
narrative used to explain/justify an operation involving British troops and how UK society 
responds in relation to the validity of that narrative, the reader should exercise caution in 
imagining (using the analogy of the graphic equaliser) that setting a societal tone or response 
to an armed intervention is akin to an invisible hand sliding various controls along 
predetermined paths. Public opinion may be affected by a variety of sources, and is a 
powerful motivator for politicians directly effecting how issues (for example, large numbers 
of casualties) are interpreted. As noted earlier in this chapter, a postmodern society is 
complex and multivariate. The manner of any interaction between the subjects discussed in 
this thesis and an armed intervention will reflect the complexity of UK society. Nevertheless, 
as an intellectual device to envisage how the various topics discussed in this thesis might 
interact, this image of a graphic equaliser might offer a useful imaginative model.     
Each of the sections and sub-sections in the thesis can be visualised as representing a
single slide control with the position of each control making a direct contribution to the 
overall ability to create the required conditions in which an interventionist operation can be 
conducted and sustained. For example, if a situation arises in which there is an existential 
threat to UK security, (like that posed by Nazi Germany in the 1930s), it is probable that the 
narrative setting in this context will be apocalyptic and therefore override or dominate other 
factors such as risk aversion. In such a context, the British soldier will be expected to fight 
and sustain casualties in defence of her/his home, family and way of life. In other words, if 
the narrative setting is apocalyptic, the settings on the remainder of the graphic equaliser are 
largely irrelevant so long as the threat to the British way of life retains that characteristic. 
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Thankfully, the government’s assessment is that the UK does not face such a threat. 
However, as the NSS indicated, the UK does face a number of serious threats, for example 
from international terrorism (including terrorism within Northern Ireland), insurgency and 
civil wars that might affect our strategic interests. The question of whether or not these 
threats will warrant a military intervention is much less clear-cut.  
To facilitate further analysis, while incorporating the imagery of the graphic equaliser,
the various chapters and their sections will be reduced to six propositions drawn from the 
content and conclusions of each chapter. This will provide a more succinct summary of the 
main arguments of the thesis.       
8.3 Six Propositions  
1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society 
with whom he/she is in relationship with. The identity of the soldier does not 
necessarily require a narrative of war.  
2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language 
of ‘being’ and ‘doing’. For the warrior their ‘being’ is intuited in combat; whereas the 
soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output.  
3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative 
deflation in the soldier’s daily experience in non-Western operational settings. 
4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a non- 
apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers. 
5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting 
will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies. 
6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to 
the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.       
8.4 Analysis 
Proposition 1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated 
by the society with whom he/she is in relationship with. The identity of the soldier 
does not necessarily require a narrative of war.  
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Adaptive, intelligent and determined adversaries will seek to either mitigate or nullify 
the technological advantage of an opponent. In Afghanistan NATO has a huge technical 
advantage over the Taliban. However, while ISAF soldiers have access to some of the most 
sophisticated weapons currently available in support of operations, the character of the 
environment is such that the fighting frequently resembles a low-tech, if high-intensity, 
conflict. The casualty rate during 2010-2011 for British soldiers was, in ratio terms, the 
highest since the Korean War. It is likely that this pattern of warfare will continue whenever 
Western militaries are tasked with confronting non-state actors drawn from a wide diaspora, 
particularly if any deployment is in a non-Western context. The operating environment will 
be (particularly if urban) congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained and in a 
globalised media centric age, tactical engagements may resemble strategic indicators. 
Conflict in this setting will likely be violent, bloody, and messy with large numbers of 
casualties both civilian and military. In ‘war among the people’ fighting is frequently at close 
quarters, with the engagement range between adversaries measured in metres rather 
kilometres. In this context, the generic British soldier needs to reside in the UK social 
imaginary towards the Achilles end of the spectrum than that represented by battlefield 
technician.     
In a military intervention of choice (for example, not involving national survival but
nevertheless requiring British soldiers to become involved in combat operations) the narrative 
required to justify and sustain such an operation would be located away from low mimesis 
and towards the apocalyptic end of the spectrum of figure 10. Although the UK is not yet 
casualty phobic, there has been an increasing trend to see soldiers killed on operations in 
Afghanistan as victims rather than agents or subjects of their own destiny. The paradoxical 
juxtaposition of the modern, volunteer soldier being seen as both hero and victim, if killed in 
the context of his/her profession of arms, will systematically erode the validity of the 
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narrative underpinning the military intervention. Such erosion will also have a direct impact 
upon the social dialogue in the public sphere that enables socially constructed identities to be 
internalised legitimately. The increasing public perception of the victimhood of fallen British 
soldiers and the interpretation of the soldier’s death as a form of scandal, acts as a powerful 
counterbalance to the creation and sustainment of a narrative of war(fare) that validates the 
identity of the generic soldier as a warrior in British society.  
In contrast, peacekeeping operations that carry a significantly lower risk of death and
injury (UK peacekeeping operations, such as in Cyprus) require a narrative closer to the low 
mimesis end of the spectrum. In this scenario, the professional soldier is a force for good, 
operating in a relatively benign environment. In this context he is neither hero nor victim. 
Rather, as a professional he is simply discharging his duties as laid down in his/her standard 
operating procedures.   
Proposition 2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in 
the language of ‘being’ and ‘doing’. For the warrior their ‘being’ is intuited in 
combat; whereas the soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected 
output. 
In the case of peacekeeping operations or those in support of civil authorities (for 
example, Op OLYMPICS, where the Army supplied thousands of troops or in the case of a 
civil emergency, such as major flooding) the role of the soldier is defined, very appropriately, 
by what they do and the tasks they perform. This of course would change in the case of a 
national emergency in which the security of the UK was under direct threat from an external 
(or as with Northern Ireland, an internal) enemy. In this case, as noted earlier, the soldier 
would be expected to fight. For the warrior, it is the actuality of fighting, and risk to life and 
limb, from which they intuit their ‘being’ in the experience of combat. It involves the 
deliberate taking of human life, not merely as a consequence of following a series of set 
procedures that culminate in life being lost but as a direct and deliberate act of will on the 
part of the warrior. Extrinsic conditioning has improved the soldier’s performance in direct 
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contact with an adversary. However, with the warrior it is the intrinsic motivation to 
authenticity that motivates him/her to actively fight, undoubtedly drawing from their extrinsic 
training and skillset.  
If soldiers are defined by what they do, the question may be raised concerning the 
validity of using British soldiers in combat operations in a non-Western setting, effectively 
intervening in ‘someone else’s war’. Any narrative constructed to justify this ‘use’ of British 
soldiers, in such a setting, would be subjected to severe criticism (genre wars) specifically on 
the issue of whether it was a legitimate use of soldiers. The recent experience in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan will only accentuate any debate. This goes to the heart of the issue of identity 
and how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British 
society. If the public view his/her nature as being towards the Achilles end of the spectrum, 
there will be an acceptance that it is entirely appropriate for the generic British soldier to be 
deployed in potential combat roles in a non-Western setting. If on the other hand, the British 
Army is thought of as being a fourth emergency service (alongside the Police, Fire Brigade 
and the Ambulance Service) then the use of the soldier in interventionist combat roles will be 
more difficult to sustain. Someone may then ask, ‘can the generic soldier not do both 
roles’  (combat and civil emergencies)? The answer is that s/he has combined both roles in 
the past; Bosnia and Kosovo are two examples. In a ‘three-block war’ the soldier may be 
required to move seamlessly between roles. However, in order to perform the role of 
‘sandbag filler’, or ‘petrol tanker driver’ or ‘fire fighter’ and combat soldier fighting 
insurgents, the identity of the warrior/soldier must be sociologically available, validated and 
sustainable in that society, both during and after that intervention.        
Proposition 3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer
narrative deflation in the soldier’s daily experience in non-Western operational 
settings.
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Total war is the logical conclusion of trinitarian war. The instrumentalised character 
of Clausewitzian war was graphically manifested in the First and Second World Wars. Wars 
of national survival, or that are perceived as having that apocalyptic nature, will enviably 
necessitate every element of that nation/society contributing to the survival of the whole. 
Consequently, those American soldiers who fought and died in their thousands on the island 
of Iwo Jima or British soldiers who fought and died in their thousands in the battles of North 
Africa did so in the belief that although far away from their native land, they were defending 
their nation and fighting for the survival of their way of life. In this context the only real 
calculation is twofold: 1, fight to defend one’s national way of life; 2, accept the imposition 
of an alternative, alien, definition of what that way of life should look like or be expressed. In 
contrast, interventions of choice are not premised on an existential threat to UK security. UK 
participation in military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Libya are recent 
examples of missions that posed no existential threat to UK security. New wars are another.  
The narrative that British soldiers are in Afghanistan to help establish the conditions
in which a Western sponsored, Afghan specific, political construct will not only be successful 
but help keep Islamist terrorism off British streets has been subjected to much debate. The 
lived experience of the soldier in Helmand province in Afghanistan, working from his 
Forward Operating Base (FOB), Patrol Base (PB) or Check Point (CP) brings him/her into 
daily contact with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations 
in light of the geopolitical goals of his/her government. As British combat operations near 
their conclusion in 2014, Helmand still resembles a feudal, tribally based society, with little 
evidence of modern Western political systems/constructs. Like the British soldiers who 
fought in North Africa during World War Two, the modern soldier has fought vicious battles 
thousands of miles away from his native country that have been bloody and costly. However, 
unlike World War Two the intervention in Afghanistan was not a war of national survival. In 
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2009 the FLET1 for many FOBs, PBs and CPs was only 400 metres from the base. The daily 
attrition of sniper attacks, IEDs, ambushes, challenged the narrative that a Western sponsored 
political solution was possible in an ancient land with no experience of Western politics and 
where many locals had never ventured further than the next valley.  
Proposition 4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate
a non-apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers.
In the later part of the twentieth century much of Europe turned its back on war and 
culturally rejected it. Not only has post-modern philosophical thought had a profound impact 
upon most, if not all, Western societies, many are marked by a growing risk aversion and 
may be described as displaying post-heroic traits, especially with regard to casualty rates. In 
the context of military interventions involving post-heroic societies, the public tend to desert 
first and then insist that forces are pulled out as a consequence. In terms of the framework 
envisaged in figures 10 and 11, the societal factors alluded to in proposition 4 are located 
firmly towards the battlefield technician end of the spectrum. If these factors were either 
imagined as a single or as several control slides in figure 12 (graphic equaliser) the specific 
societal settings (for example the weight given by a specific nation to each factor) will be 
determinative in establishing the extent of any narrative authorising military intervention. 
Therefore, if the narrative genre is less than apocalyptic, proposition 4 will govern the nature 
of a society’s participation (reflected in national caveats) and will be directly related to the 
number and types of casualties that a post-heroic society is prepared to tolerate. 
Politicians in Western democracies are extremely sensitive to military casualties
resulting from interventions of choice and that are not directly related to national survival. 
Although the UK is not casualty phobic, the societal factors in proposition 4 will nevertheless 
be a significant contributor in establishing (using the imagery of figure 12) the threshold 
beyond which the narrative used to justify military intervention will suffer significant 
deflation. This will become more prominent if the modern focus upon the fallen soldier as a 
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husband, father, son, and brother, for whom the public becomes imaginary family members, 
continues after Afghanistan in any future interventions. Some recent documentaries2 have 
focused upon the human element of the soldier’s experience and the subsequent impact that 
has had upon the family of the soldier. Often this is juxtaposed with the attitude of the MOD. 
By focusing upon individual stories, the viewer is implicitly invited to identify what the 
impact would be upon their own family. One consequence of this is to bring the validity of 
the intervention under the spotlight of public opinion in a distinctly individual and human 
manner. For example, is intervention in X worth the lives of Y British soldiers? In the 
Kosovo air campaign, the suspicion was that a mission was not worth the life of a single 
NATO pilot. 
Proposition5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive
operational setting will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies.
Many Western societies espouse liberal values such as those enshrined in the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and The Fourth Geneva Convention (4CIV). 
Adopted in 1949, 4CIV was largely borne out of a desire to define humanitarian protections 
for civilians in time of war and to outlaw the practice of total war. Modern International Law 
is derived from and has built upon its principles. Although 194 countries are signatories to 
4CIV, the later part of the twentieth and early part of the twenty-first centuries have been 
marked by vicious conflicts and civil wars in various parts of the world. Sadly, inter-racial 
conflicts (such as witnessed in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) have been a 
consistent blight upon modern human history. The conflict in Syria is the latest example of a 
civil war exacting a horrific price on its civilian population, including the accusation that 
chemical weapons have been used. Not unlike the situation concerning the inter-ethnic 
warfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, the question of military 
intervention by Western powers was once again a pressing political topic in 2013.  
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The issue is not whether Western states, particularly European states, are serious 
about the liberal values they espouse (for example, ECHR and 4CIV). Rather proposition 5 
asks a question concerning whether or not the depth of those values is sufficient to justify and 
validate a military intervention in a non-Western and possibly non-permissive operational 
environment in support of the liberal values they advocate. In essence it asks the question, 
‘what price is a liberal society prepared to pay, to protect the basic human rights of civilians 
who are not part of that society but who are nevertheless caught up in horrific warfare?’ To 
use the analogy of the graphic equaliser (figure 12) the control slide that might represent 
liberal values may actually have little impact even if it is placed at its maximum setting. 
Other societal factors (other control slides) such as casualty tolerance, risk aversion, and a 
post-heroic society, may simply nullify it, rendering it practically ineffective. Although 
convinced of the importance of the truth of their liberal values, many within the West are 
extremely reluctant in committing troops in support of those values.   
Proposition 6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in
contradiction to the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its 
liberal values.
UAVs along with other robotic weapons platforms, provides those Western states who 
have invested in this technology with a capability of a precision military strike with no risk to 
the human operator. It also affords Western states the option of a limited form of military 
intervention, while avoiding the difficulty of casualties to those involved in controlling the 
remote platform. Not only is it a pragmatic approach to advanced technology but it is a 
logical development of an instrumentalised form of war(fare). It is, however, the antithesis of 
the concept of the warrior. If proposition 5 questions the depth of the West’s liberal values, 
the increasing use of stand-off robotic weaponry confirms that sacrifice in pursuit of those 
values is an increasingly difficult concept to justify in risk averse, post-heroic societies. The 
acceptance of risk, and preparedness to share in the community of fate historically accepted 
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by combatants on the battlefield and the willingness to pay the price required in defence of 
those values a society holds as inviolable, are principles that have always been understood 
and accepted as elemental parts of war. This raises an interesting juxtaposition: those who 
espouse the highest of values are frequently reluctant, even unprepared, to use military force 
in defence of them, while those whose values are less noble are willing to fight to maintain 
that which in the West might be considered ignoble (for example, the systematic slaughter of 
800,000 Tutsis by the Hutus). This is one example of the ‘say – do’ gap. Those who espouse 
liberal values failed to intervene in a meaningful manner that might have prevented this 
genocide.     
The military intervention by UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan combined with
intense fighting in both operations, particularly in Helmand, has demonstrated that the 
generic British soldier has been able when required to function at the interphase between the 
warrior and the soldier. There have been many thousands of times in Afghanistan 
(particularly HERRICK 10-12) when the soldier (to use figure 11) was clearly within the area 
‘close quarter combat’, ‘major risk’ and ‘warrior’ and far removed from the battlefield 
technician. One question however, that this analysis poses, drawn from all six propositions, is 
whether or not UK society is prepared to continue to accept the generic British soldier 
residing in an area that is ideally suited to war among the people.  
Despite the lack of a major state or existential threat to UK security, the British Army 
still possess, even after SDSR and Army 2020, a formidable capability to intervene militarily 
virtually anywhere in the world. It has the ability to deploy an armoured division, augmented 
with sea and air components, as part of an international alliance. The rapid development of 
robotic weapons platforms, however, could potentially offer a substantially modified version 
of this scenario. It is an interesting thought experiment to ponder how British society would 
respond to the following offers: 1, the option of placing British soldiers deliberately in harm’s 
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way to uphold UK/Western values; or 2, of using robotic weapons in pursuit of UK national 
strategic aims. Though pragmatic, the development and use of robotic weapons platforms 
may also be seen as a confession that the concept of sacrifice in defence of one’s values/
principles is increasingly unsustainable in many Western societies.       
8.5 Concluding Comments    
Every generation is shaped and moulded by its experiences and the stories created to 
make sense of that experience. The attacks on 9/11 created the circumstances in which an 
apocalyptic style of narrative emerged that for a period of time altered the manner in which 
the various factors discussed in this thesis interacted. For much of the 1990s the UK had been 
in the forefront of military interventions of choice. In contrast, soldiers who served in the 
British Army during the period 1970-1989 are readily identifiable by the limited number of 
operational medals on display at a Remembrance Service. Whereas, soldiers serving from 
1990 onwards have significantly more operational service medals and it is not unusual to see 
SNCOs/Warrant Officers/Officers with 5-12 medals. Although most of the military 
interventions involving UK forces involved some combat, it was limited and resulted in 
minimum casualties. The recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have altered this context. 
In contrast with the UN missions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO missions 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, the British soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan has been involved in 
sustained and intense combat operations with a determined and adaptive adversary resulting 
in casualty numbers that frankly eclipse those from all the other recent intervention 
operations combined. This is the context for this generation; it is from this cultural milieu that 
the dominant societal narrative(s) will emerge; not only will UK society create the stories that 
help to make sense of it, these stories will directly shape the identity available to the generic 
British soldier.  
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The concept of a spectrum of meaning, upon which the generic British soldier exists 
in the UK social imaginary, is a useful framework by which to examine how the nature of the 
British soldier is imagined. In the case of a threat to national survival, the issues are rather 
straightforward. When the situation is less than apocalyptic in narrative terms, the discussion 
in the public sphere will become much more contested and complex. Future military 
interventions in a non-Western operational setting will inevitably be interpreted by UK 
society in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan. Social commentators will ask the public 
whether or not any proposed intervention is not only legally and morally justified but worth 
the potential loss of life and life changing injuries that such interventions of choice entail. 
This societal dialogue will bring the identity of the British soldier into focus. The closer that 
imagined identity is towards the end of the spectrum typified by Achilles, the more likely UK 
society, or at least a majority, will accept the British soldier being deployed in a combat role 
in war among the people in defence of liberal values. The development of robotic weapons 
platforms, however, offers many Western countries another option. Stand-off weapons 
provide the possibility of a limited military involvement, at little cost to the nation employing 
this technology. Valuing sacrifice and accepting sacrifice are not necessarily the same things. 
A nation may remember its fallen war dead with grateful thanks, while simultaneously 
rejecting the concept that such a sacrifice is either a current requirement or tolerable. Remote 
controlled weapons platforms, at least initially, offer a form of risk-free war. It is likely that 
the only context, in which valuing and accepting sacrifice is considered acceptable, will be an 
apocalyptic narrative of national survival. If UK society cannot continue to embrace the 
organic link between preparedness to accept sacrifice in defence of its values and principles, 
it is possible that it may be more willing to view the generic British soldier as closer towards 
the weapons platform/battlefield technician end of the spectrum.          
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It is entirely possible that the MOD is unaware that the control slides this chapter has 
postulated exists or that the central thrust of this thesis is a practical reality that should be 
addressed or at the very least understood. Policy makers might sleepwalk into a context 
where they ask or expect soldiers to move seamlessly from sandbag filling to combat 
operations in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either unable 
or unwilling to perform that role. It is, it seems to this author, a reasonable and practical 
question to ask where on the imagined spectrum the generic British soldier resides. Once this 
question is addressed a force field analysis, a concept applied in every change management 
programme in the Army, could be developed to help understand how the interaction of the 
various issues examined in this thesis will tie any decision to deploy the Army into public 
discourse on any deployment. One possible force field analysis, extrapolated from the charts 
in chapter 8, might look like this: 
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Fig 14 
Once the nature of the generic British soldier has been placed on the spectrum imagined in 
this thesis, the force field analysis suggested in figure 14 could offer a basis upon which to 
evaluate the cultural, practical, philosophical and intellectual pressures affecting how the 
British soldier is envisaged in the UK social imaginary. This in turn would provide policy 
makers with a functional framework to understand those roles British society is prepared to 
tolerate and validate when deploying and utilising the generic soldier. This thesis has 
articulated the issues involved in locating where on the spectrum the generic soldier may be 
imagined, whereas figure 14 offers a construct for anyone wishing to take the work forward 
by offering an imaginative framework of the opposing forces involved in seeking to 
reposition the soldier in public discourse.     
1 Forward line of enemy troops. 
2 For example, the BBC Panorama Special 15 July 2013 ‘Broken by Battle’.  
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Annex 1 
Being in Existentialist Thinking 
Being-in-itself. Being as it is in itself, without reference to, or dependent upon, anything else. 
According to Sartre, ‘for the being of an existent is exactly what it appears’1, ‘being is the 
ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere’2. Sartre sums up 
his thoughts on this in this manner by simply stating, ‘Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is 
what it is’3.  
Being-in-situation. This is the premise that as humans we exist in-situation. Flynn explains 
that, ‘not only does this mean that we are not disembodied spirits floating above the material 
universe… to exist in situation underscores that we are an integral part of the universe and the 
cultural world that envelops it. Less than angels, we are more than machines’4. Sartre 
maintained that this involved two elements, firstly our ‘facticity’, that is things like our race, 
nationality, talents, limitations and the others with whom we have dealings with5. The second 
element is ‘the process of transcendence’6. Sartre argues, that ‘the for-itself can not appear 
without being haunted by value and projected towards its own possibilities’7. In other words, 
individuals can always go beyond their present facticity; they can become.      Being-in-the-
world. This refers to our consciousness of being-in-the-world, or as Husserl referred to it 
as ‘inhabiting the life-world’8. In Being and Time Heidegger explores the way Dasein 
relates to other entities9. He argues that, ‘there is no such thing as the “side-by-side- ness” 
of an entity called “Dasein” with another entity called “world”’10. Cartesian 
metaphysics, which underpins all scientific investigation, posits the central idea that we are a 
detached observer from that which is observed11. What Heidegger is essentially arguing is 
that we are not detached observers but immersed within the world in which we live.     Being-
for-others. This refers to our relatedness and interaction with others and is often linked with 
two other existentialist themes, ‘bad faith’ and ‘inauthentic’. It also involves how others 
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affect the way we feel (feelings of shame, pride, etc.). In Being and Nothingness12, Sartre 
uses illustrations of how some construct themselves around the expectation of others. One is 
of a woman who agrees to go out with a particular man, but tries to hide from the reality of 
the situation, especially as the night continues. The second is of the waiter, playing the part of 
the waiter for others. For Sartre, he may look like a waiter, behave like a waiter but he is not 
a waiter,  
It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. 
But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a 
“representation” for others and for myself, which means that I can only be in 
representation. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him 
as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from 
him.13  
In effect, what Sartre is saying is that when a person plays at being something, they are 
‘being-for-others’ rather than for themselves.   
Being-for-itself. Sartre’s definition of this sounds somewhat paradoxical. He reasons, ‘yet the 
for-itself is. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is and which is what it 
is not’14. He appears to be arguing that there is a sense in which ‘being-for-itself’ is, although 
he makes no attempt to define where, or in what kind of state it indeed is or could be. To put 
it crudely, there is a sense in which my Dasein is for-itself, realised and complete. In this 
Sartre comes suspiciously close to Plato’s idea of forms existing in perfection outside our 
realm of imperfection. However, this is not what my Dasein is and what it could be is not yet 
realised. It is very similar to the point made by Kierkegaard ‘awake, the difference between 
myself and my other is posited’15. Awake Dasein is intuitively aware of what it is and may 
become, however, the present reality for the existentialist is one of not yet. However, being- 
for-itself contains within it the desire to make choices that will enable it to achieve its 
ultimate goal of completeness.      
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1 JP Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans HE Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957) pxlv. 
2 Ibid., plxiii. 
3 Ibid., plxvi. 
4 TR Flynn, Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p 65.  
5 Ibid., p66. Sartre’s description of ‘The Facticity of the For-Itself’ is found in Being and Nothingness p79-84. 
On page 83 he states, ‘this perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself which, without ever allowing 
itself to be apprehended, haunts the for-itself and reattaches it to being-in-itself – this contingency is what we 
call the facticity of the for-itself’.  
6 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p95 ‘The For-Itself and the Being of Possibilities’ p95-102. However, for his 
detailed treatment on this see chapter 3 ‘Transcendence’ p171-218. 
7 Ibid., p96. 
8 D Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) p182.   
9 M Heidegger, Being and Time, trans J Macquarrie and E Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) Part One, 
chapter 2 ‘Being-In-The-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein’ p78-86. 
10 Ibid., p81. 
11 See J Reynolds, Existentialism (Chesham: Acumen, 2006) p25.  
12 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Part One, chapter 2, ‘Bad Faith’ p46-67.    
13 Ibid., p60.  
14 Ibid., p79. 
15 As cited in S Earnshaw, Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2006) p15.   
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